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1
Introduction: “Within unrest, 
there is always a question”
Eva Badowska and Francesca Parmeggiani
Krzysztof Kieślowski’s Dekalog (The Decalogue, 1989), which the fi lm critic 
Robert Fulford has called “the best dramatic work ever done specifi cally 
for television,”1 had arguably humble beginnings. The director recalls a 
chance meeting in the streets of Warsaw in the early 1980s with an attor-
ney friend, Krzysztof Piesiewicz: “I bumped into him. It was cold. It was 
raining. I’d lost one of my gloves. ‘Someone should make a fi lm about the 
Ten Commandments,’ Piesiewicz said to me. ‘You should do it.’ ”2 In a later 
documentary, the director adds, “I thought [Piesiewicz] had gone mad.”3 
The idea continued to percolate, gradually developing into a project con-
sisting of “ten propositions, ten one-hour fi lms,” a solution conceptually 
closest to the “ten words” of the Commandments (KK, 143). But Kieślowski 
was not yet thinking about directing The Decalogue himself, reasoning that 
it would make a great debut project for ten up-and-coming young direc-
tors: “For a long time in Poland television has become the natural home for 
directorial débuts.” In fact, the project seemed, at the time, tailor-made for 
television production, since the state television network “wasn’t interested 
in one-off fi lms. It wanted serials and, if pushed, agreed to cycles.” As the 
project developed, Kieślowski became invested in it, and, in the end, “re-
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alized rather selfi shly” that he wanted to direct it himself (KK, 144). The 
notion of representing ten different perspectives survived in the fi nished 
work only in that “each of the ten fi lms was made by a different lighting 
cameraman” (KK, 156).4
The form that The Decalogue eventually took is variously described as a 
serial, a series, or a cycle, but Kieślowski preferred to think of it as a cycle, 
emphasizing the discontinuity among the episodes. Unlike in a typical tele-
vision series, characters do not regularly reappear, and there is no progres-
sion of narrative from week to week.5 Like a literary, musical, or pictorial 
cycle (the Arthurian cycle, for instance, or Richard Wagner’s four-opera 
Ring Cycle, or Giotto’s frescoes in the Scrovegni Chapel in Padua, Italy), 
The Decalogue is composed of ten freestanding but interrelated parts that 
focus on a central concept. The cycle raises, in a unique visual language, 
the enduring questions of ethics and the law, questions that are instanti-
ated but not resolved by the Ten Commandments. While individual epi-
sodes do, in fact, respond closely to specifi c ethical imperatives, the overall 
relationship between The Decalogue and the Ten Commandments is a “ten-
tative one.”6 Correspondences between commandments and episodes are 
uncertain and provisional and surely never one-to-one: For instance, both 
Six and Nine deal with adultery; Five does not have the monopoly on the 
question of “killing,” as related questions come up in One, Two, and Eight. 
Conversely, too, all episodes could be said to comment on the fi rst (or 
second, depending on the religious tradition) commandment, as characters 
struggle to articulate meaning in the apparent absence of any certainty that 
there are “no other gods” (Exod. 20:3 RSV). Or, if we are reminded of the 
love precept in the New Testament, “This I command you, to love one an-
other” ( John 15:17 RSV), the series transcends the Ten Commandments 
altogether, for all characters experience love or its absence.7 The episodes 
of The Decalogue are thoroughly interconnected, as are the Ten Command-
ments (and the New Testament addition) to which they refer.
Earlier critics of the fi lm series paid great attention to identifying spe-
cifi c correspondences between individual episodes and applicable com-
mandments. Those who, like Joseph G. Kickasola, acknowledge the Polish 
Catholic context out of which the fi lms emerged discern compelling con-
nections between the layout of the episodes and the traditional Catholic 
catechetical formula of the Ten Commandments.8 On the other end of the 
spectrum, Slavoj Ž iž ek, writes in a typically contrarian fashion that the 
“majority of interpreters take refuge in the alleged ambiguity of this rela-
tionship. . . . Against this easy way out, one should emphasize the strict cor-
relation between the episodes and the Commandments: each installment 
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refers to only one Commandment, but with a ‘shift of gear’: Decalogue 1 
refers to the second Commandment, etc., until, fi nally, Decalogue 10 brings 
us back to the fi rst Commandment.”9
The present collection, however, is based on the assumption that the se-
ries loosely follows the traditional catechetical formula (see Joseph W. Ko-
ter ski’s essay in this volume), and that the dominant design of the cycle is 
rooted in this pedagogical simplifi cation of the biblical text. This does not 
preclude other fruitful connections between the fi lms and the Ten Com-
mandments, as long as any desire for an all-encompassing “strict” theory 
à la Ž iž ek is laid to rest. For instance, The Decalogue, when read alongside 
a rabbinical interpretation of the biblical text, reveals meanings that the 
catechetical formula may be said to eclipse (see Moshe Gold’s essay in this 
volume).
Even more striking is the fact that the Ten Commandments were cho-
sen as an inspiration for a fi lm made in Poland in the 1980s by one of 
cinema’s most outspokenly agnostic directors. To audiences familiar with 
Cecil B. DeMille’s 1923 The Ten Commandments (or its 1956 remake), 
Kieślowski’s variation on the same theme may rightly appear to have very 
little to do with the story of Moses or even with its twentieth-century ren-
dition, such as in the second half of the 1923 silent fi lm. Kieślowski has no 
use for either the epic story or its modern didactic application. The Polish 
1980s—after the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981, and be-
fore the Round Table agreements that effectively brought the communist 
era to an end in April 1989—were dark and chaotic: “Tension, a feeling of 
hopelessness, and a fear of yet worse to come were obvious” (KK, 143). It 
is against this background that Kieślowski and Piesiewicz present a series 
of ten fi lms about nothing less epic than “individuals in diffi cult situations” 
(KK, 145). Aiming to pose “essential, fundamental, human and humanistic 
questions” (KK, 144), not the kind bound to politics and place, each epi-
sode of The Decalogue portrays a different protagonist trapped in the midst 
of a complex ethical dilemma that also encompasses the larger sphere of 
the family and the community. These individuals, who are “caught in a 
struggle” and “[go] round and round in circles” (KK, 145), cannot be lifted 
out of their impasses by any moralistic application of the Commandments. 
When a naïve young journalist once caught Kieślowski in the midst of 
fi lming Two and asked if The Decalogue would be a “treatise about the moral 
code,” the director responded bluntly: “You use awfully serious language. 
I don’t think it will be a treatise about any moral code. I don’t know if such 
a thing really exists, if it can function. These fi lms are simply about life.”10 
Though in Kieślowski on Kieślowski the director alludes to “think[ing] that 
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an absolute point of reference does exist,” it is not at all clear that God or 
religion embody such an absolute (KK, 149). Just a page later, the director 
suggests that this point of reference may well be internal, since we are all 
“in a position to set our own, inner compass” (KK, 150). Faith and religion 
are constantly invoked and endlessly queried in The Decalogue, but rarely 
do they seem to offer a solution that the protagonists can accept as fi nal or 
viewers can take repose in. The interrogation of the ethical impasse does 
not let up at the end of each episode. The protagonists come up against 
the Commandments, usually failing to measure up. Pining for answers, 
they appear to sink deeper into confl ict, irresolution, or stasis. Above all 
else, they are fallen, and their sins, if such they be, cannot be easily expi-
ated; there is no apparent escape from the ethical morass. If The Decalogue 
at all belongs under the rubric of religious art, it is only insofar as there is 
“a spiritual dimension embedded in [Kieślowski’s] sensual textures.”11 The 
moments of transcendence are fl eeting and reside in the simplest of human 
gestures (a touch, a hug); within memories about the dead loved ones; or 
within musical backgrounds and haunting photography.
The ethical anxiety inherent in Kieślowski’s cinema exceeds the confi nes 
of both religious and cinematic conventions. The Polish genre of “cinema 
of moral anxiety” (kino moralnego niepokoju) popular in the late 1970s of-
ten portrayed young characters who stand up against compromised social 
systems in order to defend basic moral values. But Kieślowski did not wish 
to see himself refl ected in the moniker, and he did not accept it as an ac-
curate historical description of the cinema of the late 1970s, either. With 
the usual delight in demolishing the assumptions of pompous interview-
ers, he once quipped: “I don’t feel any moral anxiety . . . this phrase only 
pigeonholes, which infuriates me.”12 Even though artists are notoriously 
reluctant to recognize themselves in established historical or critical cat-
egories, Kieślowski is correct that this particular label fails to elucidate the 
ethical complexities he studies in his fi lms. In Kieślowski, there is nothing 
quite as simple as a confrontation between a righteous individual and a 
corrupt social group. If anything, both are compromised and shot through 
with opposite forces. While the “cinema of moral anxiety” fails to capture 
Kieślowski’s art, the feelings of anxiety, disquiet, or restlessness—and the 
aspiration, against all odds, to an elusive tranquility (spokój)—are funda-
mental to his ethos: “It is unrest [niepokój] that makes me get up in the 
morning, and not love, hope, or whatever else you mentioned. Within 
unrest, there is always a question.”13
Kieślowski maintained, “You can’t change anything through fi lm,” but 
he believed in fi lmmaking that fostered dialogue: “I make fi lms to converse 
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about some subject that I feel is important.”14 The Decalogue cycle certainly 
fulfi lled his wish to communicate with his audiences about questions he 
deemed essential, even universal. In an interview with Alberto Crespi, the 
director emphasized that he “would like [The Decalogue] to be a dialogue 
with the viewer on life, as sincere as possible.”15 Stanley Kubrick, the direc-
tor’s great admirer, explains that Kieślowski and Piesiewicz achieve this ef-
fect of dialogue by “allowing the audience to discover what’s really going on 
rather than being told. . . . You never see the ideas coming and don’t realize 
until much later how profoundly they have reached your heart.”16
This collection of essays extends this concept of dialogue to critical read-
ings of the fi lms as well. The relative paucity of English-language sources 
on the fi lm cycle remains somewhat shocking: Of the ten book-length 
publications on the series, only one, by Christopher Garbowski (1996), is 
available in English.17 Garbowski’s short book remains a valuable resource, 
as it was one of the fi rst systematic attempts at an interpretation of the fi lm 
series and of the early critical reactions in Polish, English, and French. 
Written in the middle of the most active decade in Kieślowski scholarship, 
which immediately followed the director’s success with Western audiences 
in the early 1990s, it did not yet enjoy the benefi t of a longer historical view 
or of subsequent critical appraisals. The remaining monographs in French, 
German, Italian, and Polish have not been translated into English. Not 
only does the present collection fi ll this gap in English-language criticism 
on The Decalogue, but it also offers an approach that is unique among all 
the existing sources on the series: It represents a broadly multidisciplinary 
and interdisciplinary array of critical voices that comprise a collabora-
tive conversation by North American and European scholars from such 
diverse areas of research as comparative literature, English, fi lm studies, 
French, Italian, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and rabbinical studies. Indeed, 
The Decalogue, in its intertextual interplay with the Ten Commandments 
and with multifarious other literary, philosophical, and fi lmic works, posi-
tively demands both a multidisciplinary approach and an interdisciplinary 
methodology. The breadth and complexity of its motifs call for a medley 
of critical voices from varied disciplines: theology, philosophy, literature, 
fi lm studies, psychoanalytic studies, and even the law. No other study of 
comparable diversity exists in North America or Europe.
The contribution of this collection of essays is not limited to its meth-
odological diversity and intertextual scope. Our aim is to reorient the 
dominant approach to The Decalogue by placing its aesthetic and formal 
concerns—which have dominated critical work thus far—into dialogue 
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with ethical, political, and religious discourses, that is, the “elephants” and 
“toothaches” Kieślowski is preoccupied with. The ensuing dialogue has 
a dual effect: It returns the fi lm cycle to its diverse historical and exis-
tential contexts while demythologizing—situating and concretizing—its 
meanings. Instead of undercutting the cycle’s open-ended structure, this 
approach demonstrates again and again how the fi lms query and exceed 
their discursive frameworks. The cyclical nature of the work also makes—
and insists that viewers and critics make—connections outside of the 
diegesis.
For example, the near-universality of the fi lms, which the director 
achieves by referencing the Ten Commandments and by depoliticizing 
and aestheticizing his narratives, itself becomes readable in this approach 
both as a legitimate artistic purpose and a historical or ideological effect. 
Kieślowski began to aspire to artistic universality early on. In Kieślowski 
on Kieślowski, he admitted to hoping that The Decalogue could be marketed 
abroad (145). Such aspirations were not easy to voice at the time; the dissi-
dents would deem them unpatriotic, and the censors disloyal. Kieślowski’s 
international ambitions aside, humanity’s “toothaches” are indeed his 
enduring concern: “Both the deep believer and the habitual skeptic ex-
perience toothaches in exactly the same way. I always try to speak about 
toothaches—always. If I am successful in talking about toothaches, I think 
everyone will understand me.”18
His great theme involves questions with a near-universal scope, such 
as individual responsibility; the place of God and religion in modernity; 
the deep psychological and legal implications of familial relationships and 
biological bonds; love, desire, and material greed. Of Elephants and Tooth-
aches presents Kieślowski as relentlessly soliciting an ethical response to 
these philosophical queries—in the form of both an inner disquiet and 
an interpersonal dialogue—from the viewer and the critic. To see one-
self as fi lming toothaches is to portray one’s themes not as abstract but as 
shared, physical, and immediate. Kieślowski’s vivid image of the tooth-
ache also acknowledges that the effect of universality is achieved at the 
level of embodied experience. The collection tackles these complicated 
problems accordingly by examining concretes, such as the masterful use of 
multifaceted visual tropes and techniques: liquids and containers, mirrors 
and lenses, angles and lighting, silences and sounds, and the blending of 
abstract images with documentary techniques. The volume draws atten-
tion as well to the intricate connections among sensual, emotional and 
intellectual experiences of individuals, building bridges from bodily pain 
to theological insight.
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Of Elephants and Toothaches also aims to elucidate an aspect of Kieślow-
ski’s approach to cinematic practice that is best summed up by his image 
of the elephant, which recurs in the director’s autobiographical narratives, 
from Krzysztof Kieślowski: I’m So-So . . . (1995) to Kieślowski on Kieślowski.19 
In the latter, Kieślowski confesses to a tendency to appropriate other peo-
ple’s memories as his own: “I steal them and then start to believe that they 
happened to me” (6). But the story of the elephant in the street that follows 
is more nuanced:
I was going to infant school and clearly remember walking with my 
mum. An elephant appeared. It passed us by and walked on. Mum 
claimed she’d never been with me when an elephant walked by. There’s 
no reason why, in 1946, after the war, an elephant should appear in 
Poland, when it was hard even to get potatoes. Nevertheless, I can re-
member the scene perfectly well and I clearly remember the expression 
on the elephant’s face. (KK, 6)20
It is hard to accept that the elephant represents a memory, even borrowed 
from another person, at all. It is much more likely that the story constitutes 
a false memory that belongs to “dreams of such power that they material-
ized into what I thought were actual incidents” (KK, 6). One may read this 
image as an instance of Kieślowski’s mastery at showing the unseen, the 
invisible. Here, we wish to portray the elephant as an image of the fi lmic 
effect, an image of art and the artistic impulse, as it stands for the highly 
improbable but artistically imperative and vividly present imaginative real-
ity. This imaginative reality is to the artist, and consequently to his viewers, 
as compelling as a remembered past. If the toothache signifi es the shared, 
commonly understood reality (even though pain can only be privately ex-
perienced), the elephant is a materialization of one person’s imaginative 
fi gment, which can only become communally shared by means of art. The 
elephant’s gigantic stature and excessive visibility contrast further with the 
miniature (private, invisible) world of the toothache, but what the images 
share is as important as what separates them: Both insist on physical and/
or aesthetic concretization in lieu of philosophical abstraction. In this way, 
the elephant and the toothache appropriately bookend Kieślowski’s fi lmic 
project.
The order of the essays that follow generally mirrors the sequence of the 
fi lms in The Decalogue, with two exceptions, William Jaworski’s “Rules 
and Virtues: The Moral Insight of The Decalogue” and Joseph Kickasola’s 
“Tablets of Stone, Tablets of Flesh: Synesthetic Appeal in The Decalogue.” 
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These essays open the volume because they offer a reading of the series 
as a whole. Jaworski examines how The Decalogue suggests an alternative 
interpretation of the Ten Commandments, as descriptions of attitudes and 
patterns of behaviors and their effects, rather than rules, along the line 
of virtue-based ethical theories. Kickasola refl ects upon Kieślowski’s abil-
ity throughout the series to represent human experience as multisensory 
cognition, pushing the boundaries between sensing and understanding. 
The ethical concerns Kieślowski addresses affect the body and the mind 
(or the spirit) of his characters and the viewer alike, and are the cognitive 
object of sensual perception and intellectual reasoning both at the diegetic 
and extradiegetic levels. Each critic relies on a distinctive methodology 
to discuss Kieślowski’s work and artistry; in fact, both approaches— one 
engaging primarily ethical questions and matters of content, the other 
addressing questions of representation and reception—are always in dia-
logue throughout the collection. For this reason, we also chose a simple 
sequencing of the remaining essays over a rigid overarching and organiz-
ing structure that we feared would induce a reading of the volume as a 
collection of two or more competing scholarly perspectives rather than a 
plurality of constantly intersecting and mutually enriching critical voices.
The order of the essays refl ects the thematic continuity from one critical 
contribution to the next, but it does not suggest an exclusive progression 
from ethical and religious concerns, which could be perceived as dominant 
in the discussions of One through Five, to aesthetic and poetic issues seem-
ingly more central in the analyses of Six through Ten. A shift in emphasis 
in the critical attention to each and all of the fi lms is only apparent. As 
a whole, this collection may acknowledge and perhaps even reproduce, 
albeit unintentionally, the way the Ten Commandments themselves are 
traditionally viewed as falling into two natural groups—the fi rst fi ve regu-
lating the relationship between God and humans, the others addressing 
relationships among humans. In fact, it encourages other interpretive 
paths while valuing and highlighting the uniqueness of each critical voice 
and disciplinary affi liation independently of our ordering principle. For 
example, Moshe Gold’s essay, “Decalogue One: Witnessing a Responsible 
Ethics of Response from a Jewish Perspective,” addresses the fundamental 
question of the affective and intellectual responses that defi ne the actions 
of Kieślowski’s characters and that the fi lmmaker demands of his viewer. 
This essay sets the stage particularly for the analyses of Five, Six, Seven, 
and Eight. In “Visual Reverberations: Decalogue Two and Deca logue Eight,” 
Eva Stadler explores Kieślowski’s cinematic artistry in the two Decalogue 
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episodes that are explicitly linked from a thematic viewpoint, the “abstract 
visual style” of Two and the “almost documentary quality” of Eight. The 
fi lmmaker’s stylistic signature, characterized by an obsessive attention to 
interior ambiance and outdoor settings, lighting and sounds, camera move-
ments and angles, and, most of all, editing, emerges as a focal critical point 
also in the essays on One, Four, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine. Kieślowski, 
who once defi ned fi lms as “fairy tales about people,” underscores the im-
portance of the director’s work in the cutting room: “There’s [a] level to 
editing and it’s the most interesting one. That is the level of constructing 
a fi lm. It’s a game with the audience, a way of directing attention, distributing 
tension. . . . The elusive spirit of a fi lm, so diffi cult to describe, is born only 
there, in the cutting-room” (KK, 202, emphasis added).21
In “Decalogue Four: The Mother up in Smoke, or ‘Honor Thy Father 
and Thy Mother,’ ” psychoanalyst Gabriella Ripa di Meana plays with 
Kieślowski’s ability “to direct attention” and “distribute tension” and the 
arbitrary relation that exists between the commandment and the fi lm’s 
content. In Four, Kieślowski explores the emergence of the subject of the 
unconscious as the subject of ethics par excellence, and challenges received 
notions of honor and dishonor by representing the story of love and desire 
between a daughter, her father, and her unknown, dead mother. At the 
center of Ripa di Meana’s original interpretation is the letter as an object 
and a trope. The letter is the mother’s letter within the father’s letter of 
the fi lmic narrative; it is thus the signifying core of the father-mother-
daughter triangle, and of the daughter’s identity formation as a daughter 
and a woman. The letter is also the literal meaning of the commandment in 
relation to the fi lm; the commandment triggers the disclosure and working 
of meaning in this and every other fi lm of The Decalogue.
The theme of love, of the experience or absence of various forms of 
love—whether pure and selfl ess, or possessive, selfi sh and greedy, idealized 
or sensual; like the love binding a mother to her child, or a father to his 
daughter, or a brother to his kin, or two friends, or a citizen to his or her 
fellow, or the love drawing individuals to material things, and so on—re-
curs consistently in the readings here collected. In “Remember the Sabbath 
Day, to Keep It Holy: Decalogue Three,” Joseph Koterski discusses the con-
nection Kieślowski establishes between what it means “to keep something 
holy” and our mindfulness of the love commitments and call of charity to 
others in our lives. For Koterski, Kieślowski expands on what the third 
commandment mandates. What constitutes a lawful and compassionate 
community—but still a community of “sinners” (SP, 67)—and what obli-
gations humans have to one another to affi rm their dignity but also tran-
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scend their individuality are at the core of Michael Baur’s reading of Five in 
“Decalogue Five: A Short Film about Killing, Sin, and Community.”
In Eva Badowska’s “States of Exception: Politics and Poetics in Deca-
logue Six,” the personal and the social are still deeply intertwined. Badow-
ska discusses Kieślowski’s transition from documentary to fi ction fi lm as 
representing the profound alienation of the individual in the public and 
private spheres in Poland in the 1980s—especially in the form of system-
atic intrusion in and devaluation of intimacy and privacy. Philip Sicker’s 
analysis of Nine in “Divine Possession: Metaphysical Covetousness in Deca-
logue Nine”—a meditation on the entwined concepts of omniscience and 
possession inherent in the ninth commandment—similarly begins with a 
consideration of Kieślowski’s exposure and critique of pervasive surveil-
lance systems. Sicker demonstrates that in Nine, covetous jealousy takes 
the form of a desire for metaphysical possession, a complete penetration of 
another’s interior life that seeks to imitate God’s surveillance of thought 
and feeling. Both Badowska and Sicker draw attention to Kieślowski’s in-
tense awareness of cinema’s ability to infi ltrate and possibly violate private 
lives, and his relentless effort to create a visual language that is both in-
quisitive and self-critical.
In “Decalogue Seven: A Tale of Love, Failing Words, and Moving Im-
ages,” Francesca Parmeggiani also addresses the question of the diffi cult 
linguistic and thematic balance that Kieślowski sought in his cinema. In 
the case of Seven, a little girl’s disarticulated cry in the fi lm’s beginning 
and her silent gaze at the end not only frame a story of found (and yet, lost 
again) love, and the director’s investigation into the various forms love 
may take or the ways in which familial and intergenerational relationships 
develop, but also demand of viewers a suspension of their indifference. 
In “Decalogue Eight: Childhood, Emotion, and the Shoah,” Emma Wil-
son still focuses on a child’s perspective, but she looks at the question of 
the gaze, the face, the gestures, of the “missing” child, and the demand 
of the child “who returns.” Personal memories and collective history are 
interwoven in the narrative structure of the fi lm. By examining the ways 
in which (audio)visual media and art forms summon an ethical response 
through appeal to the emotions, touch and embodied memory, Wilson 
also explores the excessive (ethical) context the Shoah proves in thinking 
about child suffering, and the intense, emotive, mnemonic investment in 
the child in representation.
Familial bonds and the ideas of community and sociability return to 
center stage in Regina Small’s essay, “Laughter Makes Good Neigh-
bors: Sociability and the Comic in Decalogue Ten,” which aptly ends the 
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volume. Drawing on Henri Bergson’s “Laughter” (1901) to analyze the 
“comic mechanization” of the main characters’ obsession with their fa-
ther’s stamp collection in the fi nal episode of The Decalogue, Small argues 
that laughter functions as a moral corrective for both the characters and 
the viewer. Kieślowski thus concludes the series with an image that under-
scores the importance, and perhaps even the moral imperative, of human 
interconnectedness.
There is no end to the elephants and toothaches of art and life, as there 
is no end to ethical and theological investigations, moral unrest, politi-
cal engagement, aesthetic experience, and critical conversations. As each 
essay originates from and responds to the “human and humanistic ques-
tions” raised in Kieślowski’s fi lms, in the other essays of the collection, 
and by theologians, philosophers, and cultural, literary and fi lm scholars 
from both sides of the Atlantic, they ultimately embody and carry on the 
dialogue that Kieślowski believed to be the driving force and objective of 
his artistic project.
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 10. “Krzysztof Kieślowski Pegaz cz.1” (video), http://www.youtube.com /
watch?v=LpyDDmOIohs (accessed November 4, 2012). Trans. Eva Badow-
ska. An English dubbed version of this 1988 video segment is also available, 
F6707.indb   12 4/7/16   6:57:53 AM
Introduction 13
with the title “On the Set of The Decalogue,” in The Decalogue, DVD, directed 
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 19. Krzysztof Kieslowski: I’m So-So . . . , directed by Krzysztof Wierzbicki, 
Kulturmøde Film (1995).
 20. It is important not to misread the image of the elephant as “elephant 
in the room” (in this case, elephant in the street). The idiom is not present 
in Polish; in fact, the idiomatic association with elephants in Polish is along 
the lines of the English expression “bull in a china shop” (where in Polish one 
says “elephant in a china shop”). Neither idiomatic meaning is relevant to this 
story.
 21. Tadeusz Sobolewski, “Ultimate Concerns,” in Coates, Lucid Dreams, 
19. Trans. Paul Coates.
F6707.indb   14 4/7/16   6:57:53 AM
15
c h a p t e r  1
Rules and Virtues: The Moral 
Insight of The Decalogue
William Jaworski
The Ten Commandments are often taken to represent a prototypical rule-
based approach to ethics. What the Commandments are supposed to pro-
vide, on this interpretation, is a set of rules for evaluating the status of ac-
tions as right or wrong. They are thus taken to be similar in their goals to 
modern moral theories such as Kantian ethics or utilitarianism. I will call 
this the “moralizing interpretation” of the Commandments, which goes 
hand in hand with a single-discipline conception of moral inquiry. Ac-
cording to this conception, serious moral inquiry is the task of philosophy 
alone. Other disciplines may be able to feed information into the philoso-
pher’s calculations, but the task of rendering that information morally rel-
evant in the form of precise, universally applicable moral principles is the 
philosopher’s special charge.
There are nevertheless philosophical reasons for rejecting the moraliz-
ing interpretation of the Commandments in favor of a more holistic alter-
native. That alternative is illustrated by the fi lms of Krzysztof Kieślowski’s 
Decalogue. The ten episodes display how the Commandments are best un-
derstood not as rules along the lines of those proposed by modern moral 
theories, but as descriptions of patterns of thought, feeling, and action 
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that can infl uence human well-being for better or for worse. The focus 
of the Commandments, on this interpretation, is not on discrete actions 
that ought or ought not to be done, but on human life as a whole, and how 
various patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting can enable us to live well 
or prevent us from doing so.
The philosophical reasons that motivate the holistic interpretation of 
the Commandments also motivate a multidisciplinary conception of moral 
inquiry, for if the Commandments concern not abstract rules, as the mor-
alizing interpretation would have it, but the rich tapestry of human life 
as a whole, then nonphilosophical disciplines do more than simply feed 
information into the philosopher’s moral calculus; their input becomes es-
sential to the very process of creating moral understanding. In line with 
this conception of moral inquiry, the fi lms of The Decalogue show us vividly 
how the Commandments are woven into the tapestry of human life in ways 
that often escape our notice. Given their focus on attitudes and patterns of 
behavior—as opposed to discrete actions extracted and isolated from the 
lives in which they can only exist as parts—attempts to identify concrete, 
datable occurrences that either violate or conform to a rule often fail. By 
contrast, abandoning those attempts in favor of the holistic alternative of-
ten leaves us wondering whether the various strands of human life could 
consist of anything but the Commandments.
Perhaps above all the fi lms movingly highlight two aspects of human 
life. First, they highlight the pervasive character of human failure and 
frailty, the way we can all strive for love, freedom, security, fulfi llment, 
esteem, and yet fail in our best attempts to achieve them. Second, the fi lms 
highlight the enduring character of human hope—hope in the possibility 
that our ultimate fate will not be determined by our past failures, hope 
that we might rediscover love and freedom even in the midst of tragedy 
and loss.
Rule-Based Ethics and the Moralizing 
Interpretation of the Commandments
Modern ethical theories are typically concerned with articulating a prin-
ciple or principles for evaluating the moral status of actions. The job of 
ethics, as they conceive of it, is to formulate abstract principles, rules, or 
guidelines that can be applied to the concrete actions of concrete individu-
als in order to determine whether those actions are good or bad, right or 
wrong. The application of these principles typically takes the form of a 
F6707.indb   16 4/7/16   6:57:53 AM
Rules and Virtues 17
calculus or decision procedure. Kantian ethics and utilitarianism are the 
most popular representatives of rule-based ethical thinking.1
Utilitarians take the rightness or wrongness of an action to be deter-
mined by its consequences, whereas Kantians take it to be determined by 
the principle on which the agent acts. Even though they differ on what 
constitutes the rightness or wrongness of an action, utilitarians and Kan-
tians share a commitment to three ideas. First, they both claim that ethical 
theorizing aims at articulating rules or principles that can be applied to 
particular actions (or in some cases principles) in order to determine their 
rightness or wrongness. Second, they both take moral evaluation to consist 
in an abstract cognitive procedure: trying to conceive the universal appli-
cation of the agent’s principle in the Kantian case, and calculating the net 
gain or loss of pleasure that results from an action in the utilitarian case. 
Finally, both take the ultimate focus of ethical theorizing to be discrete 
actions—even forms of rule utilitarianism, which look to evaluate moral 
principles, take the latter to be right or wrong in proportion to their ten-
dency to result in right or wrong actions.
The moralizing interpretation takes the Commandments to be in the 
same business as modern moral theories. It claims that the Command-
ments represent a premodern attempt to do more or less the same thing 
that Kantians and utilitarians are doing. The Commandments articulate 
principles to which discrete actions must conform if they are to count as 
morally permissible, and moral evaluation consists in determining whether 
particular actions violate any of the principles.
Understood in this way, however, the Commandments are problematic 
for well-rehearsed philosophical reasons. I will mention just three.
1. The problem of generality versus specifi city: Rule-based ethical theories 
must articulate moral principles that balance the demand for generality 
(the demand that they apply to all people in all circumstances) with the de-
mand for specifi city (the demand that they be applicable to specifi c agents 
in specifi c circumstances). Many attempts to formulate universal ethical 
principles fail to satisfy one requirement or the other. The Command-
ments, in particular, fail to satisfy the specifi city requirement, for they are 
so general that they do not tell us what to do (or to think or feel), but only 
what not to do. As a result, they lack content specifi c enough to tell us how 
to live.
2. The problem of justifi cation: Every rule-based ethical theory must pro-
vide some justifi cation or grounds for why its particular set of principles 
is the set according to which we should live. Why, for instance, must we 
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avoid killing? Why should we not covet our neighbor’s goods? Why not 
steal? Answering these questions can often be very diffi cult without invok-
ing contentious metaethical and metaphysical theses.
3. The problem of accounting for rule-following or rule-breaking: Rule-based 
ethical theories must provide a general account of the costs and benefi ts for 
human life of following or breaking the rules they endorse. Suppose, for 
instance, that someone is unable to follow the principles—the way an al-
coholic might be incapable of following the principle “Do not drink to ex-
cess.” A rule-based ethical theory must give an account of the signifi cance 
of this type of case. Moreover, what in general are the implications for 
human life of following or breaking a moral rule? The fi fth commandment 
says, “Thou Shalt Not Kill.” But what if I do? We are all aware that killing 
might have legal or social implications, ones that could be dodged with 
suffi cient ingenuity. But are there any implications for my life that can-
not be dodged? Perhaps I will become an immoral person, one that con-
stantly breaks moral rules. But why should I care about that? If being moral 
amounts simply to obeying certain principles, why should I care about be-
ing moral? Why should I think that being moral is a good thing? Any 
rule-based ethical theory has to be able to answer questions of this sort. It 
must situate its principles within a broader account of rule- following and 
rule-breaking and their signifi cance for human life. Again, this is a diffi cult 
task to accomplish without invoking contentious metaethical and meta-
physical assumptions.
Human Striving for the Good Life and the Antimoralist Challenge
The third of the aforementioned problems with rule-based ethical theories 
is especially important for our discussion. It raises the question of whether 
human behavior is capable of conforming to abstract principles and what 
implications this might have for human well-being. Concrete human life 
is gritty and imperfect, unpredictable and indeterminate. It does not lend 
itself easily to the imposition of strict principles. One reason for this is 
that human nature is inherently limited in so many ways. Even if I judge 
that following a certain moral principle is for the best, I might still be un-
able to follow that principle in practice. The spirit is willing, but the fl esh 
is inevitably weak. A more important reason to doubt the possibility of 
human life conforming to abstract principles derives from an account of 
human striving.
Human life is fundamentally driven by desire. Part of being human is 
precisely the desire for certain goods: for life, love, pleasure, joy, freedom, 
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security, power, health, wealth, status, and esteem. We are constantly striv-
ing to live well, to get as much out of life as we can. Our day-to-day ex-
istence is an exercise in trying to achieve such goods—strategizing about 
how to secure them and negotiating obstacles to their realization. Seen 
against the backdrop of human striving, the Commandments can look 
like a system of principles that inhibit our natural inclination to achieve 
these goods. They can appear as a force of alienation, something that arises 
not from human nature but rather against it as an impediment to human 
fulfi llment. The upshot is that a life based on the Commandments or an 
analogous set of principles could only be one that ends up crushing rather 
than liberating the human spirit. An antimoralist view of this sort has of-
ten motivated various diagnoses of traditional moral theories in terms of 
class struggle, or power, or some other form of social control. Since the 
imposition of abstract principles on human striving could only inhibit hu-
man well-being, antimoralists argue, traditional morality could only be an 
instrument used by some to dominate and oppress others.
The founding assumption of this type of antimoralist view is that ab-
stract ethical rules are at best orthogonal to human fl ourishing and are at 
worst impediments to it. There are at least three ways of responding to this 
worry. Naïve antimoralists jettison traditional morality without explor-
ing the possibility of alternative ways of understanding its content. Naïve 
moralists, on the other hand, endorse the content of traditional morality 
without attempting to respond to the charges of antimoralists. A third op-
tion is to articulate an understanding of traditional morality that clarifi es 
how its content fi ts into a more general account of human fl ourishing. This 
option endorses the content of traditional morality while yet responding to 
the charges of antimoralists. This is the view, I want to suggest, that is rep-
resented by Kieślowski’s Decalogue. Its depiction of people and the circum-
stances in which they fi nd themselves shares the antimoralist’s skepticism 
that human life can conform to abstract principles, and yet it also shares 
the moralist’s conviction that traditional morality is deeply important to 
human well-being. In what follows, I will develop this idea by appealing to 
an ethical theory based not on rules but on the creative exercise of human 
abilities.
Virtue Ethics
The fi lms of The Decalogue generally resist attempts to identify concrete 
datable occurrences as violations of a rule. They instead situate the actions 
of the characters within a broader fabric of thoughts, feelings, attitudes, 
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dispositions, and personality and character traits. Consequently, the fi lms 
suggest an interpretation of the Commandments different from the moral-
izing one. In what follows I will propose an interpretative strategy based on 
an ethics of virtue or virtue ethics.
The original philosophical architects of virtue ethics were Plato and Ar-
istotle, but other representatives include Augustine and Aquinas, and more 
recently Elizabeth Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, and, I would suggest, 
Krzysztof Kieślowski.2 The Decalogue provides moral theorists with re-
sources to develop a virtue-ethical interpretation of the Commandments, 
an interpretation it expresses in fl esh-and-blood terms using the medium 
of fi lm. From the standpoint of virtue ethics, meditating on the fi lms of The 
Decalogue proves more useful for developing one’s moral understanding 
than attempting to formulate abstract principles of the sort that character-
ize the endeavor of modern moral philosophy.
An ethics of virtue takes its starting point from unremarkable observa-
tions about human life. We are animals who have evolved in response to a 
range of environmental pressures largely beyond our control. As a result, 
we have physiological, social, and spiritual needs, which we are constantly 
trying to satisfy. In general, we strive to live well, to achieve lives fi lled with 
as many good things as we can: love and security, pleasure and joy, health 
and freedom, wealth, power, status, and esteem. The central idea of virtue 
ethics is that we cannot achieve human goods, especially those distinctive 
of human life at its best, by following abstract rules, but only by carefully 
cultivating certain patterns of thought, feeling, and action. Living well in-
volves the practiced balancing of a range of desires and demands that con-
stitute the raw material of human life. It involves learning how to weave 
the various strands of human existence together into a well-proportioned 
whole. Those strands include making decisions about what to do and how 
to feel and act; managing hardship; dealing with other people; managing 
sensual pleasures; estimating and evaluating people’s abilities and knowl-
edge; managing self-exertion, one’s attitudes and behavior toward truth; 
the relationship between time and tasks; anger, sadness, and other emo-
tional states; humor, one’s physical appearance; managing conversation; 
managing trust placed in others and in oneself, one’s intellectual skills; 
managing failures and mistakes; managing sexuality and one’s weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities.
According to an ethics of virtue, there are better and worse ways of 
managing these aspects of human life. What makes the better ways better 
is that they enable us to fl ourish. They enable us to achieve the goods that 
we desire—the physiological, social, and spiritual needs we demand—in a 
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way that does not disfi gure life as a whole with imbalance and dispropor-
tion. Traditionally, these better patterns of thought, feeling, and action 
have been called “virtues.” Virtues are character traits or dispositions—
patterns of thought, feeling, and action—that enable us to live well. Vices, 
on the other hand, are patterns of thought, feeling, and action that if cul-
tivated will inevitably damage and disfi gure human life. Consider some 
simple examples.
Eleanor wants to learn to play the piano. In order to achieve that end 
and its associated goods, she is going to have to work hard; she will have 
to practice. Practice involves hardship, and hence it requires the ability 
to exert oneself and channel one’s energies to accomplish the task despite 
hardship. If Eleanor manages hardship well, if she has discipline and forti-
tude, then she will be able to achieve the goal of playing the piano and thus 
secure the goods associated with it. If, on the other hand, she does not have 
fortitude—if, for instance, she is disposed to quit in the face of hardship 
and is unable to channel her energies in the face of it—then she will not 
be able to achieve what she wants. Musicianship and the goods associated 
with it will remain beyond her grasp. This is true not just of musicianship, 
but of many other things as well: dancing, mathematics, writing, speaking, 
and athletics, as well as the management of friendship, marriage, health, 
wealth, and countless other things. All of them involve dealing with hard-
ship in one way or another. The fortitude that enables Eleanor to succeed 
in one area will enable her to succeed in others. Possessing the ability to 
channel her energies and stick to a diffi cult task despite its diffi culty will 
help her achieve the goods associated with a range of activities. Conversely, 
lacking that ability will hinder her achievement in a range of activities.
Consider another example. Eleanor’s efforts will be greatly assisted if 
she is able to benefi t from the advice and constructive criticism of others 
such as her piano teacher and fellow students. If Eleanor is able to take 
constructive criticism for what it is worth, if she has the humility to do so, 
she will be much better off than if she lacks it. If she is arrogant and dis-
misses the evaluations of others, or if she lacks self-esteem to the point of 
being crushed by constructive criticism, then, as in the case of fortitude, it 
is not just Eleanor’s piano-playing that will suffer, but many other aspects 
of her life as well: her friendships, her relationships with coworkers, her 
marriage, and so on.
Given their widespread impact on the potential for human well-being, 
character traits such as fortitude and humility count as virtues; and con-
versely, arrogance, laziness, and weakness of will count as vices. A human 
life that incorporates the virtues will end up being better than a life that 
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incorporates the vices. The virtues enable their possessors to achieve the 
goods that characterize human life at its best; they are precisely the pat-
terns of thought, feeling, and action that enable us to live lives with love, 
freedom, security, and joy. Vices, on the other hand, have the opposite 
effect; they diminish our capacity to achieve these goods; they are the pat-
terns of thought, feeling, and action that prevent us from being loving, 
free, secure, and joyful.
What is important to recognize about the virtues is that they are not 
rules but abilities. Each has two components: (1) the ability to make ac-
curate judgments about what contributes to living well under the circum-
stances, and (2) the ability to think, feel, and act in accordance with those 
judgments. Temperance, for instance, involves the ability to judge accu-
rately how to indulge in sensual pleasures in a way that contributes on the 
whole to living well, combined with the ability to indulge in sensual plea-
sures in just that way. The person who is temperate with regard to drink-
ing, for instance, knows what to drink, how much to drink, when to drink, 
and with whom to drink, and he or she drinks in accordance with those 
judgments. The temperate person’s abilities to make accurate judgments 
about drinking and to think, feel, and act accordingly cannot be codifi ed 
in an abstract set of principles any more than, say, Michael Jordan’s ability 
to play basketball could be codifi ed in an abstract set of principles. Both 
involve concrete abilities acquired by concrete individuals in response to 
concrete circumstances—abilities that continue to be concretely exer-
cised in concrete situations. Life presents us with complexities, and we 
determine who we are in coping with them, in trying to navigate through 
them, in trying to resolve the tensions among the competing demands that 
arise in trying to live well. In these kinds of concrete circumstances, char-
acter is both formed and expressed; in them we manifest concretely our 
potential for good or evil, as Zofi a (Maria Kościałkowska), the professor of 
ethics, says in Eight. Attempts to formulate abstract principles to express 
what the exercise of those abilities amounts to could provide approxima-
tions at best, and distortions at worst, of what the virtues are.
Because the virtues have this concrete, ability-driven character, and be-
cause they have a direct bearing on our ability to live well—they are char-
acter traits that enable us to live well—it turns out that, on a virtue-ethical 
theory, being moral is less like following an abstract algorithm and more 
like producing a work of art, or engaging in musical or athletic perfor-
mance. There might be constraints that mark the bounds of intelligibility, 
or aesthetic appreciation, or what counts as a legal move in a game, but on 
the whole engaging in these activities is a creative and dynamic process 
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that involves the exercise of concrete skills that were learned and that are 
now exercised in concrete situations.
A Virtue-Ethical Interpretation of the Commandments
What do the Ten Commandments mean in the context of a virtue theory? 
To someone who endorses the moralizing interpretation of the Command-
ments, it is unclear whether the Commandments are compatible with vir-
tue theory at all. Virtue ethics is based on motivation and empowerment, 
the acquisition and exercise of concrete abilities. The Commandments, 
on the other hand, constitute a list of abstract principles. What could one 
possibility have to do with the other? The genius of Kieślowski’s Decalogue 
is that it fl eshes out an answer to this question. It shows us what the Com-
mandments mean in terms of the day-to-day rhythms of human life, our 
day-to-day strivings to live well. From this perspective, the Command-
ments appear not as abstract principles governing various categories of 
action—principles to which actions must conform on pain of qualifying as 
“wrong”; they appear rather as descriptions of broad patterns of behavior: 
thought and feeling, as well as action. The fi lms show us what happens 
to human lives that incorporate various patterns of thinking, feeling, and 
acting. They thereby provide a basis for an account of traditional morality 
capable of responding to the antimoralist challenge.
Consider, for instance, the fi fth commandment: “You shall not kill” 
(Exod. 20:13 RSV). Exponents of the moralizing interpretation often take 
this to be the paradigmatic moral rule. Taken strictly, this understanding of 
the commandment is problematic. Does it prohibit killing in self-defense, 
for instance? Conversely, does it permit hideous acts of violence that fall 
short of actually killing someone? Affi rmative answers to these questions 
strike many people as absurd. That is why exponents of the moralizing in-
terpretation typically gloss the fi fth commandment in a way that prohibits 
violence and permits killing in self-defense. But why do these answers seem 
absurd? According to a virtue-ethical interpretation of the commandment, 
the reason is that we can recognize that an act of wanton killing represents 
a broader pattern of behavior— one that can have destructive implications 
for human well-being. The cultivation of that pattern is what the com-
mandment warns against. It effectively says: Do not cultivate the habits 
of thought and feeling that would enable you to murder lest you alienate 
yourself from the goods you most deeply desire. That pattern of behavior 
comprises not just murder, however, but other forms of violence as well: 
The habits of mind that enable murder are the same as those enabling 
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hideous acts of violence. The commandment can thus be extended to the 
latter as well. On the other hand, since the attitudes that motivate killing 
in self-defense are not of the same sort, their cultivation need not alienate 
one from the goods associated with living well. The commandment, then, 
need not be taken to proscribe killing in self-defense.
An understanding of the fi fth commandment along these lines is illus-
trated in Five. The fi lm gives us a glimpse into the character of a young 
man, Jacek Lazar (Mirosław Baka). Jacek coolly walks the other way as he 
sees two men brutally assault a third in the street; he callously chases away 
the pigeons being fed by an elderly woman; and he drops a rock from a 
highway overpass to break the windshield of an oncoming car. He assaults 
a man in a public restroom for no apparent reason, and he ultimately lures 
a cabdriver, Waldemar ( Jan Tesarz), to a remote location to murder him. 
Jacek has incorporated patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting that have 
devastating consequences for the achievement of human fulfi llment. He 
lives a life of profound social isolation—something expressed even in the 
sickly hues and penumbral shadows in which he is fi lmed (Figure 1–1).3 
That isolation crystallizes as he is caught, tried, convicted, and ultimately 
executed for his crime.
The fi lm displays in a matter-of-fact way what it would mean to cultivate 
the pattern of behavior prohibited by the commandment, and it extends 
the scope of that pattern by drawing a parallel between Jacek and Walde-
mar, whom we see engaged in similarly callous acts. Joseph G. Kickasola 
describes the parallel in the following terms:
Jacek deliberately scares away an old woman’s pigeons. He pushes a 
man into a latrine. He drops the rock on a busy highway. In the same 
Figure 1–1. Jacek in Decalogue Five.
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callous manner, Waldemar leaves Dorota [a pregnant woman] and her 
husband, sexually harasses Beata (the vegetable market worker), and 
cruelly honks to scare a passing man and his dogs. This point /counter-
point of cruelties leaves the viewer with the impression that the two 
men (who have not met) are actually engaged in a game of bitter one-
upsmanship. Their solidarity in contempt is a poisonous kinship, and 
one wonders whether Waldemar might have just as likely killed Jacek as 
the other way around. (205)
One way of interpreting the parallel between Jacek and Waldemar is to 
say that each has cultivated patterns of behavior that result in a social and 
spiritual death long before undergoing the biological deaths we witness in 
the fi lm.
Moreover, The Decalogue sets up a further parallel with Polish society as 
a whole. Kickasola remarks, “There is a certain deadness that permeates the 
entire Decalogue” (174), and he notes that Five suggests that “Polish society 
may not be so different from the lonely halls of the penal institution” (202). 
The judge who tries Jacek’s case describes the verdict as “inevitable.” We 
watch the executioner (Zbigniew Zapasiewicz) making the arrangements 
for Jacek’s hanging with a cool, clinical familiarity that bespeaks experience 
and above all routine: “Custom hath made it in him a property of easiness,” 
as Horatio remarked to Hamlet.4 On the other hand, when Jacek’s defense 
attorney, Piotr (Krzysztof Globisz), struggles with the question of whether 
he could have intervened in Jacek’s life to avert the crime, the judge dis-
misses the sentiment: “You are too sensitive for this profession,” he replies. 
Is a society that makes killing a property of easiness also spiritually dead? 
Is it a society that is capable of contributing to human fl ourishing? Or is it 
instead a society that has lost the ability to help its members cultivate the 
patterns of thought, feeling, and action every human needs to live well?
All the fi lms of The Decalogue illustrate how patterns of thought, feel-
ing, and action infl uence our ability to secure the goods we most deeply 
desire in life. One, for instance, illustrates how worshipping false gods does 
not amount to burning pigeons before stone idols, but placing our trust 
in things that are ultimately incapable of providing us with what we most 
deeply want in life. Two and Eight show us that lying is not a straightfor-
ward matter of saying what is untrue; utterances that betray the life and 
love we most deeply desire are lies whether those utterances be true or not. 
Four shows us how the constancy of love and care, not biology, is what mat-
ters most in defi ning our relationships to those we call mother and father. 
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Six illustrates the dangers of cultivating an attitude that trivializes human 
sexuality and divorces it from its connection to human intimacy. Seven 
shows us that stealing encompasses a broad range of attitudes, feelings, and 
circumstances that bear only a family resemblance to the paradigm case of 
absconding with someone else’s goods. We see how various forms of theft 
can infl uence human life and alienate us from the ones we love and the 
ones we ought to love. Nine shows us that it is possible not just to covet our 
neighbors’ spouses, but our own spouses as well, and that human fulfi ll-
ment is threatened by an attitude that treats people as possessions.
Frailty and Hope
There are two aspects of human life that the fi lms illustrate in an especially 
powerful way: the enduring character of human frailty and the equally 
enduring character of human hope. They mark what is perhaps The Deca-
logue’s deepest insight into the human condition.
Failure is as real a part of human life as anything else. We all pursue 
the good life, and yet we invariably make choices and cultivate patterns of 
behavior that hinder us in our pursuit. One of the most insightful features 
of The Decalogue is the way it reveals the myriad ways we are capable of 
failing, the myriad ways we fall short of realizing what is best for us and for 
others. Like any other aspect of human life, however, there are better and 
worse ways of managing failure. The better ways correspond to virtues. 
Among them is hope.
Hope, one might say, is the ability to believe that failure is not the end 
of the human story. Importantly, however, hope is not the same as opti-
mism. Optimism concerns what we can reasonably expect given anteced-
ent conditions. Based on what I know about someone’s abilities, history, 
and current circumstances, I might be rationally justifi ed in supposing that 
he or she will succeed at a certain kind of task. Hope does not have this 
aspect of making a rational projection about what future states of affairs are 
likely to result given past and present conditions. In fact, hope is perfectly 
compatible with pessimism about the human condition. The data on hu-
man life gathered hitherto do not lend themselves easily to optimism, to 
the reasonable expectation that the future of humankind will be any bet-
ter than its past. On the contrary, the history of humanity gives us every 
reason to suppose there will continue to be injustice, corruption, greed, 
falsehood, violence, oppression, ideology, theft, war, and indifference. We 
have every reason, in other words, to believe the cliché that history will 
repeat itself, that the future of humankind will resemble its scarred past. 
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Hope, however, reaches beyond this reasonable expectation. It is the abil-
ity to believe that, despite humanity’s dismal penchant for repeating again 
and again the same mistakes, failure is nevertheless not the whole of the 
human story.
The fi lms of The Decalogue are hopeful but not optimistic. The events 
they depict do not give us reason to suppose that the characters’ futures 
will be any better than their wounded pasts. They do not have the deter-
minacy of Hollywood-style happy endings. They are instead characterized 
by the indeterminacy of real hope. They leave open the possibility that 
the future will not be defi ned by the past; that failure is not the whole 
story; that the inertia of human failure will not outpace the meaningful-
ness of future human striving. But neither do they ignore that inertia, nor 
is it the case that the future appears completely unproblematic, completely 
untouched by past entanglements. Consider, for instance, the husband and 
wife, Andrzej (Olgierd Ł ukaszewicz) and Dorota (Krystyna Janda), in Two. 
The fi nal scene shows Andrzej joyfully telling the doctor (Aleksander Bar-
dini) that he and Dorota are expecting a child. What he does not know—
what she and the doctor have both concealed from him—is that the child 
has been fathered by another man. Likewise, Zofi a and Elżbieta (Teresa 
Marczewska), the women in Eight, are reconciled with each other, but we 
are reminded in the fi nal scene that not everyone has been reconciled to 
the past, including the tailor (Tadeusz Ł omnicki) once falsely accused of 
collaborating with the Gestapo. In Four we look forward as Michał ( Janusz 
Gajos) and Anka (Adrianna Biedrzyńska), a father and daughter, try to re-
evaluate their relationship after the discovery that she may not in fact be 
his biological daughter. But the letter, which had seemed throughout the 
fi lm to hold the key to that reevaluation, is burned beyond readability (Fig-
ure 1–2). Human life is fi lled with sorrow and loss. The Decalogue gives us 
so many images of human frailty, and yet despite that the fi lms all end with 
an image of hope.
Ten communicates this idea perhaps most clearly of all. Two brothers, 
Jerzy ( Jerzy Stuhr) and Artur (Zbigniew Zamachowski), discover that they 
have inherited a stamp collection worth millions. Although they initially 
claim to be indifferent to material possessions, they grow increasingly jeal-
ous of the collection, enticed by its countless promises of future gain and 
well-being. When the collection is stolen through their own folly, the 
brothers turn on each other: Each tells the police investigator in secret that 
he suspects the other of having stolen it. Although they ultimately discover 
who is really responsible for the theft, they have no way of proving it, and 
hence no way of retrieving the collection. They come to terms with their 
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Figure 1–2. The letter burns beyond readability in 
Decalogue Four.
loss, and each comes to terms with his betrayal of the other. In the fi nal 
scene, they confess their betrayals and exchange forgiveness. They also 
discover that they have both acquired an interest in stamp collecting and 
have independently purchased the same (common and inexpensive) series 
of stamps. We see them with foreheads pressed one to the other, laughing 
through their tears at the absurdity of their situation and in newfound ap-
preciation of brotherly love in the midst of loss. As Kickasola describes it:
The two men have coveted, desired, been selfi sh, possessive, and 
 suspicious of others. Yet in the end, they share their new material 
 interests, combining the stamps to make a series. . . . Giving oneself 
away to a loved one marks the beginnings of morality and its teleology. 
The fi nal, uncanny “chance” occurrence [the discovery that they 
have both purchased the same stamps] precipitates the miracle of 
recon ciliation. (241)
Our situation is like that of the brothers. Human life seems to hold out to 
each of us the promise of unlimited gain. But the reality of living reveals 
that promise to be illusory; it reveals the true character of human limita-
tion and ultimately loss. And yet there is still the possibility of rediscover-
ing love, freedom, and joy in the midst of that loss and in full recognition 
of human frailty and limitation. Witnessing their plight and the plights of 
the other characters in The Decalogue inspires us with a desire that this pos-
sibility should be realized, that all should be well for the characters and for 
ourselves despite all we have done to make it unwell. Ultimately, then, The 
Decalogue suggests the image of a forgiving universe—a universe in which 
despite our folly we are not ultimately crushed by the weight of our past 
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failures; we instead discover that the most worthwhile aspects of human 
life, the most cherished of human connections, are forged in the experi-
ence of failure and shared vulnerability.
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c h a p t e r  2
Tablets of Stone, Tablets of Flesh: 
Synesthetic Appeal in The Decalogue
Joseph G. Kickasola
It very quickly became clear that these would be fi lms about 
feelings and passions, because we knew that love, or the fear of 
death, or the pain caused by a needle-prick, are common to all 
people, irrespective of their political views, the colour of their 
skin or their standard of living. . . . We decided to place the action 
of Decalogue in a large housing estate, with thousands of similar 
windows framed within the establishing shot. Behind each of these 
windows, we said to ourselves, is a living being, whose mind, whose 
heart and, even better, whose stomach is worthy of investigation.
—krzysztof kieślowski
In the fi lms The Double Life of Veronique (1991) and The Three Colors Trilogy 
(1992–94), Krzysztof Kieślowski left behind most of the aesthetic trappings 
of his early documentaries and moved into more sensuous and formalis-
tic territory.1 Much of the power of Kieślowski’s later cinema hinges on 
the aesthetics of immediacy—that is, the perceived directness of affect-as-
meaning it produces.2 I argue that in the series of fi lms before Veronique—
the monumental Decalogue series (1989)—we see hints of this stylistic shift 
as he searched for new ways of expressing the spiritual and moral themes 
that interested him.3 If we draw upon a crude dualistic analogy—that is, 
the factual ideations of the documentary as corresponding to mind and 
the sensuous nature of form as appealing to body—we might say that The 
Decalogue demonstrates a dialectic between the mind and body, stylistically 
and thematically.
It is not clear that Kieślowski would have wanted his career to be seen in 
this stark way, as if his documentaries were coldly intellectual and his later 
features were lacking ideas. If anything, Kieślowski saw himself on a singu-
lar trajectory in pursuit of reality, and his later features simply strain into 
those areas of metaphysical reality that resist reportage or easy fi guration.4 
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In The Decalogue, Kieślowski is reacting to (and working within) a cultural 
and historical construct, that of the Ten Commandments. Here, a particu-
larly interesting dynamic evolves as a tension between the ideal, rational, 
abstract, disembodied Word (the Commandments as an abstract ideal) and 
the body that comprehends, struggles with, and lives through it.
As I will discuss, in recent years a wide variety of otherwise disparate 
thinkers have argued for a notion of embodied meaning. In other words, 
in contrast to the strict alignment of meaning with its linguistic manifesta-
tions, they argue for meaning and knowledge that is bodily, prelogical, and 
epistemologically heavy. These thinkers—ranging from cultural theorists 
to philosophers to neuroscientists— often disagree about a great many 
things, but they may be united under the moniker of embodied epistemol-
ogy, in that they see a fundamental symbiosis between sense perception, 
emotion, and knowledge.
In this essay I will use this general triangulation and this literature of 
embodiment to explore a particular dimension of Kieślowskian immediacy 
in The Decalogue. Kieślowski was not interested in the exposition of the 
Ten Commandments but rather in their sensual and dynamic force in our 
contemporary lives. Throughout the fi lms, he treats sensual evocation to 
be part and parcel of real knowledge. His sensual strategy in effect does 
not tell us what the Commandments propositionally mean, but how they 
mean, even as we appropriate their meanings through the fi lms. In this 
vein, I would like to trace one particular sensory path in The Decalogue, that 
of tactile synesthetic appeal. This path will serve as an example of the sort 
of lived meaning for which, I believe, Kieślowski aimed.
I will begin with a general discussion of synesthesia, so that we might 
defi ne and clarify our terms. In the process, I will survey a number of 
interrelated epistemological concepts that reveal a paradoxical power in 
Kieślowski’s images—a strength he intuitively understood as crucial—
that even when certain sensual experiences like touch are amputated from 
the physical contact that gives them life, their cinematic evocation can still 
resonate with a certain immediacy of meaning. This will be followed by 
a discussion of specifi c examples of synesthetic appeal in the fi lms of The 
Decalogue, and some refl ection on the impact of synesthetic immediacy on 
the overall theological tone of the series.
Understanding Synesthetic Appeal
Synesthesia is a general term that encompasses all experiences in which 
stimulus from one sensory mode evokes or literally triggers another. The 
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range between evoking and triggering can be wide, from everyday synes-
thesia (e.g., commonplace matching of shape between touch and vision) 
to the clinical variety of synesthesia (a very literal engagement of second-
ary sense through a unique sensual pathway, which likely arises from hard 
neurological wiring in clinical cases). My emphasis here will be on the uni-
versal, everyday variety.5
When I say “everyday” synesthesia I am essentially talking about cine-
matic phenomena that appeal transmodally. Transmodal processing—that 
is, the confl uence of modes of perception (such as sight and touch, for 
instance)—is a very large part of everyday perception, but we are only just 
beginning to understand the complexities of its mechanics. We often use 
multiple senses to comprehend something, and some senses (such as touch) 
regularly evoke an image (feel and identify your car keys in your pocket or 
purse, for instance) even if you are not seeing that image with your eyes. 
Transmodal appeals are considered a form of synesthetic appeal for this 
very reason; one sense triggers a memory from another sense experience. 
Films, of course, hinge on this experience as well, and the phenomenon 
is ubiquitous, but some fi lms highlight and function through transmodal 
qualities more than others, and in Kieślowski’s case, this is critical to his 
approach to the subject matter.
Phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty once wrote, “The senses 
translate each other without any need of an interpreter and are mutually 
comprehensible without the intervention of any idea.”6 More recently, neu-
roscientists Barry E. Stein and M. Alex Meredith noted that some stimulus 
features, such as intensity, form, number, and duration are believed to be 
amodal—that is, not the function of one particular modality—and are, in 
fact, transferred readily across modalities, and are thus transmodal.7 The 
ramifi cations of this theory for our study of Kieślowski are that much of 
what we consider to be everyday synesthetic experiences are these proper-
ties of stimuli—like time, intensity, form, number, and duration—that 
directly transfer through various modalities. These elements function as 
a type of vocabulary for Kieślowski’s nonverbal eloquence regarding the 
lived experience of The Decalogue.
In order to incarnate and animate the abstract ideals of the Command-
ments, everyday synesthetic experience must be epistemologically heavy 
even as it is immediate (i.e., bypassing linguistic mediation). For centu-
ries in Western philosophy there has been a division between so-called 
higher mental operations and lower ones, with historically varying degrees 
of emphasis placed on the former, but rarely equal epistemological sta-
tus granted to the latter. The former operations (e.g., language, intellect, 
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reason, rationality, refl ection, and so on) have been privileged over sensa-
tion, emotion, feeling, intuition, and even perception itself. By contrast, 
the literature of embodiment largely reinforces two assertions made by 
the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl over a hundred years ago: the epis-
temological heaviness of intuition and imagination, and the fundamental 
idea of intentionality (that we reach out or intend toward meaning in all 
perception).8
The fi lm critic Vivian Sobchack draws upon a later phenomenologist, 
Merleau-Ponty, who avoided some of the transcendental idealist traps into 
which Husserl fell and managed to detail how any evaluation of cinematic 
perception must always account for the body of the subject.9 In her essay 
“What My Fingers Knew,” she articulates a bodily, precognitive, nonlogi-
cal, immediate tactile knowledge, synesthetically evoked by seeing Jane 
Campion’s fi lm The Piano (1993). The opening shot of the fi lm is an ab-
stract image, revealed only in the second shot to be a woman’s fi ngers un-
derwater with sunlight shining between them. Clearly, Sobchack’s reaction 
to the shot is fundamentally contingent on memory recall, but her account 
makes it clear that this is not mere semiosis of the linguistic variety:
Despite my “almost blindness,” the “unrecognizable blur,” and re-
sistance of the image to my eyes, my fi ngers knew what I was looking 
at—and this before the objective reverse shot that followed to put those 
fi ngers in their proper place. . . . From the fi rst (although I didn’t 
consciously know it until the second shot), my fi ngers comprehended that 
image, grasped it with a nearly imperceptible tingle of attention and 
anticipation and, offscreen, “felt themselves” as a potentiality in the 
subjective and fl eshy situation fi gured onscreen. And this before I refi g-
ured my carnal comprehension into the conscious thought, “Ah, those 
are fi ngers I am looking at.” . . . Those fi ngers were fi rst known sensu-
ally and sensibly as “these” fi ngers and were located ambiguously both 
offscreen and on—subjectively “here” as well as objectively “there,” 
“mine” as well as the image’s. . . . We do not experience any movie 
only through our eyes. We see and comprehend and feel fi lms with our 
entire bodily being, informed by the full history and carnal knowledge 
of our acculturated sensorium. (Carnal Thoughts, 63)
Here is the rub: The essence of the experience and what makes it knowl-
edge is the content of that memory, but content is only valuable to the 
extent that it is reifi ed and experienced. Her fi ngers “know,” and she knows 
that she knows through experience. Likewise, the synesthetic migration 
of abstract visual forms into the haptic domain says something about the 
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transmodal properties of such images. I have argued elsewhere that ab-
straction (including editing strategies that highlight abstraction, similar to 
those Sobchack describes) is fundamental to Kieślowski’s style.10
Along these same lines, Laura U. Marks argues for the weightiness of 
non-verbal knowledge as it is cinematically transmitted. She contends “that 
many new works in fi lm and video call upon memories of the senses . . .” 
and the title of her book, The Skin of the Film, “suggests the way vision 
itself can be tactile, as though one were touching a fi lm with one’s eyes.”11 
She calls this “haptic visuality,” an emphasis on the synesthetic relation 
between sight and touch, and argues that Gilles Deleuze’s “Time-Image” 
cinema offers her a model and terminology with which to discuss these 
“new languages” which are not verbal, as Deleuze draws on the philoso-
pher Henri Bergson, who always embodied memory in the senses. Marks 
writes:
I have found it necessary to understand how meaning occurs in the 
body, and not only at the level of signs. The elements of an embodied 
response to cinema, the response in terms of touch, smell, rhythm, and 
other bodily perceptions, have until recently been considered “exces-
sive” and not amenable to analysis. I will argue that they can indeed be 
analyzed— or, more properly, met halfway. Ultimately I argue that our 
experience of cinema is mimetic, or an experience of bodily similarity 
to the audiovisual images we take in. Cinema is not merely a transmit-
ter of signs; it bears witness to an object and transfers the presence of 
that object to viewers. (xvii)
Sobchack and Marks fi nd an unusual complement in an important aes-
thetician from the analytical school of philosophy, Jenefer Robinson, whose 
book Deeper than Reason (2005) argues that emotion should not be the Cin-
derella of the epistemological family, and reason should not be the wicked 
stepmother. Her question of what emotion is leads her to believe it is an 
exceptionally effi cient (however general) appraisal of a given situation. If it 
is an appraisal (and Robinson makes a very comprehensive case), it is a type 
of evaluation that yields a type of nonverbal knowledge. Some emotions 
are, in fact, “quick and dirty non-cognitive affective appraisals.”12
If we were to summarize what this immediate knowledge is, we might 
say that it is epistemologically heavy and direct knowledge, which precedes 
verbal language and includes bodily experience (including synesthetic, 
transmodal evocation) and emotion, both of which convey knowledge 
without the mediation of verbal categories. These are the feelings at the 
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gut— or “stomach”—to which Kieślowski alluded in the quote opening 
this essay.
Part of the reason philosophers and fi lm theorists are returning to these 
notions of bodily experience and direct knowledge is that the hard sci-
ences are too. Many neurologists are leaning away from the old dichotomy 
of sensing vs. understanding, precisely because there does not seem to be 
a direct, linear process from the low to the high stages in perception; the 
model is more like parallel processing than linear fl ow.13 Likewise, a lot of 
very fundamental perceptual work happens in the low areas, such that it 
is hard to imagine thinking without them. If that is so, perhaps even these 
low stages have a claim to knowledge. The psychologist Rudolf Arnheim 
argued for years that both intellect and intuition are essential for what it 
means to be human, and one should not be preferred over the other. In one 
of his many essays on the matter, he writes:
As far as the differences between verbal and nonverbal language are 
concerned, I will cite only the obvious example that many verbal 
languages treat things and actions as separate entities, whereas the 
directly perceptual media, especially the ones presenting movement 
such as pantomime or fi lm, display them as aspects of an inseparable 
experience. . . . Both means, the resources of direct experience and the 
instruments of concepts, are needed, whether by a scientist or an artist 
or indeed by any person curious about the world where he or she is 
living.14
Arnheim’s idea of the projection of meaning is nearly identical to Husserl’s 
intentionality. It is worth noting that most neuroscientists support this 
notion of active perception today.15 Likewise, philosopher and cognitive 
theorist Mark Johnson has recently developed an entire theory of aesthet-
ics based on intentionality, the primacy of emotion, and the deep, visceral 
foundations of knowledge.16 Thus, scientists have affi rmed the Husserlian 
hunch on intentionality and epistemological weight. This forms a founda-
tion for our exploration of everyday synesthesia, what scientists consider a 
type of multisensory process.
The everyday synesthetic experience is what I would call a diluted or 
semi-sensation. It is not exactly a memory, though memory drives it: It is a 
physiological, sensual response that evokes a cascade of other physiological 
and sensory responses, forming an epistemologically heavy dynamic of im-
mediate meaning in the perceiver. This is quite different from semantically 
mediated knowledge.
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The next section will analyze some instances where cinema is synesthet-
ically evocative, and I hope to show that this is not merely association or 
memory, or that our visceral reactions are merely crude impulses. Rather, 
both of those elements are inextricably bound together to form experien-
tial knowledge, something close to Sobchack’s “what my fi ngers knew” in 
her articulation of an embodied existential phenomenology.
The Synesthetic Immediate in The Decalogue
The preceding section formed a philosophical and neurophysiological case 
for sensuous knowledge. It is precisely this type of knowing that enables 
Kieślowski’s lived theological refl ection to function. Our examples from 
The Decalogue, to be explored here, will merely serve as that: examples, oc-
casions for experiential knowledge. Kieślowski draws on common memo-
ries, and neurophysiological sympathies, to convey the lived experiences of 
his characters, as they navigate the arenas of morality demarcated by the 
Commandments.
One might argue that this cinematic resonance is not unique to 
Kieślowski or even The Decalogue. However, one might also refl ect on the 
theological substrate undergirding the series, to which I alluded earlier in 
this essay. By tackling some of the most foundational sets of ideas in West-
ern culture, Kieślowski attempts to inject the Commandments with life, 
animating them as zones of experience in which we struggle to connect the 
ideal with the lived body.
One way he does this is through haptic synesthetic appeal, which takes 
on several stylistic manifestations. For instance, close-up shots of objects 
appeal to the haptic sense through a magnifi cation of texture. Particularly 
intense, abstract visuals have a function all their own in Kieślowski’s cin-
ema, but their synesthetic qualities lie in their emphasis on primary sen-
sory qualities (some of which—such as intensity and form—hold trans-
modal appeal).17 Shots of the tactile organs (hands, skin, and tongue) are 
also common, and they evoke a strong mimetic response. Images of hands 
induce strong synesthetic reactions, and powerful images of hands about 
to cut or being cut can be found in episodes Two and Three. Finally, haptic 
associations include images of things that have some natural or indexi-
cal relationship with the sense of touch (e.g., a shot of a fl ame evokes the 
memory of the feeling of heat, or pain, or both).18
We might say that Kieślowski’s fi lms appeal to the universal triangu-
lation of sense experience, emotion, and morality. This is most evident 
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in One, where Paweł’s metaphysical questions—“who is God?”—are an-
swered by a hug from his aunt Irena:
AUNT: What do you feel now?
PAWEŁ : I love you.
AUNT: Exactly. That’s where he is.
In our perception of the conversation, we are given a standard, back-
and-forth edited conversation. Paweł and his aunt do not appear in the 
same frame throughout their verbal, intellectual conversation. The end of 
this Socratic dialogue, however, culminates not in a linguistic answer, but 
a sensual one, as the two characters draw close into one frame. We see this 
proximity, but we also, transmodally, sense the smell of the aunt’s coat, the 
texture of her clothing, and the haptic intimacy of the diminished space 
between the characters. Kieślowski seems to be indicating here that the 
Decalogue series will present the possibility of God through the context of 
human relationships and sensual experience (the aunt and her nephew, and 
the intimate contact between them). In this way, Kieślowski presents the 
Commandments as abstract ideals that purport to order human life. Yet, 
their real impact is found in the nonverbal, emotional and sensual dynamic 
they create. They must be animated within a human sensual arena to have 
any real force, effect, or—as we have discussed—complete meaning.
Indeed, we might initially consider the fi rst episode as something of a 
template for how Kieślowski utilizes such appeals. It is worth noting that 
One, like so many of the episodes, begins with almost no dialogue. Here 
we see Kieślowski employing a stream of sensual appeals as well as looks 
and glances that index emotions. One image is the mangy frozen hair of 
the dead dog touched by Paweł, with which we might contrast Paweł’s 
later petting of the guinea pig, a cuddly little animal strikingly noted for its 
sharp teeth. From a semiotic perspective, the guinea pig is not a sign for 
soft sentiment. Rather, through synesthetic evocation of contrasting sen-
sations, Kieślowski problematizes a simplistic logical equation. Through 
sensation, the animal is at once felt to be lovable and threatening.
This sort of paradoxical duality is common in the synesthetic appeals 
Kieślowski makes throughout The Decalogue, and it functions as a phenom-
enological analogue to the intellectual paradoxes that are inherent in most 
theologies. To cite an example Kieślowski himself often pursued, how can 
one propositionally believe in fate or predestined future and still preserve 
some notion of free will? Theologians have wrestled with this paradox for 
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centuries, and many have labeled it a divine mystery beyond verbal or in-
tellectual reach. However, we often experience things that embody the 
paradoxes, and so we know them bodily, but not intellectually. In this case, 
the dialectic of the cuddly creature and its menacing sharp teeth manifests 
a concrete, sensual binary rather than a propositional one. This, and many 
other examples like it, suggests that we live through the paradox rather 
than intellectually resolve it.
The synesthetic appeals also inform our understanding of the charac-
ters and do something to advance the plot. For instance, Paweł shows his 
aunt a device to turn on the water in his apartment. His aunt, being a sen-
sual person who touches and engages the world more than she talks, sticks 
her hand in the stream. It is interesting that Kieślowski, fi ghting against 
the limiting time of 50 minutes for this episode, chooses to spend the extra 
time watching the aunt putting her hand in the water, for no other reason 
than to experience the water rushing over her skin. We might naturally see 
this in semiotic terms: She is a woman who is connected to water, mov-
ing water, as it stands as a symbol of life (and where frozen, still water will 
become a symbol of death) (Figure 2–1).
However, this interpretation can work only retroactively, since it is not 
part of the original experience of perceiving the image. What is primary is 
the synesthetic response: We sympathetically (Marks would say “mimeti-
cally”) remember something of the feeling of wetness on fi ngers, and that 
memory works more in the mode of feeling than abstract fact. Likewise, it 
is a key sensation for us to feel water (as well as the coldness of the dog fur 
and the milk bottle Paweł touches), because it will become central to what 
Paweł tragically feels at the end of the fi lm. Cold water also elicits pity in 
Three, when the cruel jailor hoses down the naked drunk, as well as humor 
Figure 2–1. Haptic appeal in Decalogue One.
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in the opening to Four, as father and daughter playfully douse each other 
with water. These are not merely symbols or propositions, but sensory 
engagements with the things that universally matter: life, death, joy, pain, 
love, and fulfi llment.
Later, Paweł’s touch of the blade of the skate represents childhood won-
der, but synesthetically it evokes an instantaneous danger or pain reaction 
that provides the story, even as it expresses another ironic binary, with 
childhood wonder and pain rolled into one image. Fire is a similar bi-
nary, which can be warm and comforting as well as painful. In addition to 
the campfi re of the young man in One, images of fl ames (and fl ames near 
hands) can be found in One, Two, Three, and Four.
The father’s walk on the frozen ice plays out a particularly interesting 
transmodal theme in Kieślowski’s Decalogue: the experience of tension and 
testing of limits. Kieślowski lingers on the image of the father walking 
on the ice, giving us time to anticipate whether the ice will break or not, 
and giving us synesthetic markers of its solidity. We might call this haptic 
testing, and it is a common theme throughout The Decalogue, a sensual 
analogue to the ideas of the Commandments as conceptual, intellectual 
limits. Characters often pensively nudge and push things, as if testing their 
material boundaries. These small challenges often happen at high emo-
tional moments for the characters, and may serve as a search for reality in a 
surreal moment, or as tests of the physical laws of the universe, performed 
in the hope that there may be some escape from them. The central point is 
not that there are such material limits, but that we know those limits bodily 
and we often wish to negotiate or transcend them. For instance, in Two, 
Dorota slowly pushes a mug of tea to the edge of the table, until it fi nally 
falls. In Four, a father, after hearing his daughter had an abortion, aimlessly 
pushes around some cordials on a table. In Five, ominously, Jacek nudges a 
rock closer and closer to the edge of the bridge rail, until it falls onto traffi c 
below, causing an accident (Figure 2–2).
Throughout the rest of The Decalogue, we see numerous other examples 
of these sorts of synesthetic engagements. For the sake of brevity, I will 
not itemize them all here, but only draw attention to a few more examples 
that might expand our understanding of how Kieślowski utilizes the synes-
thetic immediate to express what he called “essential, fundamental, human 
and humanistic questions.”19 We might develop some themes here, within 
which these synesthetic engagements can be contextualized: synesthetic 
evocations of life, struggle, and death.
We might include in the category “life” synesthetic moments of haptic 
intimacy (for example, when Paweł hugs his father after the chess match 
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Figure 2–2. Haptically testing limits in Decalogue 
Two.
in One) and sexual tension (as in most of Three, the story of an affair in 
the making, or in Four, when Anka’s drama coach tells her to “get closer” 
to her fellow actor). We remember in Seven that little Ania will not let go 
of her father’s fi nger, while her mother Majka asks in vain for kisses and 
tender hugs.
In Six, the relationship between synesthetic appeal and voyeurism is 
made plain, and the bodies of the characters become Kieślowski’s script. 
We may wish to touch Magda, even as her lover touches her. This intimacy 
provokes the jealous Tomek to report a fi ctitious gas leak, after which, in 
a sort of mad joy, he wildly punches the wall out of an embodied surplus of 
emotion. When Magda spills her milk, she plays in it with her fi nger. Later, 
Tomek’s hands on Magda’s thighs send him over the edge. Before long, he 
cuts his wrists. In each case, Kieślowski synesthetically appeals through 
lingering, carefully constructed, wordless images.
In a sense, all the episodes are about struggle on some level, but Two 
manifests this theme the most synesthetically. For instance, after Dorota 
coolly picks the leaves off her houseplant and mangles the stem, Kieślowski’s 
camera hangs on a close-up of the slowly rising remains of the plant. The 
stem rises, bit by ugly bit, refusing to die. In Andrzej’s hospital room, the 
dripping of water on the bed frame, peeling paint, and the drowning bee 
all exude a tension of time and duration that excruciatingly appeals to our 
sense of touch, and the embodied, sympathetic struggle for movement 
and life.
In Five, the most visceral of all the episodes, we are given this same strug-
gle unto inexorable death. The agonizing detail of each of Jacek’s blows, 
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and Waldemar’s desperate bodily surges and twitches in death, are matched 
only by the unbearable synesthetic tensions mercilessly present at Jacek’s 
hanging. The Russian Formalist Viktor Shklovsky famously said that the 
purpose of art was to “make the stone feel stony.”20 In Jacek’s hands the 
heavy, unrelenting stone feels so to mortal effect. Indeed, the entire episode 
is steeped in synesthetic evocation, from Jacek’s menacing twisting of the 
rope around his hands to his slovenly consumption of the pastry in the café.21
Finally, we might see Eight as one of the most direct instances of the 
mind/body dialectic. The fi lm begins with a moving camera, a child’s hand 
clasping an adult’s hand in the frame. The child’s fi nger moves delicately, 
trustingly, setting the synesthetic and emotional stakes high enough that 
we wince when we learn of her betrayal later. The old professor Zofi a says 
nothing throughout the opening sequence of the fi lm but, instead, exer-
cises, exerts, and comes to rest on the rough, wooden rail. The crooked 
picture frame symbolizes something of the outside forces which philoso-
phy never seems quite to conquer, even as it disrupts our transmodal sense 
of balance. This episode—which has more dialogue than most others and 
deals far more with abstract ideals, language, and rationality—is constantly 
being balanced by human touch and forces beyond control or articulation. 
The acrobatic rubber man in the park—who transmodally strains and pulls 
through our sense of our own bodily limitations—synesthetically embod-
ies the balance between ideals and embodied knowledge: “It’s just a matter 
of exercise,” he says to Zofi a. Even though the man declares that it may be 
“too late” for Zofi a to learn the embodied practice of fl exibility, Kieślowski 
suggests otherwise.22 Elżbieta, in the end, begins to pray again (one of the 
few overtly religious images in the series), and Zofi a and Elżbieta have 
several tender moments of contact. The fi lm ends with a silent image of 
reconciled touch between them—where God is, according to Aunt Irenka 
in One—thoughtfully observed from a distance by the weary, jaded tailor.
Kieślowski’s Decalogue presents the ideals of the Commandments as they 
meet the embodied, living person. He does not pretend that this meeting 
is always happy, easy, or even fully comprehensible, but our bodies know 
something of these Commandments and the reality to which they speak. 
Kieślowski’s embodied appeals remind us of their relevance, and—liter-
ally—engage us in their meanings. Their meanings, and the ideals they 
embody, are directly connected to theological assertions, which Kieślowski 
treats more like metaphysical themes. To conclude this essay, the relation-
ship between these themes, their theological substrate, and the synesthetic 
immediate dynamic warrants some refl ection.
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Theology and Synesthetic Appeal
In Carnal Thoughts, Sobchack has sketched out an existential, phenomeno-
logical, descriptive account of One that is articulate, insightful, and similar 
to my account, at least in some of its phenomenological concepts. What I 
have called “evocative” and “transmodal” phenomena, she refers to as “mi-
metic ana-logic” (89), and what I have called “nonrational knowledge” she 
refers to as “emotional turbulence” that has “equal weight” with “logical 
contingence” in Kieślowski’s cinema (90). In effect, she sees Kieślowski as 
demarcating the boundaries at which our “irrational” senses, desires, fears 
and dreams confront the brutal, limiting, material realities (87). I would 
not, generally, use the term irrational, but there is an overall sympathy 
between our arguments.
Sobchack ignores any kind of theological underpinning or context to 
the fi lms, and sees everything phenomenologically in terms of material 
existential experience and secular conjectures beyond that experience, such 
as contemporary chaos theory, which attempts to track patterns of ran-
domness and orderliness in the universe quite apart from any fi rst cause 
(90 n. 7). Her descriptions about how the “lived body” makes “sense” of 
the experience is infl ected—she readily admits—by her own philosophical 
presuppositions which are radically material and leave little room for any-
thing beyond what she calls a “concrete metaphysics,” which contemplates 
the interface of material body and material world (1–2, 87). She comes 
close to a theological concept when discussing the inexplicable and omi-
nous “I am ready” of the computer screen in One, but couches it in standard 
cultural studies language (i.e., “an emotional signature of otherness that 
doesn’t deign to ingratiate itself” [92]).23 She conceives of Kieślowski as a 
pessimist-yet-humanist, “tormented by transcendence” despite the “harsh 
dialectics” of his fi lms, which undermine stable religious metaphysical sys-
tems (86, 107–108).
For sure, one ought to be cautious when applying theological concepts 
to Kieślowski, given his dubious theological commitments and well known 
suspicion of organized religion. However, I would like to open up the ma-
terialist bracket here and allow for some theological refl ection. We are, 
surely, free to assume that theological ideas are not out of bounds in a fi lm 
built on the structure of the Ten Commandments, and there is evidence 
to suggest that Kieślowski himself was concerned with more than material 
reality.24 Rather than pursue a particular theology, however, it seems wiser 
to pursue some more general—rather than dogmatic—philosophical the-
ology here. What I mean by this is not to insist upon a particular religious 
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portrait of God or the particular creeds of a given church, but to see the 
Commandments as a type of zone, within which one can engage the ques-
tions of ultimate reality, morality, and purpose. There is evidence to sug-
gest that Kieślowski felt this way about the fi lms. His friend, the fi lmmaker 
Agnieszka Holland, once remarked:
I think that Krzysztof is somebody who had an incredibly deep need 
to believe in something transcendental. He did believe, but at the 
same time he wasn’t really the member of any church, and his rela-
tionships toward the religious were less theological than ethical and 
metaphysical.25
Within a broad theological context, one fi nds some parallels that Kie-
ślowski himself might have found attractive. Kieślowski’s need for “some-
thing transcendental” may very well grow from the same ground as the 
anti-materialist, anti-positivistic concerns of Poland’s most famous reli-
gious son, Karol Wojtyła, Pope John Paul II (whose photo appears, and 
whose person is discussed, in the very fi rst Decalogue installment, and com-
ically in Nine). Wojtyła was known as a serious philosopher, theologian, 
and even a poet, but his most signifi cant achievement, in the eyes of most 
Poles, was simply as a native son, unafraid to speak out about the oppres-
sion in his own country. At the time Decalogue was made, few fi gures—
religious or otherwise—were more important to the ordinary Pole than 
he was.26
Remarkably, Wojtyła’s theological approach to the body is contrary to 
much of religious history, where sensual experience and Western religious 
ideas have not been good bedfellows. Note how sensory experience is also 
akin to synesthetic experience in this quote, from renowned art historian 
David Freedberg:
From Clement of Alexandria (with all his antipathy to images) to 
Bernard Berenson (with all his love of them), the eyes are the channel to 
the other senses. These are what are dangerous, or enlivening, or both—touch 
above all. Once our eyes are arrested by an image, so the argument more 
or less runs from Plato onward, we can no longer resist the engage-
ment of emotion and feeling. . . . We may be moved; we strive to touch 
the unloving object before us. Whether inevitable processes or merely 
inclinations, these are what detract from the purity of mental opera-
tions tout court. That higher side of our beings that sets us apart from 
animals, the realm of intellect and spirit, is brought down and sullied. 
(Emphasis added)27
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Wojtyła’s approach, however, is to argue that a proper theology of the 
body begins with the notion of the material world as a divine gift (includ-
ing our material bodies, and all their sensual modes of understanding). He 
fi ghts against a Cartesian— or neo-Manichaean—division between mat-
ter and spirit, and argues forcefully that human beings should never be 
reduced to “mere matter.”28 He sees offi cial strictures on sensual life not 
as a Manichean tendency, but rather as its opposite: a safeguard for assur-
ing the “dignity of the body” (309). As for the human person, he admits an 
aspectual dualism of body and spirit, but does not admit a dualism of per-
son: “We cannot consider the body as an objective reality outside of man’s 
personal subjectivity” (364 –365). Thus, whereas Wojtyła might applaud 
Sobchack for the importance she has placed upon the body in perception 
and the generation of meaning, he would likely be concerned that the 
philosophical basis for her approach—her “concrete metaphysics”—still 
contains the danger that the body (and hence the other) will be reduced to 
“mere matter,” and thus abused as an “object” (94 –96).
Kieślowski, no doubt, differed from the pope on many things, but they 
did share essential concerns for sensory experience, a bodily experience of 
the world, and that life and truth not be measured solely in scientifi c, ma-
terial, or rationalistic terms. This is the essence of the quote that opened 
this essay, the Kieślowskian tripartite “mind,” “heart,” and “stomach.” It is 
also at the heart of Kieślowski’s assertion—after hours of study of religious 
commentaries and philosophies surrounding the “meaning” of The Deca-
logue—that he and cowriter Krzysztof Piesiewicz felt no compunction to 
articulate an authoritative interpretation of the Commandments. Rather, 
“we wished to say: ‘We know no more than you. But maybe it is worth in-
vestigating the unknown, if only because the very feeling of not knowing is 
a painful one’ ” (KK, xiv). The “pain” of “not knowing” is, it seems, indexi-
cal of the Commandments’ signifi cance for this generation.
Wojtyła’s theology of the body aims at the celebration of personhood—
persons as unity of body and spirit—as a remedy to those who would treat 
the body as an object. Such a notion is also at the heart of Martin Buber’s 
I-Thou binary.29 Buber’s conception of treating something as an “it” is to 
treat reality (be it a person or a tree) as an object for use or mastery. Rather, 
he encourages us to consider all of reality as a “Thou,” not objectifi ed, but 
giving and receiving in reciprocal relation to us. The Commandments, in 
summary, can be seen as a set of principles for avoiding the temptation to 
mastery.30 Kieślowski’s synesthetic appeals may be seen as simulations of 
that very struggle, even as it also presents sensory alternatives to an ar-
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rogant neo-Manichaeism. Mastery is, after all, a temptation that is both 
intellectual and sensual.
Kieślowski critiques the former, neo-Manichaean temptation in the 
very fi rst episode. “Eliot said poetry is what’s untranslatable,” Paweł’s fa-
ther remarks in his lecture, and this is another clue to Kieślowski’s pur-
suit of the Commandments (all that meaning attached to and suggested by 
those words, but which cannot be circumscribed by the words themselves). 
He goes on, in his materialistic fashion, to describe a godlike computer 
(“Try to imagine an interpreter capable of accumulating all knowledge of 
words and language with an unlimited memory that can be used at any 
time”), and as he speaks we ironically see that precise thing that the com-
puter cannot truly have: feeling-as-meaning, indexed by a close-up on 
his hands. Signifi cantly, this view belongs to his curious and affectionate 
young son, who has recently been told by his aunt that God dwells in the 
touch between persons. As Sobchack’s example has shown, hands are often 
the gateway for synesthetic experience, not simply conceptual symbolism 
of such experience.
The sensual temptation to mastery is found at the intersection of de-
sire, body, action, and morality, and so it is natural that Kieślowski’s synes-
thetic appeals would function so effectively here as well. For example, the 
cruel hosing of the drunk by the anti-Semitic orderly in Three provokes a 
double-synesthetic response: that of mastery and power over another, and 
a painful, haptic sympathy of cold. Likewise, our abstract, rational knowl-
edge of anti-Semitism informs our emotional and moral response. The 
balance here should not be lost. The temptation to hate the body must be 
countered by sensual knowledge, as it is through that appeal that so much 
of our sense of meaning, purpose, and ethics are foundationalized. At the 
same time, the senses are often inclined toward mastery and must be tem-
pered by principle and compassion.
In Kieślowski’s case, not only does he rely upon transmodal evocation, 
but he also uses it as a means of amplifying the sensual interface of the body 
with a given ideal. Essentially, this animation is through struggle, through 
experiential knowledge and the sense of pressure and limit, and the emo-
tion within the thematic space the command demarcates.31 No episode is 
like a sermon or a lesson, but rather, as Kieślowski says, “the fi lms . . . [are] 
infl uenced by the individual Commandments to the same degree that the 
Commandments infl uence our daily lives” (“Introduction,” xiv).
Kieślowski surely struggled over spiritual issues and nothing approach-
ing a religious conversion or certainty has been documented, but strug-
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gle, to the religious mind, is an essential part of the faith experience. The 
prominent “harsh dialectics” in Kieślowski’s fi lms, as Sobchack describes 
them (Carnal Thoughts, 106–108), are also complemented by numerous, 
mysterious occasions of grace, salvation, redemption, and joy. We should 
note that the family contact that defi ned God and opened The Decalogue 
(Paweł and his aunt embracing) returns in one of the fi nal images of Ten. 
We see two reconciling brothers, who not only forgive each other but press 
their foreheads together: a symbolic and haptic union of mind and body, to 
heal the Manichaean rift and to close this monumental fi lm series.
It is in these hopeful moments that the religious hope for the body 
makes its presence known in Kieślowski’s cinema. The theologian T. J. 
Gorringe argues that God has purposed sensual life as a mode of his own 
self-expression, and within this embodied experience we might fi nd hope.32 
It is a hope of human touch and sensual delight which facilitates healing, 
as suggested in episode Eight, through Zofi a and Elżbieta’s reconciled em-
brace. Intellectual and moral questions remain, but healing begins none-
theless. As Gorringe writes, “Through the exercise of our senses, God 
moves towards the creation of a new world, a world of the celebration and 
affi rmation of bodies, and therefore of the creator who imagined them and 
gave us them materially, as the consummate sign of the grace of God’s es-
sential nature” (27).
Unlike Gorringe, Kieślowski was not setting out to fi nd a theology of 
the body, but even so his Decalogue exhibits the same embodied drama 
of human brokenness and redemption. Kieślowski picked the Ten Com-
mandments as his structure because, in his own words, he looked around 
Warsaw and had the impression that he was “watching people who didn’t 
really know why they were living” (KK, 143). He simply wanted to see if 
these abstract ideas mattered, and if that mattering is measured by lived 
experience.
As Rudolf Otto wrote in his meditation on The Idea of the Holy, the ra-
tional and nonrational are the warp and woof of the spiritual fabric.33 One 
cannot have authentic religious experience without both, and Kieślowski’s 
fi lms address each of these perceptive arenas. His work is about the dance 
between the intuitive, intentional, emotional, and rational self and the raw 
forces of the world. Meaning is the essential dynamic, and in Kieślowski’s 
hands the Ten Commandments are less a set of decrees for him to interpret 
and more a description of the dance (and the dance fl oor), as well as the 
zones of sense, movement, and morality. One may assume that the Com-
mandments are simply expressions of norms or ideas, but the consummate 
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achievement of Kieślowski’s fi lms is that he demonstrates how these ideas 
still matter, that they form occasions for living encounters with the spiri-
tual, however broadly one wishes to defi ne it. In this light, it becomes clear 
that synesthetic appeal is a chosen vehicle to accomplish what has histori-
cally been a primary goal of religious experience—that is, in Cytowic’s 
words, “to describe that which transcends language” (The Man Who Tasted 
Shapes, 319).34
This essay has only begun to chart Kieślowski’s embodied approach to 
meaning. Kieślowski’s affi rmation of the body as the ground of knowledge 
acts as a corrective to overly idealist approaches to the Commandments. 
In other words, Kieślowski stitches the abstract ideal back into the body, 
where it matters, even as he ruminates on the instance of its mattering. We 
are not simply minds, pursuing the Divine, shirking off the body. Neither 
are we just brains, biomaterially processing input. The cinematic incarna-
tion of the Decalogue reminds us who we are, and it asks us who we wish 
(and ought) to be, body and soul.
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may appeal to mastery, even if the Commandments resist it. However, I believe 
that vision is more complicated than that, and, in short, Kieślowski’s images 
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c h a p t e r  3
Decalogue One: Witnessing a Responsible 
Ethics of Response from a Jewish Perspective
Moshe Gold
When a minister, rabbi, or priest attempts to solve the ancient 
question of Job’s suffering through a sermon or lecture, he does 
not promote religious ends but, on the contrary, does them a 
disservice. The beauty of religion, with its grandiose vistas, reveals 
itself to man not in solutions but in problems, not in harmony 
but in the constant confl ict of diversifi ed forces and trends.
—rabbi joseph b. soloveitchik
PAWEŁ  (THE YOUNG SON): “For the peace of her soul.” You didn’t 
mention a soul.
KRZYSZTOF (THE FATHER): It’s a form of words of farewell: there is 
no soul.
PAWEŁ : Auntie says there is [a soul].
KRZYSZTOF: Some fi nd it easier to live thinking that.
PAWEŁ : And you?
KRZYSZTOF: Me? Frankly, I don’t know.
—krzysztof kieślowski, Decalogue One
Creating a Tentative Relationship between Verse and Film
Viewers and critics commonly question the relationship between Krzysz-
tof Kieślowski’s ten fi lms entitled The Decalogue and the biblical Deca-
logue. Although the fi lms and the screenplays receive diverse theoreti-
cal, theological, and emotional responses, few studies have considered 
Kieślowski’s work from the perspective of Hebrew scripture, even more 
precisely, from the perspective of specifi c rabbinic and halakhic traditions 
of responses to those verses.1 Given that Kieślowski is portraying Poland, 
a Catholic country, most critics have privileged readings of the fi lms from 
a Christian perspective. Yet in neglecting interpretations that offer rab-
binic perspectives, we have failed to understand adequately the complex 
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relationship— one might even call it a hermeneutic encounter, both bibli-
cal and philosophical—between fi lm and commandments, a relationship 
that Kieślowski himself claims informed his research. The director notes 
that although he and fellow screenwriter Krzysztof Piesiewicz read widely 
from “both Old and New Testaments . . . we decided fairly quickly to dis-
pense with all of this. . . . We didn’t want to adopt the tone of those who 
praise or condemn. . . . Rather, we wished to say: ‘We know no more than 
you. But maybe it is worth investigating the unknown, if only because the 
very feeling of not knowing is a painful one.’ ”2 Instead of creating a specifi c 
and direct correlation among the Ten Commandments and the fi lm series, 
they “found it easier to solve the problem of the relationship between the 
fi lms and the individual Commandments: a tentative one. The fi lms should 
be infl uenced by the individual Commandments to the same degree that 
the Commandments infl uence our daily lives” (xiii–xiv).
By on the one hand seeking a direct correlation among the fi lms and the 
Ten Commandments and on the other hand ignoring the origins of the 
verses—words fi rst uttered in Hebrew scripture to the Jewish people—
past criticism has failed to explore the presence of Jewish interpretations 
of the Ten Commandments that, as I will show, lie dormant in the fi lms. 
Indeed, if we understand that Kieślowski’s reference to “our lives” can re-
fer to more than the two screenwriters, then our analysis of the religious 
dimensions of the fi lm ought to include Jewish responses as well. Becom-
ing more aware of the ample Jewish exegetical traditions can help eluci-
date the nuances of Kieślowski’s fi lm and the particulars of the Decalogue. 
At the same time, Kieślowski’s work presents critical challenges to Jewish 
readers of the Decalogue who do not stay attuned to complicated ways that 
these principles infl uence their “daily lives.” If the response to the bibli-
cal Decalogue remains routine and rationalized to such an extent that one 
disregards the verses’ intricacies and dilemmas, then the experiential and 
living signifi cance of the yoke of these principles can become antiquated 
and irrelevant.
The commentaries I will adduce address existential and ethical signifi -
cations from within the language and ethos of the biblical text. Moreover, 
we can better understand much of Kieślowski’s work once we experience 
it alongside the work of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik (1903–1993), one 
of the twentieth century’s preeminent scholars of Halakha and rabbinic 
hermeneutics, philosophy, ethics, and intertextual traditions.3 Though 
these two asymptotically related lines of thought never actually touch, the 
reverberations that resound as the lines get closer address those perennial 
questions that beset—and, in part, defi ne—human existence.
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I argue that the insights on traditional Jewish material suggested in many 
of the lectures and texts of R. Soloveitchik demonstrate that Kieślowski’s 
Decalogue might best be witnessed as enactments of a responsible ethics of 
response.4 By writing almost exclusively about the fi rst two verses of Exo-
dus 20—literally just sixteen words in the Hebrew text: “And God spoke 
all these words, saying: I am the Lord, your God, Who took you out of 
the land Egypt, from the house of slaves”—I explicitly work against the 
tendency in Kieślowski criticism to omit altogether the opening of Exo-
dus 20 from discussion. In addition, I demonstrate that although the words 
of the Decalogue in Exodus are indeed addressed to the Jewish people at 
Mount Sinai, R. Soloveitchik’s exegetical works on these two terse verses 
portray many insights that Kieślowski’s fi lm dramatizes, from a non-Jewish 
perspective and without clear resolutions, yet with utmost importance for 
those who continue to ask questions that challenge people of all faiths. 
Both Jewish and non-Jewish viewers can leave the fi lm with stark situations 
and dilemmas that demand responsible responses. Here, I use the word 
“responses” to include characters’ responses in the fi lm (such as Paweł’s 
[Wojciech Klata] father’s response to his son’s death or to the mysterious 
stranger or to the notion of a soul), the Jewish people’s responses to God 
in Exodus (as depicted in biblical verses and classic rabbinic commentar-
ies), the divine response to humans (unique and ambiguous moments in 
the fi lm such as the wax tears on the Madonna’s face, and God’s response 
to the Jewish people’s suffering in the house of bondage), and Kieślowski’s 
viewers’ responses to his work (such as those demanded by the camera).
I argue that with just this infi nitesimally small portion of rabbinic inter-
pretation that I cannot fully represent in these pages, viewers of Decalogue 
One will begin to notice the array of responses in the fi lm building in inten-
sity, creating a demand for responsible responses by anyone confronting 
Kieślowski’s fi lm. While Kieślowski is less interested in specifi c answers, 
he is precise in presenting the daily ethical dilemmas and limitations his 
characters encounter with each other, which he channels via a mysterious 
sense of transcendence that haunts much of his fi lm. Focusing nearly ex-
clusively on framing scenes in One that have not been adequately addressed 
by fi lm critics, I claim that lingering, haunting images and sequences of 
human responses and facial expressions actually demand that human beings 
who watch and listen to the fi lm acknowledge the fullness of possibility 
in the cinematic event by responding to the ethical obligation Kieślowski 
announces. The exact nature of each participant’s response will vary, as I 
will discuss with R. Soloveitchik’s interpretation of an ancient confl ict of 
interpretations—but a response is, dare I say, commanded.
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Moreover, a complex rabbinic and halakhic perspective on the Deca-
logue is a necessary addition to any critical notion of how the command-
ments “infl uence our daily lives” in the empirical world as we experience it: 
“All the frames of reference constructed by the philosophers and psycholo-
gists of religion for explaining the varieties of religious experience cannot 
accommodate halakhic man as far as his reaction to empirical reality is 
concerned.”5 By presenting a minute portion of a detailed rabbinic per-
spective on the prefatory words of the Decalogue, I wish to refute the fol-
lowing kind of critical claim: “[One] is a meditation on what for Kieślowski 
would be the fi rst of the Ten Commandments: ‘Thou shalt not worship 
false gods.’ ”6 Not only does this falsely overemphasize the “fi rst” part of 
the biblical Decalogue (it summarily dismisses the very two verses that my 
entire essay, and, I claim, One, address), but it also suggests a far too exclu-
sive “meditation” on “false gods.”
And God [Elokim] spoke all these words, saying . . . (Exod. 20:1)7
The narrative of One begins not with a causal, Aristotelian sequence, but 
rather with a powerful sense of empirical reality: ice, water, a lake, and the 
banks of a lake. As viewers can attest, the fi rst few moments of the fi lm, 
while focused on empirical nature, present a luminescent and haunting 
musical and imagistic (though not static) preface to the narrative proper. 
Why? Let us go back to Exodus for a moment. Though not in many lists 
of the Decalogue, the fi rst verse of chapter twenty in Exodus, according to 
traditional rabbinic exegesis, signifi es an abundance of information with 
each of its seven words.
Let us fi rst examine the rabbinic understanding of the word “Elokim,” 
which is too often simply translated as “God.” Indeed, this issue of transla-
tion stays attuned to Kieślowski’s fi lm, for much of the father’s (Henryk 
Baranowski) academic lecture and work concern the problems inherent 
in translating what many consider to be untranslatable (he mentions, for 
instance, Eliot’s comments on poetry). Rashi (1040–1105 CE), who is 
the biblical and Talmudic commentator par excellence and is the starting 
point for many Jewish interpretations of the Chumash (Pentateuch), claims 
that the word “Elokim” signifi es exacting punishment; “Elokim” invokes 
judges and adjudication. Rashi is actually stressing the uniqueness of the 
Ten Commandments. At times, the indication in the Torah is that people 
will not be punished if they do not observe volitional commandments.8 
From Rashi’s perspective, people might have thought that there is also no 
punishment for not obeying these Ten Commandments. “Elokim” thus 
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informs us, claims Rashi, that if people do not observe the Decalogue, the 
judge will adjudicate and people will be punished. The commandments are 
not optional here.
Rashi is working within a traditional interpretation of Elokim as stated 
in the Mekhilta, a classic rabbinic commentary on much of Exodus.9 Ac-
cording to this earlier text, disobeying a command by Elokim causes pun-
ishment in one’s life (rather than in the afterlife). R. Soloveitchik builds 
on these commentaries by the Mekhilta and Rashi by bringing us back to 
“Elokim” as used in the creation narratives of Genesis. For R. Soloveitchik, 
God’s “dual relationship to creation” is expressed in two terms: Elokim and 
the tetragrammaton. Elokim stands for the ruler of nature; the tetragram-
maton stands for the ruler of metaphysical laws.10 Here, R. Soloveitchik 
refers to Rashi’s comments on Elokim in Genesis: Elokim connotes “a 
shalit [the ruler of the cosmos] and shofet [the judge of the sociopolitical 
order]” (Rashi on Genesis 2:5). What does natural rule mean in this situ-
ation and how does this natural power of Elokim relate to the opening of 
the Decalogue? We can better understand natural law by focusing on the 
opening shots of One.11 First, let us notice the focus on nature in the fi lm’s 
opening shot, which barely receives comment.12 We must ask what sig-
nifi cance imbues Kieślowski’s mesmerizing depiction of the resplendent, 
organic complexity of nature, in the fi rst moments of his Decalogue. The 
slow camera movement shows the partly frozen natural waters moving as if 
with massive, but inexplicit, meaning.
The partly frozen water, which has been altered by human interven-
tion, indicates how people in the fi lm have defi ed a crucial meaning of 
Elokim, or, as R. Soloveitchik explains the term in Rashi and the Mek hilta: 
dayan le’hiparah (a judge to exact punishment), that which legislates both 
cosmic and sociopolitical orders. Elokim signifi es the principles of cau-
sality, mathematics, physics; moreover, a “violation of natural law always 
results in catastrophe” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:6). For R. Soloveitchik, this kind of 
 violation also occurs when “modern technologically minded” people try to 
gain absolute control of the environment. Put tersely, “natural law is basi-
cally an existential law . . . [one] either accepts the natural law, or causes the 
termination of [one’s] own existence. This is Elokim Shalit [judge]” (Nor’ot 
ha-Rav 5:8). In addition, Elokim is shofet, a lawmaker who legislates moral 
laws, and the outcome is similar: A violation of moral law causes catastro-
phe. R. Soloveitchik’s reading of Rashi (and the Mekhilta) invites us to real-
ize that Exodus 20 begins with Elokim to underscore that these “ten prin-
ciples constitute the foundation for any civilized existence, and are placed 
on the same level as the laws governing nature” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:12).13
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The term “Elokim” also refers to God’s relationship with the universe 
and with man in the natural universe. In Genesis, for example, Elokim 
dominates the fi rst chapter (“and Elokim said, ‘let there be light,’” and 
so on).14 One clear ramifi cation of R. Soloveitchik’s reading of Elokim in 
Exodus 20:1 and in the fi rst chapter of Genesis is that the term refers to 
a judge who exacts swift punishment in the world that humans inhabit. 
Violating natural law, such as adding heated water to a frozen pond, will 
cause a swift effect: Ice will melt (causing Paweł to die). Let us note that in 
Kieślowski’s screenplay, though not in the fi lm itself, this form of natural 
causation is given as the explanation for the ice on the lake breaking. The 
justice of natural law is exacting (which is why Elokim is used in the cre-
ation story of Genesis 1, when different dimensions and beings of nature 
are brought into existence). From this perspective, Exodus 20 begins with 
Elokim to announce that the basic moral laws contained in the Decalogue 
are not volitional; if disobeyed, dire consequences occur in this earthly, 
natural, existence.
Our focus on “Elokim,” however, is still insuffi cient to deal with 
Kieślowski’s opening scene, for the partly frozen ice alongside the fl ow-
ing water and above the natural world living beneath the icy surface os-
tensibly foreshadows the death of Paweł, the spilled ink bottle, and other 
haunting images. Indeed, it is not simply death that is foreshadowed, but 
natural life and death in sentient beings.15 For instance, the animal king-
dom appears in unexpected fi gurations in this fi lm. The opening shot 
before we move to Paweł and his father focuses on birds; then we witness 
Paweł happily responding to the pigeons through the window; shortly 
thereafter, Paweł encounters the dead dog; then at school Paweł encoun-
ters the living guinea pig in the arms of a female peer. At this point 
Kieślowki switches to the father’s lecture, which deals with translation 
and symbolic transfers of meaning. From this point in the fi lm, animals 
become representations of animals.16 For example, Paweł in bed looks 
at pictures of birds, and quite powerfully, in bed before the second half 
of the fi lm, Paweł clutches his stuffed elephant. Indeed, this stuffed ele-
phant echoes the unseen but mentioned Miss Piggy and Kermit—puppet 
creatures (but representing, however comically, animals) who inhabit the 
mathematical word-problem Paweł’s father gives his son toward the start 
of the fi lm. The father’s response to the animal kingdom is exclusively 
symbolic; the son, though, in his fi rst screen appearance, happily watches 
the natural drama of pigeons fl ying and taking crumbs. We can sense 
the joy on the boy’s face. Why should Kieślowski intersperse all of these 
natural creatures into his metaphysical drama? Why should he move from 
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images of real natural beings to images of either illustrations or fake natu-
ral beings?
I would like to suggest, based on the rabbinic interpretation of Elo-
kim as exacting judge of natural laws, that Kieślowski’s fi lm intersperses, 
overlaps, and merges the Decalogue’s earthly natural principles—causal, 
cosmic, earthly, animal nature, and sociopolitical, interhuman nature—
with existential and spiritual principles. Just as we should not view part of 
the Ten Commandments in Exodus as being inherently more natural than 
other parts, we should not separate all the parts of Kieślowski’s Decalogue. 
The fi lms go together, and both the natural and mysteriously transcendent 
moments are experienced, and responded to, by the same characters. Un-
like critics who want to divorce the rational character from the spiritual 
character, or the natural element from the spiritual element, we can more 
effectively recognize the honesty and complexity of Kieślowski’s project by 
addressing the mixture of these parts “in our daily lives.”
To better understand this idea from a rabbinic perspective, let us return 
to Exodus 20:1, but now let us focus on the word kol (all): “Elokim spoke all 
[kol] these utterances.” The word “all,” it turns out, displays an enhanced 
notion of parts existing together. Once again, R. Soloveitchik becomes an 
exegete of Rashi, who is an exegete of the Mekhilta. A close reading reveals 
that the biblical verse does not need to use the word kol; it is superfl uous 
on the level of simple plot, so it means, for Rashi, that God pronounced all 
the words simultaneously, in one statement. From a halakhic perspective, 
R. Soloveitchik points out that kol has two meanings: It is a mathematical, 
additional, integrated sum total of something, and it denotes a gestalt, a 
wholeness, an intrinsic oneness of total unity. The total of the second is 
intrinsic unto itself, whereas the total of the fi rst is integrative (adding parts 
up to a sum total).
The question, then, is what kol means in Exodus 20:1. R. Soloveitchik 
claims that God did not speak “all” as in an additive sum, where each part 
has its own priority over the complete sum of the parts; if so, then “all” 
would indeed be superfl uous in the verse. Rather, the Mekhilta and Rashi 
demonstrate that God spoke all Ten Commandments in a holistic, gestalt 
manner. The Decalogue is not the sum of adding ten, mutually indepen-
dent and unrelated parts, but is an “organic unity” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:18). 
The practical consequence of this reading—as Kieślowski might say, the 
infl uence on “our daily lives”—is that the “Decalogue is indivisible” (Nor’ot 
ha-Rav 5:18). When the Mekhilta claims that God says it “all” in one say-
ing, the Mekhilta is asserting a powerful message to people: Accept “all” 
or none at “all.”
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Unlike critics who want to accept a stark division between science (or 
reason) and faith in One, or a stark division between a ritual or theological 
notions of morality and secular, humanistic notions of morality, or even a 
stark separation between each of Kieślowski’s ten fi lms, a rabbinic under-
standing of “all” in Exodus 20:1 would allow us to perceive that the very 
notion of the Decalogue itself is based on an “all” together or “none at all” 
attitude. Any question about God’s participation in this world cannot be 
limited to abstract theological conceptions, or those that might be asked in 
the rooms governed by Paweł’s father. Such a question must include Elo-
kim’s participation in all natural principles as well. In other words—and 
this is crucial for an effective response to all of One—we need not wait for 
Paweł’s father to enter the church at the end of the fi lm to start encounter-
ing the challenges of God’s participation in creation and destruction. The 
opening scene of ice, water, fi re, and birds, with the mysterious man star-
ing directly at us, not to mention the crosslike image of the building as the 
camera moves upward, challenges us to respond to all that we witness (Fig-
ure 3–1). Indeed, we are placed in a postevent position at the start of the 
fi lm, for the aunt, Irena (Maja Komorowska), cries in response to the fi lmed 
vision of Paweł, who has already died, on screen before her. The cross-cut 
to the mysterious man crying suggests that he too has experienced Paweł’s 
death. The fi lm’s plot is over before the fi lm begins. What matters is the 
history of responses and responsible memories, the human responses to 
others and to moments that suggest mysterious transcendence—even, or 
perhaps especially, in nature.
Figure 3–1. The mysterious man staring directly 
at us in Decalogue One.
F6707.indb   58 4/7/16   6:57:57 AM
Decalogue One 59
The consequences of this reading, both of the verse and the fi lm, are far-
reaching. For R. Soloveitchik, the Mekhilta and Rashi promote a notion of 
the Decalogue that cannot be based on a secular, social morality that relies 
for its authority and commandments on either one’s own judgment or the 
legislation of one’s moral conscience. R. Soloveitchik quotes a famous pas-
sage in the Tosefta (a Tannaitic source from the times of the Mishnah)17 to 
show that a Decalogue morality presupposes that “one does not steal from 
his neighbor unless he also denies the existence of God” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 
5:20). Kieślowski’s fi lm enacts for us the following traditional dilemma: 
Should one accept authority and legislation of moral norms from outside 
of oneself, or should one attempt to create a moral conscience that strictly 
comes from one’s own reasoning? One embodies the dilemma itself.
In fact, R. Soloveitchik’s understanding of the Tosefta brings us to a 
strange narrative, one that speaks to Paweł’s father’s agnostic comments 
in the fi lm about the soul and God. When considering the question of 
whom society should “consider a contemptible creature,” the Tosefta says, 
“Rabbi Reuven answered that society should hate the atheist, the agnostic, 
the skeptic, one who denies the existence of his Maker. The philosopher 
did not understand. He asked, ‘How is this so? Why should a non-believer 
be held in contempt and hate? Isn’t faith the private affair of the individual? 
His skepticism is not harmful to society’ ” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:21). Tellingly, 
R. Soloveitchik emphasizes the social dimensions of a choice that the phi-
losopher perceives affects only the individual: “Rabbi Reuven answered, 
‘Honor thy Father and Mother, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not forni-
cate, Thou shalt not steal; there is no man who will violate these precepts 
until he has denied the existence of his Maker’” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:21). For 
this Tosefta, if there is no faith in God, social relations on all levels will 
disintegrate.
Kieślowski, though, is surely not arguing that we should hate Paweł’s 
father or his skepticism. What he might be arguing is that in a society 
there might not be (typologically) Paweł’s father without Paweł’s aunt. 
How so? To better understand the social dimension here, let us move to 
R. Soloveitchik’s interpretation of the traditional rabbinic stance against 
secular ethics in terms of the opening words of the Decalogue, and, of 
all things, Marxism, which brings to mind the political history and con-
text looming behind the massive edifi ce that is the main structural setting 
for Kieślowski’s fi lm.18 For R. Soloveitchik, “Marxism is fundamentally an 
ethical credo . . . [since the] underlying idea of Marxist econometrics is 
justice. Labor, according to Marx, creates the economic value system, and 
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hence the so-called ibber-wurth belongs to the laborers and not to the in-
vestor or the Capitalist” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:24). Yet, based on his analysis of 
Russian Marxism, R. Soloveitchik claims that this “ethical doctrine turned 
into a gospel of brutality and tyranny” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:24), for without 
adherence to a moral power beyond oneself, without the fi rst verses of the 
Decalogue, which stress human relations with the divine, there can be no 
adherence to the second half of the Decalogue, which stresses human rela-
tions with humans.19
The kol (all) of Exodus 20:1 turns out to mean an ethical principle: The 
Decalogue cannot be divided since it is a gestalt whole. One cannot re-
spond to parts of the Decalogue without responding to all of the Deca-
logue. Theological faith must be integrated into secular morality: “Man 
cannot legislate his own moral laws” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:26). Moreover, ar-
gues R. Soloveitchik, ethos and ritual are so bound together that they are, 
for most purposes, identical. There is no opposition between the sacred 
and the mundane, the academic lecture hall or the hall of a house of wor-
ship. Sacredness, unlike what Paweł’s father might think as he bursts into 
the church at the end of the fi lm, is not limited to cultic gestures, to rituals, 
to the ecclesiastical. R. Soloveitchik even calls this attitude of strict separa-
tion “moral schizophrenia” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:29). Unlike such schism, the 
kol unity of the Decalogue means that no moral system can be divorced 
from faith. Kieślowski’s fi lm as a whole, not a specifi c character within the 
fi lm, performs these very confl icts.
Not only should one not bracket One from all ten fi lms, but one 
should also respond to the whole of One in terms of metaphysical, spiri-
tual, and physical laws. In other words, the father’s lecture on theories 
of translation needs to be applied to the fi lm itself. Whether the fi lm 
translates real birds into illustrations; animals into stuffed animals; natu-
ral calculation into seemingly unnatural events, frozen ice into melted 
ice; candle wax drippings on a painting into (possibly) real tears of the 
Madonna; human memory into computer memory (or even, in the aca-
demic lecture, “unlimited memory” of a translator); digital commands 
into locked doors and running water; Polish into English (Paweł is sup-
posed to take English  lessons, but his tutor is sick); or Hebrew verses on 
the Ten  Commandments into Kieślowski’s Decalogue: All of these trans-
lations  suggest that responses to transcendence cannot be kept inside a 
single location (the walls of a church) or a single time (either of happiness, 
during the aunt’s time with Paweł or Paweł’s time with the birds; or of 
horrible sadness, during the time after Paweł’s death, when the father’s 
inward state is the focus of the screen or during Paweł’s response to the 
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dead dog). Just as the opening shot does not stay focused on fi xed ice, 
but moves along frozen and fl owing water, so too what was ostensibly 
mundane, even a bottle of ink, can suddenly translate into an intimation 
of mysterious transcendence and sacredness, and vice versa, as happens 
with the holy water turned into a block of ice in the shape of a tear on the 
father’s head at the fi lm’s end.
Yet, while the array of responses is starting to come to the critical fore, 
the nature of this command is still not clear enough. That is because, in 
part, we have not yet addressed the last word in Exodus 20:1, laymor, which 
means “saying.” In a simple reading, the word appears to be superfl uous. 
If God “spoke all these words,” then why should the verse add a word that 
means “saying as follows”? If, however, the act of saying became a perfor-
mance by respondents, then the word accrues a constellation of meanings. 
God “spoke all these words” in order that the people respond by saying 
something in acknowledgment of “all” these words. As Rashi says, quot-
ing Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion from the Mekhilta, “this teaches us that the 
people would answer ‘yes’ to the positive commandments and ‘no’ to the 
negative commandments” (Rashi on laymor in Exodus 20:1). The Mekhilta 
itself, as R. Soloveitchik points out, also includes Rabbi Akiva’s opinion that 
the people responded yes to both positive and negative commandments.
What parts of the verse troubled the Mekhilta? For R. Soloveitchik, 
there are two issues: one halakhic, the other semantic. In terms of Halakha, 
there are intricate legal procedures for a convert to undergo to accept “the 
yoke of the commandments” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:32). To accept this yoke 
fully, it was insuffi cient to say, “we will do and we will hear/learn” in re-
sponse to the whole Torah. God required that each dibur, each saying, 
“each law, each principle, be accepted individually” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:32). 
In terms of semantics (the second issue), the word laymor in Hebrew often 
means “to be repeated” by someone (usually Moses) to an audience (usually 
the Jewish people). The exegetical problem here is that God addresses the 
people directly; God does not use Moses as a hermeneutic intermediary. 
Thus, laymor semantically appears to be logically irrelevant. The Mekhilta 
therefore claims that laymor actually indicates responsiveness, acceptance, 
assent, or confi rmation by the people: “ ‘laymor’ has the connotation of be-
ing accepted, of taking upon oneself, of being committed, of responding to 
the great challenge” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:33).
With this hermeneutic of response in place precisely during the open-
ing verse and scene of the Decalogue, we must ask what the difference is 
between Rabbi Yishmael’s account and Rabbi Akiva’s. Here, R. Soloveit-
chik explores the psychological, legal, and ethical distinctions between the 
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two to such an extent that he connects this dispute to the critique of secular 
ethics whenever the concept of chok (commandments that human reason 
cannot rationalize) gets removed from practice “in our daily lives.” Accord-
ing to Rabbi Yishmael (which is Rashi’s only account), the Jews accepted, 
that is, responded to all the positive commands with the affi rmative “yes”: 
“I am your God”—“yes.” The people accepted, that is, responded to all the 
negative commands with the negative “no”: “You shall not accept other 
gods”—“no.” On the other hand, according to Rabbi Akiva, the people 
responded “yes” to everything. Phrased in a modern philosophical man-
ner, the foundation of this confl ict emanates from different interpretations 
of “the philosophy of motivation” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:34). Here R. Soloveit-
chik provides a quotidian anecdote to explain the ancient dispute. If R. So-
loveitchik were to tell his grandson Moshe not to play with another child 
because the child is poorly behaved, his grandson might respond either by 
saying “‘No, Zeidy. I won’t play with him,’ or he may answer, ‘Yes, Zeidy, I 
shall not play with him’ ” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:34 –35). For R. Sloveitchik, what 
distinguishes this answer is whether his grandson agrees with his assess-
ment, or whether he agrees to be obedient: “When Moshe tells me, ‘No 
Zeidy, I shall not play with him,’ he means to say that he concurs with me as 
far as my evaluation. . . . [But if ] he answers ‘Yes, I will not play with him’ 
[it] means . . . ‘I shall respect your wishes. I myself do not see any harm in 
fraternizing with Johnny. . . . However, your order will be carried out’ ” 
(Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:34 –35). This fi ctional distinction of responses—narrated 
clearly in terms that affect our daily lives—embodies an essential question 
in Halakha and, for that matter, a question any individual who seeks to 
obey a commandment might ask: What motivates one’s obedience to a law? 
Should a person follow Rabbi Yishmael—answering “No, I won’t play”—
out of an existential motivation that expresses an inward urge to agree with 
an ethical norm? Or should a person follow Rabbi Akiva, answering, “Yes, 
I will not play”: an act of obedience that is imposed from without?
R. Soloveitchik’s distinction applies to the two kinds of decrees uttered 
in the Decalogue. The majority of commandments in the Decalogue are 
mishpatim, usually defi ned as norms that one considers to be reasonable, 
not chukim, usually defi ned as ritualistic norms that do not have explicit 
reasons. The stereotypical division between mishpatim and chukim keeps 
these norms in mutually exclusive categories, if not in opposition. Chukim 
are not to be understood fully by means of rationally derived principles, 
but are to be accepted out of submission to the law. Mishpatim, such as the 
decrees that deal with interhuman relationships, are comprehensible by 
reasonable people. This, for R. Soloveitchik, is Rabbi Yishmael’s philoso-
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phy of motivation: We use our reasoning to fi nd negative acts, like stealing 
or killing, despicable, so we reject them.
However, Rabbi Akiva’s philosophy of motivation presents a radically 
different psychology and ethics: We conform to the negative commands 
because of the normative decree.20 For Rabbi Akiva, there is no motiva-
tional difference between the mishpatim and the chukim. Without using 
any Derridean language, R. Soloveitchik deconstructs the standard op-
position between chukim and mishpatim to claim that a “clearly defi ned 
distinction between chukim and mishpatim is almost non-existent. It is 
a sheer illusion” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:41). Although R. Soloveitchik demon-
strates that there are occasions when stealing or murder might be accepted 
by one’s own conscience, and even acceptable by society, he claims that 
whether one truly understands the full nuances of the decree or not, the 
judge in these cases cannot be human criteria of ethics or justice: “Left to 
its own conscience, society, little by little, simply destroys the very fabric 
of its morality” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:45). Ethical reasonableness is an insuffi -
cient source for social justice; people cannot defer to their own sensitivity. 
The responses of hatred to the atheist (in the Tosefta) is not necessarily a 
hatred of a human being, but a hatred of an ideological ethics that remains 
grounded in pure inwardness, a rationality understandable by a person’s 
own cognitive powers. Marxism as an ethical system is to be despised, from 
this perspective, because it attempts to base the ethics of the Decalogue 
entirely on human cognition: “It is not atheism that can replace God, but a 
new godless religion such as Communism” (“Aseret ha-Dibrot,” 117).
In his own precise manner, Kieślowski’s opening fi lm presents this an-
cient debate about motivation for all (kol) the episodes to follow. What is 
the natural motivation behind both Paweł’s father’s and his aunt’s beliefs, 
fi delities, trusts, and behaviors? The word laymor in Exodus 20:1 signifi es 
acceptance by those who receive the Decalogue. The nature of this ac-
knowledgment is precisely what Kieślowski demands of his viewers when 
he has his characters and his scenes dramatize the confl icting motivations. 
Instead of seeing One as only depicting a confl ict between scientifi c and 
religious beliefs, which is a more traditional understanding of the fi lm, I ar-
gue that we should now see the fi rst episode as dramatizing the ethical ten-
sion of responses to noncognitive, nonrational experiences and obligations 
as well as to cognitive, rational, mathematically calculated experiences—
particularly through the camera’s intense focalization on facial responses 
of the natural father and aunt, the facial responses of the iconic Madonna 
mother (with her tears of wax), the facial response of the chess master to 
the father-son winning team, the facial response of a perplexed human to a 
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computer screen that is “ready” for something, and the facial responses of 
the mysterious man at the fi re.21 As R. Soloveitchik claims, “God may be 
found in science, aesthetics, and morale, in crisis or in triumph” (“Aseret 
ha-Dibrot,” 116); we might add, in an aunt’s hug with her nephew. Even 
in an academic room, which ironically and sadly anticipates the father’s 
silent rage and inward struggles at the front of the church, the camera lin-
gers on the responses of the father’s audience, and most intensely, on the 
young Paweł’s directorial responses of framing his father from different 
angles and perspectives (all occurring as the professor discusses aesthetic 
potentials for computers and the problem of translating what might be un-
translatable). When searching for a source of human morality, a response 
to scientifi c order is not, at base, that much different from a response to 
beauty. Moreover, if we understand R. Soloveitchik’s interpretation of 
Rabbi Akiva, then as Kieślowski shows, human beings are fully capable of 
reasoning and killing, of cognitive rationality and immorality, of creating 
artifi cial systems of translations, computing, beliefs, and a felt sense of a 
divine gift in a human embrace. For Rabbi Akiva, though, the fi rst way 
to stop murder is to submit to a force outside of oneself, to obey a divine 
decree that comes from outside human invention. Kieślowski fi lms these 
philosophical differences to demand a response to it “all” from us, his fi lm’s 
respondents.
From this perspective, one in which, as the Mekhilta underscores, there 
are not ten utterances, but a single utterance by God, the entire series 
of fi lms relies on our initial response to the natural opening and to these 
fi rst characters’ responsive and affective convictions and motivations. 
Kieślowski’s fi lm moves us to a crucial realization: Ritual commandments 
cannot be separated from commonsensical ethical ones. Building in incre-
mental intensity, the frozen (natural) water that cracks and the freezing 
water that fl ows beneath the icy surface—the opening and simultaneously 
the absent narrative center of the entire fi lm, since we never see the mo-
ments of Paweł’s death in icy water—is also the frozen (spiritual) water that 
Paweł’s father puts to his head at the end of the fi lm. Natural cosmic orders 
cannot be separated from socioeconomic orders, which cannot be sepa-
rated from social justice, which cannot be separated from the motivation 
behind a response. I would even claim that Kieślowski is, ironically, at his 
clearest when he does not fi lm the event of Paweł’s death: What better way 
to say to us that the fi lm is about the responses to that event, from start, to 
middle, to end? Again, even the face of the watcher seen toward the start 
of the fi lm—before we even see Paweł with his father—demands our re-
sponse to a felt acknowledgment. Even without knowing ancient Talmudic 
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and halakhic disputes, Kieślowski fi lms the utterly intense, even horrifi c, 
resolve of human beings’ responses to chok. Do we, those of us watching in 
the audience, want to say “yes” or “no” to Kieślowski’s pronouncement?
I am God [tetragrammaton], your God [Elokekha], Who took you 
out of the land of Egypt, from the house of slaves. (Exod. 20:2)22
The next verse is often quoted as the fi rst offi cial saying in the biblical Deca-
logue. It might at fi rst seem more familiar to Kieślowski’s critics, but the rab-
binic exegesis will defamiliarize it by taking us to vastly different dimensions 
of divine expression and human confl icts, specifi cally, the relation between 
doubts and responses. The fi rst word stresses the speaker’s ethos—Anokhi 
(meaning “I”)—by referring to a particular event, the exodus from Egypt 
and bondage, rather than to a universal emphasis on nature or genesis. Why, 
as classic Jewish commentators ask, does God not describe Himself as the 
Creator of the cosmos rather than as the Redeemer? Rashi provides multi-
ple responses. First, he says, “taking you out of Egypt is suffi cient reason for 
you to be subject to Me.” This interpretation agrees with that of Ibn Ezra, 
who “quoting Yehudah Halevi, says that the reason for this was that the Jews 
had not experienced Creation but had experienced the Exodus” (“Aseret ha-
Dibrot,” 114–115).23 They needed to respond to their personal redeemer. 
This personal experience might also help to explain why Kieślowski stresses 
the extremely personal experiences of his characters. Unlike a philosopher 
or theologian, Kieślowski does not fi lm an abstract philosophical treatise 
on the powers of creation. His characters live in the ethical confl icts and 
emotional turmoil of their personal, daily lives. One cannot quite relate to 
the Decalogue if it does not address the intimately felt, lived experiences of 
human beings who suffer, who are in bondage, who are enslaved.
Rashi augments this explanation by observing the strangeness of the 
word Anokhi (“I”). In terms of the Hebrew language, one must ask why 
God does not use the more standard Hebrew word for “I,” Ani. Here, 
R. Soloveitchik distinguishes the semantic valences of the two words for 
“I.” One would use ani when “I” is the subject of the sentence, but the 
“emphasis [of the sentence] is on the action” (“Aseret ha-Dibrot,” 115). 
One would use anokhi when one wants to proclaim and stress one’s very 
identity. The verse, in other words, has God proclaiming that his iden-
tity is God. Why? Because people at the time, claims Rashi, encountered 
different appearances of the divine. During the exodus, at the parting of 
the waters, God appears “as a mighty warrior,” but now, here at Mount 
Sinai, God appears “as an old man, full of mercy.” Out of concern that 
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the people would confusedly think that there are multiple divinities, God 
says “Anokhi”—it is I, the same God, the same identity. Crucially, what 
R. Soloveitchik claims we learn here is that “God’s actions differ . . . since 
actions are in response to different needs, to different situations” (Nor’ot 
ha’Rav 12:109). Since imitatio dei in rabbinic discourses demands the hu-
man imitation of divine characteristics, we need to learn degrees of change 
and appearances in response to different confrontations. That is, unlike a 
perception of God as an actor fi xed in the same motion or appearance con-
stantly, R. Soloveitchik’s interpretation shows how beings need to respond 
differently, to behave differently, depending on the situation and needs.24
It is precisely here (with God in both warrior and merciful guises), how-
ever, that our analysis brings us to a crucial difference between one of the 
fi lm’s notions of God (and the human response to the divine) as expressed by 
Paweł’s aunt, and R. Soloveitchik’s emphasis on rabbinic Judaism’s concep-
tions of divine manifestations. After Paweł says that he feels love when em-
bracing his aunt, his aunt says that that is where God is. This utterance by 
the aunt does not mandate that God is found exclusively in interhuman em-
braces, but her comment about God’s location or felt presence does appear 
to emphasize love more than anything else. This particularly Christian view 
does not correspond with R. Soloveitchik’s halakhic perspective. The di-
vergence in the asymptotic relation I have created intensifi es here. Namely, 
“Judaism, as a moral discipline, is not a homogenous discipline of love and 
compassion. Judaism is also very practical; it knows that man cannot protect 
himself with love alone” (“Asert ha-Dibrot,” 115). In other words, complex 
moral discipline is precisely what the opening of the Ten Commandments 
stresses. When we consider the notion of imitatio dei or when we seek God’s 
appearance in the world, we should understand that God assumes multiple 
guises on earth, at times a being who exacts punishment and justice, at times 
a being who is imbued with and expresses love and mercy.25 The translation, 
so to speak, depends on the situation’s responsible responses. The aunt’s no-
tions and expressions of love and God are not necessarily wrong, but they 
are insuffi cient to express or depict the manifold nature of the divine. It is 
not the case that we should leave the fi lm insisting that only Paweł’s father 
needs to add his sister’s faith to his own existence; it is the case, rather, that 
the sister also needs to add her brother’s understanding of the cosmos to 
her notion of God and love. In both cases, moments of violence and death 
would destroy any person’s conception of the divine if the divine only in-
cludes a human sense of love in the living embrace of two humans. Human 
beings “cannot protect [themselves] with love alone.”
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Rashi does not leave us with just a focus on multiple responses and 
guises. He adds another interpretation, one that stresses difference in 
sound, voice, and direction. In turn, I argue, we can use his commentary 
to address the signifi cant direction of technological sounds in the second 
half of One. The people at Sinai might have been confused about multiple 
identities of God due to His different actions and appearances (“Aseret ha-
Dibrot,” 115). Thus, the Decalogue teaches people to resist a fi xed posi-
tion; as part of the injunction to imitate the divine, we must learn to adapt 
to needs and circumstances. In addition, claims Rashi, the people might 
have also been confused “because [they] heard many sounds [during the 
revelation], as it says ‘the sounds’ (Exodus 20:15) coming from four direc-
tions and from the heavens and earth” (Rashi on Exodus 20:2). Here, the 
potential doubt in the people’s responses addresses the relation between 
identity and difference: Because voices were coming from all directions—
the word kolos in Exodus 20:15 is in plural—people might have inferred 
that there are many divinities. Hence, God announces “Anokhi”—I, with 
my unique identity—am the only God speaking. R. Soloveitchik claims 
that the multiple directions “demonstrate . . . the universality of Jewish 
law [which] is not bound nor confi ned to one area” (Nor’ot ha’Rav 12:111). 
Speaking in America and aware of the Diaspora, R. Soloveitchik posits that 
regardless of location, people must abide by identical commandments.
Whereas this interpretation explains the four directions, it does not ac-
count for the additional claim of two directions and voices “from heaven 
and earth.” For this reason, R. Soloveitchik shows a dialectic that, I argue, 
works effectively to explain Kieślowski’s need to have both the sister and 
the father respond to Paweł, as well as his need to have Paweł’s father and 
sister respond, each in different locations and at different times, to screens 
(television and computer) and representations that point to the divine (the 
picture of the Pope and the artwork representing the Madonna). Addition-
ally, it turns out to address the multiple sounds that play such crucial roles 
in the transformations of the father’s ethos and the narrative structure. 
God’s voice needs to come from above, or the heavens, to respond to peo-
ple who wish to live the lives of saints, lives “in defi ance of society” (Nor’ot 
ha’Rav 12:113), for Torah principles and an ethical existence. At the same 
time, God’s voice needs to come from the earth below to respond to peo-
ple who live within society, in an earthly, carnal existence—people who 
do “not work to surrender nor withdraw from joys of this world” (Nor’ot 
ha’Rav 12:113). In other words, God does not only address the saintly life 
of the Pope in Irena’s picture; God also addresses those who toil in the 
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frozen earth and water, those who need to light fi res for warmth and for 
heating water (which includes both Paweł and the mysterious man).
Thus, for R. Soloveitchik, when God announces “Anokhi/I am God 
[tetragrammaton], your God,” God is asserting that there are multiple 
ways for people to reach the divine. On the one hand, for example, one can 
be a great scholar and academic, demanding the most from one’s intellect 
in order to use one’s intellect to reach the divine. Indeed, one of R. So-
loveitchik’s major contributions to Jewish notions of imitatio dei (developed 
extensively in Halakhic Man) is the obligation to imitate God’s creativity; 
thus, R. Soloveitchik is a major advocate of advanced, intellectual creativ-
ity and self-creativity.26 One might even say that R. Soloveitchik’s heroic 
paradigm for the typological halakhic person is the mathematician who 
calculates an ideal system, who desires to bring the divine down to earth, 
much more than the emotionally zealous religious fi gure who desires to 
leave this natural existence and reach the divine. On the other hand, one 
can approach the divine more experientially and emotionally, not just as 
Paweł’s aunt suggests, but also as Paweł’s father does in the last scenes of 
the fi lm, in which the force of the fi lm arrives not in the viewer’s clarity of 
whether or not the father fi nds God or fi nds answers, but rather in the poi-
gnant approach of this human being who has been forced to acknowledge 
a clear limitation of human existence. Kieślowski has us ponder an act of 
rebellion (overturning the table, or even coming into the church at all) if 
one does not believe at all in a divine transcendence. Kieślowski does not 
show us that there is no atheist in a foxhole (the cliché of turning to God 
in times of duress); in a more challenging way, he takes us on the inward 
journey of the father’s range of responses.
Indeed, it is at this turning point in the fi lm’s narrative, once the living 
Paweł no longer appears in the fi lm (though he will reappear on the taped 
fi lm shown on the television monitor at the end), that we should listen to 
the sounds of the fi lm. Kieślowski’s critics have brought much critical acu-
men to bear on the ink bottle and spreading ink, but what of the sounds the 
father starts to hear while he tries to wash all the ink off his hands? From 
this point until the father realizes it is Paweł who had died beneath the ice, 
we hear the sounds of a plane, an ambulance, a helicopter: technological 
sounds announcing a terrible revelation. This indeed might be the fi lm 
director’s own translation of the fi rst two biblical verses immediately fol-
lowing the Decalogue in Exodus: “And all the people could see the sounds 
[kolos] and the fl ames, the sound of the shofar and the smoking mountain; 
the people saw and they moved and they stood from afar. They said to 
Moses, ‘You speak to us and we shall hear; let God not speak to us lest 
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we die’ ” (Exod. 20:15–16). The aesthetics of synesthesia (seeing sounds), 
the mixture of sense perceptions, is precisely what Kieślowski has us wit-
ness as both the start of the father’s recognition, and the heterogeneous, 
experiential, inward journey that the father endures for the rest of the fi lm. 
Indeed, the rest of the narrative is structured as a response to terrible tech-
nological sounds that reverberate in, and confront, this parent’s very be-
ing. His changing facial expressions and speeds, his decisions to take the 
stairs or the elevator, his emotionally wrenching stare, are all responses 
to the mixed sounds and sights that announce a profound encounter with 
absolute limitation, not just a revelation. The long stretches of silence and 
haunting sounds from a wind instrument on the soundtrack not only con-
trast with the extensive use of logos by the father (not to mention his lec-
ture on language) in the fi rst half of the fi lm, but set up the confrontation 
with the divine in the church.
Before I accentuate this notion of limitation in the fi lm and in the bib-
lical Decalogue further, we should ask how Exodus 20:2 might lend cre-
dence to this rabbinic emphasis on each person’s response to the divine, 
and the divine’s address to each individual. It turns out that the gram-
mar of the verse provides potential support for such a claim. In Hebrew, 
the Decalogue in Exodus (and in Deuteronomy) has God use the singu-
lar “Elokekha” (your God); however, those commandments and phrases 
from the Decalogue that appear in Leviticus, starting in chapter 19, have 
God speak in plural “Elokeikhem” (your God). The grammatical differ-
ence stands out even more when one reads what God says after the Ex-
odus Decalogue: “You have seen that from the heavens I have spoken” 
(Exod. 20:19). In Hebrew, “You have seen” is plural, yet the Decalogue is 
in the singular. Why? Basing himself partly on the Ramban’s exegesis of 
the verses, R. Soloveitchik reinterprets the Ten Commandments in terms 
of the classic confl ict between an individual and a social group (the one 
and the many).27 A person should not assume that God only addresses the 
group of people in the plural. If an individual disobeys, the individual will 
be punished. Similar to the halakhic analysis of kol, the analysis here relies 
on the halakhic sense of “following the majority.” For R. Soloveitchik, one 
cannot rely on what the majority accomplishes. Every individual is unique 
and must observe the law “regardless of what the members of society do” 
(Nor’ot ha’Rav 12:120). The singular form of the Decalogue addresses each 
and every individual personally. For each respondent to Kieślowski’s fi lm, 
the obligation addresses not the group of critics or academics; it matters 
not what the majority rules about the fi lm. The personal response to the 
fi lm is an integral part of its haunting power.
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In addition, a rabbinic approach in the manner of R. Soloveitchik must 
also stress the strong force on limitations, on retraction and contraction. 
How does this emanate from the multidirectionality of divine voices, 
which complicates the relationship between diversity and unity? For R. So-
loveitchik, God, omnipresent, contracts in order to create the revelation 
at Mount Sinai: “Just as God presents himself in both modes, so man must 
emulate him in both expression and in self limitation. Man is duty bound 
to manage his own moral law as modern man is inclined to do” (“Aseret 
ha-Dibrot,” 116). Is there a more effective response to the very fi rst spoken 
words in Kieślowski’s fi lm? Unlike critics who ignore the complicated and 
resonant beginnings of the fi lm, again, the fi rst spoken words by Paweł and 
his father present to us in quotidian, experiential terms, this exact confl ict 
between human self-creation /expansion and human self-limitation /nega-
tion. The fi rst words uttered by Paweł’s father are numbers: He is counting 
aloud his push-ups, a physical enactment of self-creation and expansion. 
Paweł announces clearly and nicely, “That’s my limit.” The boy recognizes 
and articulates his limitations. From this perspective, the fi lm contains the 
narrative of the boy’s actualized limitations, including the literal embodi-
ment of human fi nitude. The father confronts, and must respond to, a dra-
matic, horrifi c law of limitation that as a modern man he might have been 
too disinclined to apply up to that point.
This stress on singular, personal responses, though, is only part of the 
biblical emphasis. To account for the locations of “Your God” in the plural 
form, R. Soloveitchik argues that this plural grammatical number is also 
crucial, for it teaches us an ethics of responsibility, namely, one for oth-
ers: “The plural form binds us all to one another” (“Aseret ha-Dibrot,” 
116). In other words, introspection, repentance, and self-creation are all 
obligations, but too much introspection neglects the signifi cance of the 
obligations each individual has to others. This distinction between group 
and individual comes forth powerfully in at least two scenes that contrast 
Paweł’s father with larger groups. One encounter occurs when Paweł’s 
father goes outside to test the ice on the lake personally. As he walks he 
encounters fi rst the face of the mysterious man staring back at him (sug-
gesting a potential epiphany, however quotidian it might be) and then “a 
nighttime gathering of silent men and women in front of a church (a wake, 
perhaps? A political gathering? Whatever it is, the occasion is solemn, 
and the people holding hands)” (Kickasola 173). While apt, Kickasola’s 
description misses a signifi cant inference: At the very least, “people hold-
ing hands” indicates a group. Kieślowski has fi lmed Paweł’s father, the 
introspective, cognitive, modern man, encountering a group that could 
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provide a responsible response. No such response appears from the soli-
tary father.
Another encounter that accentuates the stark contrast between the indi-
viduality of modern man—Paweł’s father—and the larger group appears 
when the camera fi lms the utterly painful inward response by the many 
and one to Paweł’s dead body. While Kickasola astutely notes the juxta-
position between the group’s response to kneel, and the father’s refusal to 
kneel (173), I suggest that this reverential movement invokes the people’s 
awe-fi lled response at Mount Sinai (Exod. 20:15–16). I would argue that 
Paul Coates’s description here manages to express part of the scene’s sig-
nifi cance: “The . . . piercing wind instrument breathes mystery and mor-
tality . . . mournfully marking the fi shing of Paweł’s body from the icy 
water as the crowd sinks to its knees to acknowledge the mysterium of the 
event.”28 The critic’s language of “fi shing” and “sinking” marks precisely 
the response of acknowledgment to the “mysterium.” Krzysztof ’s face and 
actions wonderfully portray his encounter with the self ’s limitation when 
confronting the mysterium of existence. He is still not ready to acknowledge 
any meaningful relation with a group (other than possibly his tzimtzum 
students, with whom he clearly holds a position of power). Dramatized 
before us, this threshold demands our own responses to the fi lm. How will 
we respond to a nearly inexpressible exhibition of an ethical norm: Will 
we engage in  tzimtzum, in contracting, in kneeling, or will we continue to 
count onwards, building up our bodies and minds (like the father does with 
his push-ups)? In what context might one response be more effective than 
the other?
This brings us to the last words of the second verse in Exodus 20: “Who 
took you out of the land of Egypt, from the house of slaves.” Why are the 
last two words necessary (mi-beis avadim, from the house of slaves), and are 
they not implied in the previous phrase? First, R. Soloveitchik offers Rabbi 
Hirsch’s distinction between two types of slaves: a free individual who is 
sold into slavery, and an individual who is born into a family and heritage 
and tradition of slavery.29 The fi rst individual knows to detest slavery and 
explicitly desires freedom. The second type of slave does not necessarily 
know what freedom means. It was not until these slaves suffered physi-
cal tortures that they cried out to God, but even then they did not truly 
understand freedom. Therefore, God says, in Exodus 20:2, according to 
R. Soloveitchik’s exposition of Rabbi Hirsch, “You never asked for free-
dom, because you did not know what freedom meant. Yet, I took you out 
of the house of bondage” (Nor’ot ha’Rav 12:133). This reading provides an 
additional insight as to why the Decalogue is addressed in a personal, expe-
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riential manner rather than from a voice reminding the people exclusively 
of the narrative of creation in Genesis. It also announces a clearly political 
dimension to Kieślowski’s seemingly apolitical fi lm. Do the Polish people 
reveal an awareness of their political state of existence? Are the people of 
this concrete complex asking for freedom from the current Polish state, 
for release from physical duress, for human acknowledgment, for clear 
answers? Is Kieślowski subtly suggesting that Poland is caught in genera-
tional bondage, or is he fi lming a free individual who is suddenly experi-
encing existential bondage? Here, too, the fi lm’s respondents are obligated 
to provide their own responsible responses.
R. Soloveitchik, however, makes these questions more emotionally poi-
gnant and relevant to modern people, for he does not leave the verse alone 
with Rabbi Hirsch’s exegesis. Instead, he adds Rashi’s perspective to con-
nect the verse to political torture, to totalitarian and Nazi regimes. Accord-
ing to Rashi, one can be a slave to the state or a slave to a private citizen. 
Whereas an individual master might be slightly generous, inclined to prac-
tice ethical laws, and merciful, according to R. Soloveitchik, the state, state 
offi cials, state taskmasters, “are generally sadists, murderers, and criminals, 
who fi nd joy in torturing people” (Nor’ot ha’Rav 12:133–134). The corre-
spondences to Poland’s history are an intrinsic part of Kieślowski’s implicit 
vision for us to acknowledge and to which we must respond.
Before we leave the second verse (Exod. 20:2) and its implied pro-
nouncements concerning bondage and suffering, as well as personal rela-
tionships, let us focus on one more word to help address the fi lm’s famous 
scene with the portrait of the Madonna: hotzeitikha, which means “who 
took you out” (of the land of Egypt from the house of slaves). According 
to traditional rabbinic sources, this can be translated syntactically to mean: 
“ ‘I [God] have gone out with you from the land of Egypt.’ We both were 
oppressed. We both were in bondage. We both gained freedom. This sin-
gular relationship which binds [God] with man, within one fellowship, is a 
result not of creation [hence, verse two does not refer to God the creator of 
the cosmos]” (Nor’ot ha’Rav 12:48), but of redemption and freedom from 
Egyptian bondage and slavery. God was, in this fi gurative sense, in bond-
age with the people, feeling and experiencing the suffering, humiliation, 
pain, and degradation right alongside each person. Indeed, this reading 
links back to the notion of tzimtzum or contraction. Based on the Ram-
ban’s exegesis, R. Soloveitchik asserts that God “contracts,” as it were, to 
be—in suffering, in oppression, in bondage—with the individuals who are 
unaware of the meaning of freedom (Nor’ot ha’Rav 12:50).
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Figure 3–2. Dripping tears in Decalogue One.
Perhaps the most understudied response in the fi lm, one that aptly 
demonstrates the rabbinic tradition of God’s Transcendent Presence, is 
the explicit framing device of the aunt’s facial response. Critics tend to 
use Catholic and Protestant frameworks to focus on the father’s response. 
For Haltof, Krzysztof “in frustration purposely destroys the makeshift al-
tar with the icon of the Black Madonna of Czȩstochowa (Matka Boska 
Czȩstochowska) . . . The dripping wax forms a few ‘tears’ on the Madonna’s 
face and she looks as if she is crying” (83) (Figure 3–2). For Coates, the 
“miracle of the Weeping Virgin is both bitterly and poignantly ironic: her 
hot tears are wax, and it is really the father who weeps” (96).30 Kickasola 
suggests, “Perhaps the Madonna does cry, symmetrical with the tears of 
Theophanes [the mysterious man /angel fi gure]: a fi lm beginning and end-
ing in divine grief. Such would be the Catholic perspective; a Protestant 
might refl ect Coates’s interpretation: she could not protect the child be-
cause ‘perhaps she is mere mortal.’ Garbowski suggests the tears are not 
for Paweł, who now has ‘all the answers to his innocent questions,’ but 
rather for Krzysztof, ‘the one who is most in pain’” (173–174).31 But what 
would a response informed by a rabbinic tradition look like? While the 
Madonna herself would not be part of the picture, Kieślowski’s perfectly 
ambiguous, magically realistic, depiction of wax and tears, responds nearly 
directly to the rabbinic tradition that has God “contract” to be with those 
who suffer physical, metaphysical, social, familial, and personal devasta-
tion and abrupt, utter, unexpected duress, fi nitude, and limitation. More-
over, God is not simply with those who suffer; God “contracts” for those 
others. Exodus 20:2 expresses God’s words as utterances signifi ed by the 
Redeemer who also joined the people to gain freedom. The wax tears are 
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perhaps the limit-test of what Kieślowski can intimate through fi lmic rep-
resentation of the unrepresentable. It is not necessarily a deity crying tears 
of grief over “His Creation affected by the Fall” (Kickasola 174). It is not 
the relation to Genesis here; it is the personal relationship experienced by 
those who suffer now, in their daily lives. In addition, whereas Kickasola 
presents a persuasive argument for connecting the tears to Kieślowski’s 
respondents, I would further develop this claim. Transcendence is with 
and for us in suffering, but the divine commands us to respond. We, the 
respondents, should perform an act of imitatio dei by contracting and cre-
ating ourselves. Therefore, unlike Kickasola’s question, which asks the 
Divine for justifi cation—“Why haven’t you done anything about this?” 
(174)—my own question tries to emulate a contraction of self: Why have 
I (not “you”) not done anything about this? What can I do for the other 
who suffers?
Kieślowski accentuates the creation of mechanisms that might mollify 
other people’s suffering, from Paweł’s comments about helping others to 
the father’s technological advances, which Paweł proudly displays to his 
aunt.32 Along with R. Soloveitchik, Kieślowski asks us to consider that the 
“logos can easily be stretched in various directions. . . . Without chok, ev-
ery social and moral law can be rationalized away” (Shapiro, Rabbi Joseph B. 
Soloveitchik on Pesach, Sefi rat ha-Omer and Shavu’ot, 238). A responsible 
ethical response demands that one’s obligation to respond emanates from a 
decree beyond one’s own rationalized conscience. Before one “rationalizes 
away” rituals and the “grandeur of religion [which] lies in its mysterium 
tremendum, its magnitude, and its ultimate incomprehensibility” (“Sacred 
and Profane,” 6), one might achieve more by limiting oneself, acknowledg-
ing the chok that cannot be rationalized away.
“Religion . . . deepens the problems [of life] but never intends to solve 
them,” writes R. Soloveitchik (“Sacred and Profane,” 6). Kieślowski might 
indeed be a major religious fi lmmaker who seeks to deepen the problems of 
life and what we experience as incomprehensible. To redeem those who are 
slaves—to the state, to an individual human master, to a computer, to one-
self—the director and the Orthodox rabbi use different expressions and 
traditions to articulate how and why people respond to the Decalogue’s 
principles. If we maintain a fundamental division between the mundane 
and the sacred, we might continue our present, agonizingly inward jour-
ney, a movement that fails to limit constructively one’s ego or to create 
oneself. Indeed, as Kieślowski states, we have already “become too egotis-
tic, too much in love with ourselves and our needs, and it’s as if everybody 
else has somehow disappeared into the background” (KK, 145).
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notes
The fi rst epigraph, by Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, comes from “Sacred 
and Profane,” in Shiurei HaRav: A Conspectus of the Public Lectures of Rabbi 
Joseph B. Soloveitchik, ed. Joseph Epstein (Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav Publishing, 
1994), 6. Further references are cited in the text. The second epigraph is 
from the fi lm Decalogue One, in The Decalogue, DVD, directed by Krzysztof 
Kieślowski (Chicago: Facets Video, 2003).
 1. Halakha, often defi ned as the ideal normative legal system of Judaism, 
can refer to the entirety of Jewish law, or the legal decision after a discussion, 
or one particular law. Yet, for Rabbi Soloveitchik such defi nitions are too static 
and atemporal; Halakha “is best understood as a mode of thinking, a way of 
interpreting man and his environment” (Shiurei HaRav, 130). Etymologically, 
“Halakha” comes from “halakh,” going, walking, or being underway.
 2. Krzysztof Kieślowski, “An Introduction,” in Krzysztof Kieślowski and 
Krzysztof Piesiewicz, Decalogue: The Ten Commandments, trans. Phil Caven-
dish and Susannah Bluh (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), xiii–xiv. Hereafter 
cited in the text.
 3. Born in Pruzha, Poland (Pruzhana, Poland/Belorussia) in 1903, Rabbi 
Soloveitchik studied at the Free Polish University in the early 1920s. My 
essay thus functions as a comparative analysis of two Polish commentators 
on the Decalogue. See R. Aharon Lichtenstein, “Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik,” 
in Great Jewish Thinkers of the Twentieth Century, ed. Simon Noveck (Wash-
ington: B’nai B’rith Books, 1963), 281–298; and “The Rav at Jubilee: An 
Appreciation,” in Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik: Man of Halacha, Man of Faith, 
ed. Menachem D. Genack (Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav Publishing, 1998), 45–60; 
and Aaron Rakeffet-Rothkof, The Rav: The World of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik 
(Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav Publishing, 1999), 2 vols.
 4. I rely upon audio recordings fi rst given as lectures by R. Soloveit-
chik in the late 1960s and early 1970s collected by Rabbi Milton Nordlicht. 
See B. David Schreiber, Nor’ot ha-Rav (New York: B. D. Schreiber, 1997), 
5:1–58; Nor’ot ha’Rav (New York: B. D. Schreiber, 2000), 12:107–134; David 
Shapiro, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik on Pesach, Sefi rat ha-Omer and Shavu’ot 
( Jerusalem: Urim Publications, 2005); and Derashot HaRav: Selected Lectures 
of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, summarized and annotated by Arnold Lustiger 
(Edison, N.J.: Ohr Publishing, 2003). Further references are cited in the text.
 5. Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Halakhic Man, trans. Lawrence Kaplan 
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1983), 17. Further references are 
cited in the text.
 6. Paul C. Santilli, “Cinema and Subjectivity in Krzysztof Kieślowski,” 
in Thinking Through Cinema: Film as Philosophy, ed. Murray Smith and 
Thomas E. Wartenberg (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 149.
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 7. Out of respect to the traditions I am working with, I intentionally 
print “Elokim” with a “k” rather than with (the more appropriate, at least 
phonetically) “h.”
 8. R. Soloveitchik provides examples of commandments to be observed 
only when “the conditions specifi ed are present,” whose fulfi llment is vol-
untary: If I choose not to have a doorframe, I will not be punished if I do 
not put a mezuzah on my doorpost (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:53); if “one wants eggs 
from a nest, he must fi rst send the mother away” (“Aseret ha-Dibrot,” Shiuri 
HaRav 112).
 9. The exact date of the Mekhilta of Rabbi Yishmael is unknown, 
though Jewish tradition estimates its redaction around the second or third 
century CE.
 10. The root of Elokim (aleph-lamed) “always suggests power or might” 
and the tetragrammaton root (heh-vav-heh) “means ‘existence’” (Shapiro 227). 
The latter signifi es mercy; Elokim signifi es judgment. God’s “immanence 
[is] represented by Elokim, and His transcendence [is] represented by [the 
tetragrammaton]” (Shapiro 228).
 11. Natural law signifi es laws that make nature what it is and what it does 
(physics, mathematics), not the philosophical discussion of the “natural law” 
of cultures.
 12. Marek Haltof, The Cinema of Krzysztof Kieślowski: Variations on Destiny 
and Chance (London: Wallfl ower, 2004), 81–82. See also Joseph G. Kicka-
sola’s description in The Films of Krzysztof Kieślowski: The Liminal Image (New 
York: Continuum, 2004), 167. Further references are cited in the text.
 13. Unlike Elokim, the tetragrammaton addresses not the natural but the 
metaphysical person. In other words, the latter term is used with command-
ments that do not save “natural society from disintegration, but . . . raise 
natural society to [a] committed covenantal community. Those mitzvos [com-
mandments such as shofar or not eating the fat or blood of animals] hallow 
and redeem the human spiritual personality” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:12–13).
 14. In the second chapter of Genesis, when a closer relationship develops 
between God and humans, the tetragrammaton and Elokim are both used.
 15. Critics often focus on the image of the dead dog when they discuss the 
foreboding opening (see Haltof 82). This focus ignores Kieślowski’s subtle 
focus on animals. In fact, as Annette Insdorf notes in a parenthetical state-
ment, “Paweł’s pigeon suggests danger: spots of blood can be glimpsed on its 
side.” Double Lives, Second Chances: The Cinema of Krzysztof Kieślowski (New 
York: Miramax Books, 1999), 74. Further references to Insdorf ’s work are 
cited in the text.
 16. There are also sounds of a dog in the background noises during the 
scene at the lake when Paweł’s father (and the crowd of people) await the 
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news, but the animal certainly does not get any clear time on screen. For 
Insdorf, even the mysterious man played by Artur Barciś “is part of this land-
scape, the furry collar of his coat adding a primitive, animal look” (73).
 17. Many Tannaitic texts were not included in the Mishnah. One such 
“supplementary” text is called a Tosefta.
 18. Here I think Santilli is right to underscore what might be one stan-
dard critical reception of Kieślowski’s work: “All ten fi lms of The Decalogue 
are set in the same massive apartment complex in Warsaw at a time when 
Polish society was still suffering from the spiritual and economic deprivations 
of communist rule” (149).
 19. Because I focus solely on the fi rst two verses of Exodus 20, this is 
not the place to address R. Soloveitchik’s claims about communism. For 
those who wish to embark on such an enterprise, they might note that the 
third verse states, “You shall have no other Gods before Me.” According to 
R. Soloveitchik, “We must not think that avoda zara (idolatry) is limited to 
idol worship. Whenever anything that is not God is given an absolute value, 
we have avoda zara. . . . [If ] Jews worship avoda zara, it will betray them. 
One modern example of this is Communism. Many Jews worshipped Com-
munism. But Russia later betrayed them and all Jews. ‘Al Panai’ (‘before my 
face’). Onkelos translates this as ‘bar mene’ (‘to replace Me,’ ‘before Me’). In-
terestingly, there are many injunctions against idol worship, but none against 
atheism. When man revolts against God, he may think himself free; but soon, 
even he will build his own idol. It is not atheism that can replace God, but 
a new godless religion such as Communism” (“Aseret ha-Dibrot,” Shiurei 
HaRav 117).
 20. Here R. Soloveitchik relies on his understanding of the halakhic sys-
tem to state that if it were up to him, he would “rule as Rabbi Akiva whenever 
he disagrees with one of his contemporaries, but not when he disagrees with 
many of his contemporaries” (Nor’ot ha-Rav 5:41).
 21. Kieślowski underscores the revelatory resonance of the computer’s 
“ready” and the human responses by changing the usual computer prompt of 
“ready” to include the biblical “I am” in the English onscreen prompt “I am 
ready” (thus echoing God’s response to Moses in Exodus). If the father (and 
perhaps the son) thinks he can store Paweł’s biological mother in the com-
puter’s memory (which the aunt shows, with the question about the mother’s 
dreams, is quite insuffi cient a notion), then after Paweł’s death, the computer 
may be “ready” to store the son as well. From this perspective, the father’s 
poignant response to the computer at the end includes a  fundamental ques-
tioning of his beliefs in computers, memory, and human identity.
 22. “Why, after all, was it necessary at this moment to refer to ‘what I 
did to Egypt?’ The answer: ‘From the viewpoint of Elokim, all the miracles 
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which transpired in Mitzrayim [Egypt] could not have taken place.’ In 
Elokim’s relationship with the world, ‘there is no departure from the laws of 
nature. Not a single particle will act in violation of its natural law’ (Shapiro, 
Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik on Pesach, Sefi rat ha-Omer and Shavu’ot, 234). This 
explains why, when God mentions his role as Redeemer from the house of 
bondage, the name of God as the tetragrammaton appears.
 23. Ibn Ezra (Abraham) (1089–1164) was a poet, philosopher, grammar-
ian, and biblical commentator. Judah Halevi (c. 1070–1141) is one of the 
great Hebrew poets and philosophers, especially famous for his theological 
and philosophical work, the Kuzari.
 24. This rabbinic notion of multiple appearances stands in stark contrast 
to the stereotypical perception of God in Hebrew Scripture. On this note, 
Kieślowski and R. Soloveitchik are worldviews apart. Kieślowski admits that 
he tends to consider “the God of the Old Testament [to be] a demanding, 
cruel God; a God who doesn’t forgive . . . [who] leaves us a lot of freedom 
and responsibility, observes how we use it and then rewards or punishes, 
and there’s no appeal or forgiveness. . . . And that’s what a point of reference 
must be, especially for people like me, who are weak, who are looking for 
something, who don’t know.” Krzysztof Kieślowski, Kieślowski on Kieślowski, 
ed. Danusia Stok (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), 149. This passage 
almost sounds as if Kieślowski is commenting on the differences between 
Elokim and the tetragrammaton. It suggests that Kieślowski the fi lmmaker 
is a much more sophisticated thinker than Kieślowski the essay writer. Such 
stereo typical thinking is precisely what One forces respondents to question. 
Further references to Kieślowski on Kieślowski are cited in the text using the 
abbreviation KK.
 25. The notion of God the merciful father is based in part on the lan-
guage used in Exodus 24:10 (see Rashi on Exodus 20:2). If one etymologi-
cal root of the aunt’s name is the Greek eirēnikos, from eirēnē (peace), then 
Kieślowski might move closer to R. Soloveitchik’s position. Irena, being 
irenic, appears to be full of peace and conciliation when she is with the live 
Paweł, but love alone might not be enough to create lasting peace. Perhaps 
the implication here is that, sometimes, for people to achieve peace, people 
must become militant, but without losing mercy and love.
 26. The usual paradigm for self-creativity, in R. Soloveitchik’s thought, is 
the act of repentance.
 27. Nachmanides (1194 –1270), known by the acronym Ramban (Rabbi 
Moshe ben Nahman), was a classic halakhic, biblical, and Talmudic scholar.
 28. Lucid Dreams: The Films of Krzysztof Kieślowski, ed. Paul Coates (Trow-
bridge, UK: Flicks Books, 1999), 95. Further references are cited in the text.
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 29. Rabbi Samson Raphel Hirsch (1808–1888) was one of the great rab-
binic leaders in Germany during the nineteenth century.
 30. Coates nicely relates the Madonna’s tears to Paweł’s mother’s absence. 
However, this point should not obscure Kieślowski’s depiction of Paweł’s 
aunt crying at the start and at the end of the fi lm. She frames, and is framed 
by, the screen.
 31. Kickasola quotes from Coates’s “Kieślowski and the Antipolitics 
of Color: A Reading of the “Three Colors” Trilogy,” Cinema Journal 41, 
no. 2 (Winter 2002): 45, and Christopher Garbowski’s Krzysztof Kieslowski’s 
Decalogue Series: The Problem of the Protagonists and Their Self-Transcendence 
(Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs; New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1996), 92.
 32. In this regard, respondents can acknowledge the fi lm’s earlier scenes 
of joy between Paweł and his aunt as he uses the computer to lock the door 
and turn on the water.
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c h a p t e r  4
Visual Reverberations: 
Decalogue Two and Decalogue Eight
Eva M. Stadler
Each of the fi lms in Krzysztof Kieślowski’s Decalogue calls into question 
the certitude implicit in the word “commandment.” As a result, the rela-
tion of each fi lm to the biblical commandment is often ambiguous and has 
been the source of disagreement and discussion among critics.1 Kieślowski 
himself insisted that he did not intend to teach a lesson or set forth a moral 
point of view in these fi lms. Rather, his aim was to start a conversation with 
the spectator. As he explained: “I am someone who does not know. . . . 
Someone who searches. I like to observe the fragments of life and I like 
fi lms that examine a small segment of life, without knowing how it began 
or how it will end.”2
In this essay I will explore the formal elements the fi lmmaker uses in Two 
and Eight to establish his dialogue with the spectator, and consider how 
meanings are suggested through mise-en-scène, through patterns of close-
ups and long shots, through editing and lighting, through the confi gura-
tion of fi lmic space, and through unusually constructed soundtracks.
In an interview given after completing the Trois couleurs trilogy, 
Kieślowski noted that “there were a lot of connections between the fi lms 
of the Decalogue,” and added that these were far more numerous and more 
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important than those between the fi lms of the trilogy.3 There are indeed 
many links among these ten fi lms which are all shot in the same large, 
gray housing complex in Warsaw. Characters reappear from fi lm to fi lm, 
often in walk-on roles reminiscent of the recurrent characters in Honoré 
de Balzac’s Comédie humaine. Many of the protagonists are highly educated 
professional people: doctors, professors, musicians, scientists. Questions 
of the role of religion in everyday life are raised and issues of family rela-
tions and education often play a central role with a particular focus on 
the lives of children. One of the most interesting links, both thematic and 
formal, is the role of a nameless, silent “witness,” played by the actor Artur 
Barciś, whom we see in almost all the fi lms. His appearances are brief and 
his look intense and indecipherable. His diegetic role varies from fi lm to 
fi lm. Annette Insdorf likens him to characters in Wim Wenders’s Wings 
of Desire who are “pure ‘gaze,’ able . . . to record human folly and suffer-
ing but unable to alter the course of the lives they witness.”4 According to 
Kieślowski, “he has no infl uence on the action but he leads the characters 
to think about what they are doing. He is an engine for thought. His in-
tense gaze on the characters leads them to question themselves.”5 As we 
shall see, his role is also a powerful device to engage the spectator in the 
action of the fi lm.
Two and Eight present an additional interesting thematic link. Among 
the ethical problems to be discussed by a Polish professor’s students in 
Eight is the dilemma faced by a woman whose husband is in all likelihood 
dying. She is pregnant, though not by her husband, and her decision as 
to whether she should have an abortion depends on whether her husband 
lives or dies. This is also the story of Two. “For me time is very important,” 
Kieślowski told an interviewer in 1991. “What I call discourse, the way 
of telling a tale, evolves in time. Camera, montage, actors, music, are the 
means of telling the tale, the discourse.”6 Depending on montage and the 
other elements of fi lm language, the “same” story can be told in many 
different ways. This is an issue of particular interest to Kieślowski, and no-
where in The Decalogue is this impact of formal cinematographic constitu-
ents on meaning more striking than in a comparative analysis of the often 
abstract visual style of Two with the almost documentary quality of Eight.
A grave yet theoretical philosophical problem in the ethics class in Eight 
is presented in Two as a pressing, living, practical, and deeply emotional 
decision which has to be made not only by the woman, Dorota (Krystyna 
Janda), but also by the old doctor (Aleksander Bardini) who treats her dy-
ing husband (Olgierd Ł ukaszewicz), and whom Dorota confronts directly 
for advice. Ethical and religious issues, as well as questions of the relation 
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of language and truth, underlie the conversations between these two pro-
tagonists, but they are never explicitly articulated. They are refl ected in 
the poetic visual style of the fi lm. Moral ambiguities are suggested in the 
structuring of space and time, the use of camera movement and close-ups 
as well as the gestures of the characters: Dorota’s unrest and nervousness, 
the doctor’s weariness. The fi lm is a brilliant illustration of Kieślowski’s 
mastery of montage and his special brand of realism where the invisible is 
invoked and the unfathomable attained through minute scrutiny of mate-
rial reality.7
The opening shot of Two focuses on the grim, colorless reality of the 
gray buildings of the housing project. In the foreground, a custodian, rak-
ing leaves, fi nds a dead rabbit. He looks up, and the camera follows his 
eyes with a long tilt (vertical tracking shot) up the side of the building 
to an enclosed terrace. The camera enters the apartment and reveals the 
ordinary, everyday life of an old man who tends to a plant, uncovers a 
bird cage, turns on the radio, and puts several pots of water to heat on the 
stove. The doorbell sounds, interrupting the English-language broadcast. 
Before opening the door, the old man faces the camera, and we catch a 
fi rst glimpse, in close-up, of his weary face, which will become a visual 
motif in the fi lm. The rabbit is not his, he tells the custodian, turning to 
feed the caged bird. The dead rabbit provides entry into the building and 
into the story, in medias res. This is the fi rst of several instances in the fi lm 
where the tracking camera allows unfettered movement through space, of-
ten skipping over expository information.
After another brief scene in the apartment, we see the old man walk-
ing down the hallway, toward the camera; he nods to an attractive woman 
standing in the hallway, seemingly waiting for something. After he leaves, 
she throws her cigarette on the fl oor, and the camera focuses on her shoe 
putting out the cigarette. It is the fi rst of many close shots of cigarettes and 
the fi rst example of the technique Kieślowski uses to transform the banal 
into a visual motif through often unexpected repetition of close-ups.
When the old man returns, the blond woman is still standing in the hall-
way, smoking. She comes to his door, introduces herself as Dorota Geller, 
and tells him that her husband is a patient on his ward at the hospital. She 
stands in the doorway, not entering the apartment, and, after a brief but 
tense conversation, leaves. The camera, now in her apartment, cuts to the 
close-up of a telephone answering machine, and then tilts up the wall over 
photographs of mountains and mountain climbers. On the soundtrack, we 
hear the recorded voice of a woman leaving a message for Dorota. The 
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camera then focuses on a medium shot of Dorota standing alone and iso-
lated among the attractive modern furnishings of her apartment.
The camera cuts back to the doctor’s apartment, where it pauses on a 
photograph of a young woman and two small children. We briefl y listen 
to a conversation between the doctor and his housekeeper, and the cam-
era pauses on the doctor’s face before cutting to Dorota in the hall and 
another cut to Dorota in her apartment. She turns on recorded classical 
music, looks out the window through the horizontal slats of a blind, and 
begins tearing the leaves off a plant standing on the window sill; she cannot 
break the stem, and the camera holds briefl y on the plant, which seemingly 
refuses to die.
Her gesture underscores the difference in temperament between 
 Dorota and the doctor. He nurtures his plant, while she—in apparent 
frustration—tries to destroy hers. There is also a striking contrast between 
their two apartments. The doctor’s apartment, with its traditional furnish-
ings and family photographs, seems to refl ect a solitary, old-fashioned life 
committed to work, while Dorota’s refl ects a youthful modern style: white 
walls hung with large abstract-looking photographs, a telephone answer-
ing machine, clean-lined furniture. The young woman’s contemporary 
taste is also refl ected in her fashionable clothing and hairstyles, and her 
constant smoking. Casting the star Krystyna Janda in the role gives Dorota 
an added aura of seductiveness and glamour.
These elements of mise-en-scène, including in particular the photographs 
we are shown in the two apartments, refl ect not only aesthetic differences 
in décor and life style but also seem to suggest additional diegetic informa-
tion not otherwise articulated. They function as texts within the text of the 
fi lm which, as Yuri Lotman suggests, can transmit information, intensify 
and accentuate meaning.8 These incorporated texts as well as the detached 
voices entering the space of the story via the telephone and the answer-
ing machine serve as mirrors and refl ections. The voices reframe Dorota’s 
dilemma by allowing others to briefl y become part of the text of her story. 
The photographs, which refl ect her husband’s interest in mountaineering, 
visually frame Dorota’s dilemma. For the doctor, the photograph of his 
family frames the quandary that results from the intersection of his profes-
sional responsibility and his personal sense of loss.
When Dorota visits the doctor’s apartment and fully explains her sit-
uation—she is pregnant, and loves both her husband and her lover, the 
father of the unborn child—the dialogue is shot in alternating close-ups 
of Dorota and the doctor. When he says that he really does not know the 
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prognosis for her husband, she nervously tries to put out her cigarette in 
a matchbox. The camera focuses on the fl are of the small fi re she creates. 
Dorota asks the doctor if he believes in God, and he replies that it is a very 
personal God, only for him. After she leaves, he covers the bird’s cage and 
looks at the picture of the young woman and the children. The camera 
pauses in a lengthy close-up of the photograph, which occupies the full 
screen.
Background information about Dorota’s life is revealed by suggestion 
or indirection in several short sequences. We learn that her husband is 
a mountain climber when a colleague waits in the hallway in front of her 
apartment to return mountaineering equipment. A little later, during a 
brief scene in a café, we learn that her lover is a musician, on tour in a 
foreign country. The camera often lingers on Dorota, silent and alone; 
the objects around her, shown in close-up—the plant, the cigarettes, the 
glass of tea she slowly pushes off a table—signifi cantly evoke her feelings. 
One sequence begins with a close-up of a cigarette in an ashtray, then a 
close-up of Dorota in the dark. The phone rings, she turns on the light, 
fi nally answers the phone and tells her lover that she will have an abortion, 
that she knows that it is all over between them. The camera focuses on the 
receiver she puts down before he says that he loves her. Music begins as 
the camera then tilts up the wall to a close-up of a large framed photo of a 
mountaineer whose face is partially masked but evidently that of Andrzej, 
her husband. The music and the photograph quite literally frame Dorota 
between the two men she loves.
The camera cuts to the apartment of the doctor who waters his cactus, 
then moves to a close-up of coffee poured into a glass. The doctor is again 
sitting at a table with his housekeeper and fi nishes the story of how his wife 
and two young children were killed during a bombing raid, many years 
before, during World War II, while he was working at the hospital.
Earlier we had seen the doctor, in his laboratory looking into a micro-
scope. The slides he studies occupy the screen in close-up. These slides 
present a new text introduced within the space of the narrative. This text 
is completely unreadable to the spectator and perhaps also to the protago-
nists. While the doctor and an associate try to interpret the meaning of the 
slides in the context of Andrzej’s illness, the witness, who in this fi lm plays 
the role of a technician or orderly, stands in the doorway and looks on. “It’s 
progressing,” the doctors ambiguously agree.
As the stories of the doctor and Dorota seem to reach a critical climax, 
it is worth noting the degree to which all the elements of fi lm language—
editing, the startling juxtaposition of spaces, the intense focus on banal ob-
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jects—have relativized what “was externally stable, set and ready-made.”9 
We seem to be in the “carnivalized” world Mikhail Bakhtin describes in 
Dostoevsky’s novels, a world where “everything is taken to the extreme, 
to its outermost limit . . . shown in a moment of unfi nalized transition” 
(“Characteristics,” 167). The encounters between Dorota and all other 
protagonists, including the doctor, almost always occur on thresholds, in 
hallways, corridors, doorways and other transient, intermediary spaces. 
The doctor’s fi rst glimpses of her are in the hallway of the apartment house 
and, in the hospital, from the corridor, through an open door as she looks 
at her motionless, comatose husband. Bakhtin characterizes this organiza-
tion of space and time in works of fi ction as a “chronotope of crisis and 
break in a life,” and continues to explain that the
word “threshold” itself already has a metaphorical meaning in everyday 
usage (together with its literal meaning), and is connected with the 
breaking point of a life, the moment of crisis, the decision that changes 
a life (or the indecisiveness that fails to change a life, the fear to step 
over a threshold). In literature, the chronotope of the threshold is 
always metaphorical and symbolic, sometimes openly but more often 
implicitly.10
In this fi lm, the witness also watches from doorways: fi rst the doctor 
and his colleague looking into the microscope, and later Dorota at her 
husband’s bedside in the hospital. A slow dripping sound is heard and im-
ages of a leaking pipe alternate with close-ups of Andrzej. The camera tilts 
down the wall from the pipe to a basin fi lled with bloody liquid. We are 
reminded of an earlier sequence where the drab elements of everyday real-
ity at the run-down hospital intrude on the narrative and invite suggestive 
readings. After Dorota is told that her husband’s situation looks bad, we are 
shown an astonishing montage: a series of disorienting cuts, fi rst to a water 
pipe dripping, then a close-up of Andrzej, semi-comatose, then peeling 
plaster as the camera slowly moves down the wall. Camera and soundtrack 
point to physical instances of neglect and disrepair surrounding the gravely 
ill man. The montage intimates other layers of meaning: Do doctors have 
any control over the lives of patients? Can only a miracle save this man? 
Slavoj Ž iž ek suggests that “if we want to reconstruct ‘all’ of the narrative con-
tent, we must reach beyond the explicit narrative content as such, and include some 
formal features which act as the stand-in for the ‘repressed’ aspect of the content” 
(58, emphasis in the original).
This manner of reading the fi lm is patently relevant in considering the 
closing sequences. When Dorota again confronts the doctor, asking him 
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to tell her with certitude if her husband will live or die, he tells her not to 
have the abortion. Her husband will die. At her insistence, he swears it. He 
then tells her that he would like to attend one of her concerts. For the fi rst 
time, we learn that she is a musician, a violinist with the Philharmonic. 
Music begins, and not a word is spoken during the entire very beautiful 
and abstractly structured sequence that marks a resolution of the crisis, the 
closing events for which there is no rational explanation. We see Dorota 
standing before her window, again looking out through the horizontal slats 
of the blind (Figure 4 –1). The camera then travels slowly down an exterior 
wall of the building in a movement opposite to the opening of the fi lm. We 
see a close-up of the doctor’s reddish face seemingly suspended against a 
black background. Is he at the concert, in his own private world, in a world 
imagined by Dorota? The camera tracks horizontally to the right. Andrzej, 
in his hospital room, opens his eyes, looks up, and, for the fi rst time, ob-
serves his surroundings as the camera continues to move horizontally until 
it halts and focuses on a drinking glass of red liquid and a bee caught there, 
struggling not to drown. After a long close-up of the bee’s struggle, the 
camera cuts back to Andrzej, who now seems to be watching intently. This 
is followed by another close-up of the bee, which fi nally frees itself. An 
abrupt cut shows Dorota playing the violin as a faint smile seems to move 
across her lips. Another abrupt cut shows Andrzej, now dressed and look-
ing healthy, standing in the doorway of the doctor’s offi ce. He has come to 
thank him, and he tells him of the added joy that he and his wife are going 
to have a baby. “Do you know what it means to have a child?” he asks the 
doctor, who answers, “I do.”
Figure 4 –1. Dorota through the horizontal slats of the 
blinds in Decalogue Two.
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This surprising closing sequence, followed by the coda of Andrzej’s visit 
to the doctor, summarizes all the aspects of fi lm language that have con-
tributed to the extraordinary impact of Two on the spectator. Camerawork, 
editing, emotionally charged close-ups, image, and soundtrack converge 
and point to the element of mystery in human experience. As Kieślowski 
explains, “I don’t fi lm metaphors. Only people perceive the images as such 
and that is very good. I want to move people, I want to bring them some-
where, I want to touch them in a certain way” (Biró 28).
At the end of Two, the spectator is not only deeply affected but left with 
many unresolved issues. Many questions remain in addition to Andrzej’s 
miraculous cure. Did the doctor lie about her husband’s prognosis when he 
advised Dorota not to have an abortion? Was this advice given to save the 
child? Was it tied to his own life experience? To his religious beliefs? Does 
Andrzej’s question to him in the last scene resolve any of this? Finally, will 
Dorota and her husband live the lie of the paternity of her child?
When Dorota’s story is presented as an ethical problem in the lecture 
hall of Eight, the issues seem to be more narrowly defi ned, somewhat sim-
plifi ed: The doctor is Catholic, it is a true story and we are told from the 
start that the child lives. The focus seems to be, to a large extent, on abor-
tion and that issue is resolved. It seems fi tting that a problem presented 
for discussion in a philosophy course should be more circumscribed in its 
outlines. It is also inevitable that theoretical analysis will somehow misrep-
resent the living, deeply emotional situation as it is described in Two.
Eight is one of the most philosophical and, visually, one of the most 
beautiful of the fi lms. A Polish American researcher, Elżbieta (Teresa Mar-
czew ska), attends a lecture in an ethics course at Warsaw University. Spe-
cifi c ethical problems are presented for refl ection and discussion, among 
them a “hypothetical” story, raised by the visitor, of a Jewish child who was 
refused shelter from the Nazis in 1943. After class, Elżbieta approaches 
Zofi a (Maria Kościałkowska), the ethics professor, and identifi es herself as 
the little girl whom Zofi a had refused to shelter during World War II.
After the scene in the lecture hall, there are three lengthy verbal con-
frontations between Zofi a and Elżbieta: in the hallway outside the class-
room, in the car in front of the house where Zofi a lived during the war, 
and fi nally in Zofi a’s apartment after a dinner they share. Quite opposite to 
the technique used in Two, the conversations in this document-like fi lm ex-
plicitly articulate questions about the meaning of truth, the relation of the 
individual to the community, the guidance that religion may or may not 
offer in ethical matters, and most centrally, the responsibility all bear for 
protecting children. “Nothing is more important than the life of a child,” 
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Zofi a admits to Elżbieta after a very tense conversation and confession. 
“Try to understand the woman,” Zofi a had earlier told her students to 
encourage them (and the spectators) to think about the problems raised by 
Elżbieta’s story as well as, by implication, Dorota’s story.
Long wordless sequences accompanied by music and/or sound effects 
are another distinctive aspect of the style of this fi lm. When they alternate 
with scenes of profound dialogue, they not only underscore the drama, but 
also allow time for the spectator to refl ect. This editing technique is visu-
ally paralleled by the intense focus on faces captured in lengthy close-ups 
or sweeping tracking shots, as in the lecture hall scene where Elżbieta tells 
her story. The focus on people, which most often accompanies dialogue, 
alternates with wordless, long, often deep shots, frequently in darkness—at 
night, through tunnels, in narrow streets or alleyways—as if the camera, 
the characters, and the spectators are seeking enlightenment. Again, con-
trary to the technique used in Two, fi lm language here seems to support the 
possibility of attaining resolution.
The credits are shot against a disorienting and deeply moving sequence 
focused on an adult leading a small child by the hand, in twilight or early 
evening. It is only later that we come to realize that this scene represents a 
retrospective to a time some forty years before the action of the fi lm. How-
ever, the close shots of clasped hands shown in this episode establish an 
important visual motif in Eight, and, as is so often the case in Kieślowski’s 
work, the close-up shot itself is central to the grammar of the entire fi lm. 
After the credits, a straight cut brings the viewer to another close-up, this 
time of a beautiful fl ower in bright daylight, and then the camera reveals a 
long shot of a park while it tracks a jogger at her morning exercise. We see 
this elderly woman in close-up and look at her hand in close-up, and then 
the camera accompanies her to the gray housing complex, now familiar to 
viewers of The Decalogue, where she lives. Not a word is spoken until she 
briefl y greets a neighbor. While the credits and the scene from the past 
are accompanied by a musical score, the outdoor scene and the later scenes 
of Zofi a in her apartment are accompanied by postsynchronized sound ef-
fects, the few words of dialogue as she greets her neighbor, and ambient 
sounds.
After the somewhat disconcerting opening sequence, the fi lm seems to 
document the present-time trajectory of Zofi a’s ordinary day: jogging and 
exercise in the park, collecting the mail, activities in her apartment, the 
drive to the university, the greeting of the students, the visit to the dean’s 
offi ce and fi nally in the lecture hall with her class. During this daylight tra-
jectory, there is some evidence of disorder in Zofi a’s orderly and organized 
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life. She has diffi culty lighting her stove and starting her car, and a paint-
ing in her living room will not hang straight. Nevertheless, the spectator 
experiences the continuity of what Bakhtin calls “biographical” space (DI, 
252–253).
In the lecture hall, Zofi a announces the topics of the class discussion as 
examples of “ethical hell.” A student tells the story of the pregnant woman 
who must know whether her husband will die in order to decide whether 
she should have an abortion. The student who tells the story emphasizes 
that the doctor believes in God. As the camera tracks over the faces of the 
other students, it seems to halt momentarily on Elżbieta fi dgeting with her 
necklace. As the student continues that it was up to the doctor to decide on 
the life of the child, Zofi a fi nishes the story by saying that she knows that 
the child lives and that this is the most important aspect of the story. As 
Zofi a gives information about the child, Elżbieta rises from her chair and 
moves forward in the lecture hall, asking if she could tell a story since the 
life of the child is so important. The camera frames her in close-up as she 
begins her story and then moves slowly over the faces of the students.
When she refers to the young Catholic couple whose apartment the child 
and her guardian visit, there is a momentary interruption by a drunken stu-
dent who bursts into the lecture hall. After the intruder is asked to leave, 
the camera returns to a close-up of Elżbieta who continues her story by 
noting that the woman said that she had to go back on her promise of acting 
as a godparent to the Jewish child, since she could not bear false witness be-
fore God. The camera stops on the witness, played by Artur Barciś, whom 
we see in this fi lm as a student in the lecture hall. He looks pensive, and 
stares straight into the camera, toward the front of the lecture hall and the 
professor. The camera stops more than once to allow us to contemplate his 
indecipherable look while other students comment on the complex moral 
issues. Does his look convey secret knowledge? Consternation?
The camera tracks back to Elżbieta and to Zofi a’s tense and nervous 
face. Before she fi nishes the story Elżbieta says that she remembers that it 
was getting dark, that a green lamp was not lit and that she was offered tea 
in good but unmatched porcelain cups. After a brief discussion of the pos-
sible motives of the woman who went back on her promise, Zofi a dismisses 
the class and asks the students, in preparation for the next class discussion, 
to try to understand the woman. After Zofi a leaves the lecture hall, the 
camera focuses on Elżbieta, who stays seated as the students leaving class 
pass in front of her, and extradiegetic music begins, as in the prologue. 
There is an abrupt cut as the camera, in a lateral pan, moves over a shelf of 
books and a telephone until it stops on the face of a pensive Zofi a sitting in 
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her darkened offi ce. As the music continues, the camera cuts to a medium 
shot of Zofi a walking down a barely lit corridor toward Elżbieta, seated 
and seemingly waiting. After a tense conversation, Zofi a invites the Ameri-
can to dinner and the camera cuts to a long shot of a car moving down a 
dark street. The car stops in front of a building, and in a brief conversation 
in alternating close-ups between the two women, we learn that “this is the 
place,” as the music begins again.
Elżbieta walks into the dark courtyard as the camera follows her; she 
looks briefl y at a small chapel where candles fl icker on an altar, she moves 
on and then hides as the camera focuses on Zofi a who gets out of the car 
and starts calling Elżbieta’s name. The sound track reverberates with mu-
sic, the echoes of the name of Elżbieta, and the sharp sound of steps that 
accompany Zofi a’s desperate search. “Is there another exit from this court-
yard?” she asks an attendant in the building. She seems lost. Is she trapped, 
has she lost Elżbieta again?
When she returns to her car, she fi nds Elżbieta sitting there. During a 
brief conversation in the darkness, the faces are occasionally lit by passing 
cars. The women seem to agree that they analyze but do not understand. 
They drive off into the dark street. There is an abrupt cut to a close-up of 
the brightly lit shade of a table lamp in Zofi a’s apartment. After the long 
nocturnal trajectory of Zofi a and Elżbieta, this is the fi rst sign of hope and 
it dramatically underscores the moral implications of Kieślowski’s use of 
light and darkness in Eight.
After dinner and a long conversation between the two women, other 
visual signals of redemption and forgiveness begin to appear in the fi lm. 
Most striking of these is that Zofi a and Elżbieta are now shot together in 
the same frame, in a two-shot, whenever they speak to each other. Prior 
to this, earlier in the fi lm, all conversations between the two were either in 
shot-reverse shot showing the face of one and then the other, or in alter-
nating close-ups.
This stylistic shift occurs during a rather unusual series of shots that 
seem to fall between a classic shot-reverse shot and a two-shot. Elżbieta 
is seated and Zofi a stands behind her with a hand on her shoulder. The 
camera moves up and down, focusing on one and then the other during 
this tense conversation. When Zofi a again says that nothing is as important 
as the life of a child, the camera focuses on her hand, which rests on the 
younger woman’s shoulder as Elżbieta raises her own hand to clasp Zo-
fi a’s (Figure 4 –2). This close-up of the clasped hands parallels the opening 
shots of the fi lm and seems to mark visually the moment of forgiveness. 
It is followed by a prolonged medium two-shot of the two women sitting 
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Figure 4 –2. Clasped hands in Decalogue Eight.
next to one another discussing what they can, as philosophy professors, 
teach their students about themselves, about good and evil, about the ex-
istence of God. At this point, a neighbor, the same man Zofi a had greeted 
at the beginning of the fi lm, briefl y visits. The fl ow of everyday life inter-
rupts philosophical speculation just as the intrusion of the drunk had in the 
lecture hall. The interruption also serves to release tension and allow the 
viewer to refl ect on the diffi cult issues raised.
Zofi a asks Elżbieta to spend the night in her apartment in the room 
of her son, whom Zofi a has not seen for a long time. In a brief shot, the 
spectator and Zofi a observe Elżbieta kneeling in prayer, in the darkened 
room, before going to sleep. This is immediately followed by a cut to Zofi a 
again jogging in the park in bright morning sunlight. Her meeting with 
a contortionist offers comic relief, the intrusion of an unusual aspect of 
everyday life, which could also be read as a graphic representation of the 
ethical twists and turns of the story we have been watching.
During their conversations of the previous evening, Zofi a had revealed 
the reason that caused her to turn Elżbieta away during World War II. The 
man who was to shelter the child was suspected—falsely, it turned out— of 
collaborating with the Nazis, and Zofi a, a member of the Resistance, was 
afraid to put the movement at risk. In the morning, Elżbieta asks Zofi a to 
take her to meet the tailor (Tadeusz Ł omnicki) whom the resistance fi ght-
ers had unjustly suspected of collaborating with the Nazis.
On the way to see the tailor, at the end of the fi lm, the two reconciled 
women ride together and their car is shown moving through a dark tunnel 
with light at the end. Elżbieta goes into the tailor’s shop, but he refuses 
to talk about the past. After she leaves, we see a close-up of the tailor as 
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he looks through the window at the two women on the street. The image 
is cut horizontally, thus reframing Zofi a and Elżbieta talking, embracing 
one another. The camera returns to the face of the tailor, expressionless or 
puzzled at what he observes. The two women come to terms with the past 
while the tailor does not speak or cannot put his predicament into words.
Like all of Kieślowski’s fi lms, the ending of Eight leaves the spectator 
with a sense of the mystery of the human condition, an acknowledgment 
of the secret areas which lie within each individual. “I try to be as close 
as possible to the protagonist,” Kieślowski explains. “The closer I am to 
him the more I discover mystery, fantasy, imagination, philosophy. All this 
is within ourselves” (“De Weronika à Véronique,” 117). Yet, as we have 
noted, formal elements used in this fi lm—editing, the confi guration of 
fi lmic space, lighting—give a sense of documenting real experience, of a 
more positive access to meaning. There seems to be light at the end of the 
tunnel.
Because of its focus on the impact of past decisions on present day 
lives, Kieślowski considered Eight one of the most important fi lms of the 
Decalogue series (“Je cherche,” 102–103). Other thematic resonances be-
tween Eight and Kieślowski’s oeuvre can also be noted. When Zofi a tells 
her visitor, after the neighbor leaves, that every house is interesting, she 
underscores a theme important to Kieślowski as a fi lmmaker. “If you look 
through any window you will see people,” he told his interviewers in 1989. 
“If you are willing to look closely there is something very interesting about 
them . . . inside each one there is something interesting” (“Je cherche,” 94). 
Insdorf sees a similarity between Zofi a’s words and the language Kieślowski 
himself uses in interviews, and she concludes that “it is hard not to see Zo-
fi a . . . as Kieślowski’s mouthpiece, espousing a skeptical humanism rooted 
in spiritual belief” (113). René Prédal suggests that Eight can actually be 
seen as a formal model for the other fi lms of The Decalogue: “Decalogue 
Eight conceptualizes the procedure used in the entire series by propos-
ing a method of reading: like the fi lmmaker, the ethics professor presents 
situations drawn from everyday life in her classes . . . the ethical problem 
is born out of the story, the idea is expressed through fl esh and blood pro-
tagonists, the concept is never separated from human substance” (82–83). 
Eight thus documents not only human experience for both the fi lmmaker 
and the characters he creates but also serves as a model for structuring and 
reading the Decalogue fi lms.
The relation between Eight and Two is ultimately not more substantial 
than the many connections that bind all the component fi lms in the Deca-
logue series. However, the thread of Dorota’s story allows us to juxtapose 
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and compare the formal elements of these two fi lms, which brilliantly dem-
onstrate the range and the virtuosity of Kieślowski’s style as a fi lmmaker.
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c h a p t e r  5
Remember the Sabbath Day, to 
Keep It Holy: Decalogue Three
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
According to an old legend, there were originally fi fteen commandments. 
But at one point when Moses was carrying the tablets down the mountain, 
he is said to have tripped and fallen, shattering one of the stones on which 
the laws had been inscribed. When he met the people assembled at the base 
of the mountain, he explained: “I’ve got good news for you, and bad news. 
The good news is that there were fi fteen commandments, but now there 
are only ten. The bad news is that adultery is still on the list.”
Smile as we might at this rather curious way of breaking the command-
ments, the story reinforces one of the points that Krzysztof Kieślowski 
illustrates throughout his series of fi lms on the Decalogue.1 The dictates 
of the Law that were given by God to Moses are precisely that—divine 
commandments, not merely human rules. They have a defi nite content 
and a divine purpose. One might try to interpret them in a legalistic way as 
stating the bare minimum of what one must do and what one must not do 
in order to keep God at bay. But that would be to miss the real thrust of the 
Ten Commandments. Understood more deeply, they are divine prescrip-
tions for how to order one’s loves rightly. They are a gift from on high, de-
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signed to lead people to exercise their freedom well, so as to live according 
to God’s providential plan for human well-being and happiness.
Each of Kieślowski’s ten fi lms displays an artist’s quest to understand 
the full import of the commandments. The stories told in his Decalogue are 
ways to explore the contents of each statute in full, without interpreting 
their requirements according to some legal minimalism. By his creative 
cinematic vision, Kieślowski is trying to discern what the purposes of the 
Almighty may have been in formulating the details of the moral law in the 
way we fi nd them. The third of these fi lms is no exception. Even Three’s 
interesting way of expressing the third commandment (“Remember the 
Sabbath day, to keep it holy”), let alone the plot that unfolds in the course 
of the fi lm, gives witness to the nature of the fi lmmaker’s quest for deeper 
understanding of these matters.
The Third Commandment
In the history of Judaism and Christianity, there have come to be a num-
ber of ways to enumerate the commandments. In part, these differences 
have arisen from the choices in regard to translation and the grouping of 
phrases in the text that were made over the course of time—choices about 
just what the proper interpretation and emphasis should be. But certain 
features of the controlling biblical texts have also played a role here.
Within the book of Exodus, the Ten Commandments (the Decalogue) 
are found as part of the divine theophany that Moses experienced at Mt. Si-
nai, as described in chapter 20, verses 1–17. The Decalogue is contained in 
a section of the text that runs from chapter 19 to chapter 24, which tells the 
story of Israel’s experience of God in this part of their desert journey from 
slavery in Egypt to the land that God had promised them. Deuteronomy 
recounts much of the same material that is found in Exodus, but this book 
is structured as a series of addresses by Moses to the people of Israel. The 
Commandments (Deut. 5:1–22) are found within the second of these Mo-
saic discourses, which begins at 4:41 and continues until 28:69.
The Catholic tradition of interpretation takes the material in Exodus 
20:2–6 and Deuteronomy 5:6–10 together as the fi rst commandment, a 
requirement of monotheistic worship. It regards the second commandment 
as prohibiting any profanation of the name of God: “You shall not take the 
name of the Lord your God in vain” (Exod. 20:7; see also Deut. 5:11 RSV). 
Protestants have tended to see the fi rst commandment as expressed in the 
single verse at the head of both biblical accounts (Exod. 20:2; Deut. 5:6) 
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and then to regard the prohibition on graven images when treating the 
following passages (Exod. 20:3–6; Deut. 5:7–10) as the second command-
ment. What Catholics have treated as the second commandment is gen-
erally taken as the third commandment in Protestant lists. The material 
that is at issue in the third fi lm of Kieślowski’s Decalogue is what Catholics 
regard as the third commandment (the fourth in Protestant versions). The 
numbering differences continue until the end of the list, where Catholi-
cism sees the fi nal verses (Exod. 20:16–17; Deut. 5:21) as containing two 
distinct commandments that prohibit covetous desires for the neighbor’s 
spouse and for the neighbor’s goods; Protestants read this verse as giving a 
single commandment.
The traditionally Catholic culture of Kieślowski’s Poland makes it natu-
ral that he uses the standard Catholic way of numbering and articulating 
the various commandments, including his decision to put the focus of the 
third fi lm where he does. This decision in no way circumscribes or fore-
closes his artistic quest to explore and appreciate the content and purpose 
of this commandment (“Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy”). In 
Polish translations, the object of remembering is “the Sabbath” while the 
idea of “keeping it holy” is relegated to the subordinate clause. In English 
translations, the emphasis tends to be somewhat different. The most famil-
iar renditions of the third commandment for English speakers put a certain 
emphasis on what we are supposed to remember to do, namely, to keep 
something holy, and the reference to the Sabbath provides the context of a 
special day of the week on which to do this. Consider, for example, the way 
in which the commandment is rendered in the New American Bible:
Remember to keep holy the Sabbath day. (Exod. 20:8)
Take care to keep holy the Sabbath day as the LORD your God com-
manded you. (Deut. 5:12)
The stress in translations like these on our obligation to respect the holi-
ness of the Lord’s Day is typical, especially given the Christian under-
standing of what day this is. Early Jewish Christians not only tended to 
honor the seventh day (what we usually call Saturday) as the Sabbath, in 
keeping with traditional Jewish customs, but also to call the fi rst day of the 
week (Sunday) the Lord’s day and to make it a special day of worship, in 
memory of the day of Jesus’s resurrection from the dead. In the Jerusalem 
Bible, the Gospel of Matthew, for instance, begins its record of the resur-
rection thus: “After the Sabbath, and towards dawn on the fi rst day of the 
week” (Matt. 28:1; see also Mark 16:1, Luke 24:1, John 20:1).
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Jewish traditions treat the Sabbath as a time for remembering God’s cre-
ation of the world. Exodus 20:11, for instance, explains: “For in six days the 
Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that is in them, and rested the 
seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day and hallowed it.” 
It was also a day for calling to mind God’s liberation of Israel from bondage 
in Egypt (see Deut. 5:15: “You shall remember that you were a servant in 
the land of Egypt, and the Lord your God brought you out thence with a 
mighty hand and an outstretched arm; therefore the Lord your God com-
manded you to keep the Sabbath day”). Israel thus understood the Sabbath 
as a sign of God’s irrevocable covenant (Exod. 31:16), a day that was holy 
and set apart for praising God’s work of creation as well as God’s saving 
action on Israel’s behalf. This act of remembering divine work was seen to 
have direct implications for human conduct—if God rested on the seventh 
day, so too human beings ought to rest and be refreshed (Exod. 23:12 and 
31:17). Keeping the Sabbath meant a halt to everyday work.
The Gospels recount numerous incidents when Jesus is accused of hav-
ing violated the law of the Sabbath. While he never failed in respect for 
the holiness of this day, he clearly offered a distinctive interpretation of 
what it means to keep the Sabbath that Christians regard as authentic and 
authoritative, beginning with his remark that “the Sabbath was made for 
man, not man for the Sabbath” (Mark 2:27). In the Christian understand-
ing of the Gospels, it is out of compassion that Christ asserts that the Sab-
bath is reserved for doing good and not harm, for saving life and not killing 
(Mark 3:4). The Sabbath is to be a day of mercy (Matt. 12:5; John 7:23) and 
a day for honoring God, for “the Son of man is lord even of the Sabbath” 
(Mark 2:28).
Once Christianity experienced a vast expansion by the infl ux of many 
people who were not of Jewish origin, there was a growing tradition of 
amalgamating the Sabbath and the Lord’s day. As a way to honor Jesus’s 
prophecy that “a day will come . . . when true worshipers will worship the 
Father in spirit and truth” ( John 4:23), there emerged a tradition of con-
ducting a weekly eucharistic liturgy that synthesized elements of the Jewish 
Passover meal with remembrance of the events of the passion, death, and 
resurrection of Christ. Further, while Christians felt excused from some 
of the regulations that had governed Jewish conduct on the Sabbath (the 
restriction on travel, for instance, to a Sabbath day’s journey), they tried 
to honor the spirit of the commandment by stressing the importance of 
making this a day for family rather than for labor. In this way the Christian 
observance of the Lord’s day attempted simultaneously to include worship, 
rest, and family.
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The Third Commandment in Kieślowski’s Decalogue
By choosing Christmas Eve and Christmas Day as the setting for this fi lm, 
Kieślowski is already at work exploring the meaning of the third com-
mandment. In Polish culture, the celebration of the traditional “Wigilia” 
on Christmas Eve is especially important, and the protagonist’s choice to 
leave his family in the middle of this celebration risks profaning something 
very sacred. The episode’s actual title—Dekalog, Trzy (Decalogue Three)—
remains enigmatic and does not defi nitively link the fi lm and the third 
commandment. Yet a number of critics seem quite rightly to align the fi lm 
with the third commandment and the fi lms’ American distributor, Facets 
Video, uses such correlations between the fi lms and the commandments as 
a marketing strategy.2 While the actual title does not provide a defi nitive 
meaning, it allows the fi lmmaker to explore the range of options within 
the ambit of the third commandment: The fi lm focuses on the question of 
keeping or profaning the holiness of the holy day—that is, in a sense, on 
the obligations of Sunday as the Christian Sabbath.
In the fi lm, we are presented with the feast of Christ’s birth as the tempo-
ral setting, and thus a focus on a day that is the Lord’s in a very special way. 
When we ponder this aspect of the third commandment in any of its pos-
sible translations, it is not likely that anyone would think fi rst of Christmas 
Eve or Christmas Day, and yet there is an interesting connection between 
this feast and the idea of the Lord’s Day. The Christian way of coalescing 
the traditions of the Sabbath with the remembrance of Christ’s resurrec-
tion introduced something quite new into the picture, and the practice of 
setting aside a day on which to honor Jesus’s birth readily suggested that 
Christians ought to recall the wholly new order of history that came with 
Christ’s appearance on the earth. So, in a remarkable way, Christmas Day 
is the Lord’s Day and the Sabbath in a paramount fashion.
The commandment, of course, contains two directives: to remember 
the Sabbath and to keep it holy. The protagonists of the story, however, 
fi nd themselves struggling to stay mindful of the sacredness of this feast 
(e.g., when trying to keep their mind on the Christmas Eve services once 
their gaze meets in the church). Sometimes they simply seem to forget 
what feast this is or even what time of day it is (e.g., as they race around in 
the taxicab all night in the process of visiting various hospitals and govern-
ment offi ces). At other times, they do seem mindful of the feast (as in the 
Christmas toasts), but even then they struggle in the efforts that keeping 
it holy require, as during the scene within the apartment that nearly turns 
into a moment of seduction. Ironically, the need to remember what day 
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this is provides both the source of the problem and the key to its resolu-
tion. What should one do to remember and keep a day holy, and this day 
in particular? And how should one do this, especially when one’s memory 
is tinged with lives that are as broken and confl icted as are the lives of the 
characters in this fi lm?
The fi lm presents us with Ewa (Maria Pakulnis) intruding upon the 
quiet Christmas Eve of Janusz (Daniel Olbrychski), a man who was once 
her lover. She claims that her husband Edward is missing and pleads with 
Janusz to help fi nd him. This story eventually proves to be fabricated, but 
Janusz—perhaps out of pity, perhaps out of some residual affection for 
her—chooses to help. Unwilling to explain what happened to his wife ( Jo-
anna Szczepkowska), Janusz decides to tell her that his taxi has been stolen 
and that he must go out to search for it. His nervousness, however, makes 
this lie implausible, and his wife even sees him speaking with Ewa.
When Janusz returns briefl y to explain that he must hunt for the taxi, 
she says nothing about what she has seen. In vain she tries to give Janusz 
an honorable way to remember his duties to his family: “Perhaps it’s not 
worth it to search for the taxi.” Janusz insists that “it’s our living”—a dou-
ble entendre that suggests that not only his job as a taxi driver is at stake, 
but something much more profound about their marriage.
Janusz and Ewa proceed to drive around the city in search of Edward. 
The night they spend together is surreal—they visit a hospital, a morgue, 
and even an alcoholic center in what proves to be a fruitless quest (Fig-
ure 5–1). By morning Eva confesses to her somewhat reluctant helper that 
he has saved her life, for she had been terrifi ed about spending Christmas 
Figure 5–1. Janusz and Ewa at the morgue in Deca-
logue Three.
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Eve alone and would surely have killed herself. It has been a night of talk, 
sometimes tender and sometimes bitter, a night of not infrequent lies, and 
a night of crude attempts at rekindling a lost love. By the end of the fi lm 
Janusz returns to his wife, whom he fi nds sleeping on the couch.
Do the characters of this story remember the Sabbath and keep it holy? 
The fi lm begins in an abstract way. There are splashes of color, fl ares of 
the camera lens, recollections that are distorted, and dabs of blue and white 
light that have an impressionist feel. There are several shots of the city from 
above—perhaps this is supposed to be a divine point of view—as well as 
scenes from a church during the vigil Mass on Christmas Eve. The pillars 
block our view from time to time, in much the same way that the daily strug-
gle with life and love can obscure one’s sense of the sanctity of this day or the 
moral implications of the commandment to keep the Lord’s Day holy. One 
gets the impression that Ewa in particular is on the outside, trying to gaze 
inside so as to see the holy. She catches the eye of Janusz, and it is clear from 
early on that she is obsessed with the project of engaging his attention.
His own muddled affections are evident in the way that he strains to 
look for her when she moves out of sight. He is visibly moved by the tradi-
tional Polish carols, and especially by the singing of “Bóg siȩ rodzi” (“God is 
born”). But as the story unfolds, it is clear that this fi lm is not a traditional 
Christmas tale. When we hear the carols sung in the church, it is actually 
the second time that they occur in the fi lm. The fi rst time was in the haunt-
ing voice of a drunk, who is seen pulling along a Christmas tree and for-
lornly asking where his home is. Later in the fi lm we will see the same man, 
who has apparently been arrested and tossed into a holding cell, being 
abused by a sadistic orderly. Kieślowski may well be asking where mercy is 
on this sacred night. Janusz’s kindness in accompanying Ewa on her search 
makes their entire trip, in one sense, an errand of mercy, but his mixed 
motives during the course of the night nearly lead him at certain points to 
rekindle an old romance that would utterly ruin the charity of his decision.
The domestic scene of Janusz’s home on Christmas Eve suggests his 
mindfulness of the need to play his part in keeping this day holy, but we 
might well feel unconvinced that he is doing anything more than playing 
a part. Dressed in a Santa Claus suit, he brings in the children’s gifts. He 
unplugs the phone and drinks a toast with his wife and her mother, who 
seems to bore him with her chattering about times long before. We are 
given the impression that he would like this to be an intimate family eve-
ning, one that has been carefully protected from intrusion from the out-
side. The buzz of the intercom disturbs their peace, and Ewa’s desperate 
desire for communication interrupts their plans.
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Perhaps there is some measure of mercy in Janusz’s compliant agree-
ment to join Ewa’s desperate search. But his motives are never wholly clear 
at any point in the fi lm—certainly not to the viewer, and presumably not 
entirely to Janusz. His prima facie duties are at home with his family, but 
Ewa’s plea for his help suggests another Christian duty, to help those in 
need. But it is not simply that he is torn between duties, for the fi res of an 
old fl ame make his response ambiguous. Is he being compassionate, or is 
he secretly hoping that there may be a temptation lurking here to which 
he may fi nd an occasion to yield? We see Janusz increasingly irritated by 
Ewa’s awkward efforts to play the part of an old friend who is distraught 
about her missing husband and simultaneously that of a temptress whose 
loneliness has driven her to this desperate strategy.
It is not clear at fi rst to Janusz— or to the viewer—that Ewa has made 
up the whole story. He seems to suspect that she is frustrated about some-
thing and is trying to manipulate him. Even as his suspicions grow, he still 
plays along. She expresses sadness when she sees an adult rush out after a 
young child who has run outside into the snow, without a coat, to see the 
red lights of a Christmas tree on a nearby traffi c island. She has no child 
to chase this evening. We are brought to a kind of sympathy for her when 
we see her paying a visit to an elderly aunt in a nursing home. The camera 
lingers over the limp leather gloves that Ewa had brought her aunt as a 
present. The aunt cannot seem to understand or even stay awake, let alone 
to acknowledge the gift.
Like many of the other car scenes in the fi lm, the sequence in which 
Ewa’s car leaves the nursing home suggests futility and almost complete 
hopelessness. We see her car enter a traffi c circle and pass the red lights of 
a Christmas tree. She drives aimlessly while considering the unlikely pos-
sibility that she may be able to enchant Janusz. The predominant red color 
of many of these scenes mingles one of the traditional colors of Christmas 
with the color of hellfi re. Later in the fi lm, their drives across the city have 
an in-built futility—Ewa has no husband for them to fi nd—and her only 
goal for the trip is to cling to Janusz for company until dawn breaks.
The institutions that Ewa and Janusz visit are utterly bleak. At the 
morgue the night clerk callously reads out the gory description of a name-
less corpse, without any concern for the possibility that this unknown man 
might be Ewa’s missing spouse. A bit later, it appears for a moment that 
they have found the man they are seeking. When shown a corpse whose 
face is torn apart beyond recognition, Ewa starts violently and throws her-
self into Janusz’s arms. The viewer would naturally suppose that this was 
a reaction of grief, but instead she bursts into a rage about her hatred for 
F6707.indb   102 4/7/16   6:58:00 AM
Remember the Sabbath Day, to Keep It Holy 103
all the men she has loved: “I wish it was him. . . . or you. How often I’ve 
pictured your faces crushed by truck wheels.” Whatever compassion was 
growing for her predicament immediately disappears.
By juxtaposing these stark and hate-fi lled images with Ewa’s crying need 
for love and understanding, Kieślowski shows us a mixture of brokenness 
and hatred. In the decision of Janusz to leave his family on Christmas night, 
we see a mingling of compassion and danger. The lies that Ewa tells Janusz 
and those that Janusz tells his wife risk wrecking their lives. On the screen 
the danger is concretized by the curious scene in which Janusz drives so 
recklessly that a police car cannot help but give chase. The viewer is sub-
jected to a bruising rush of lights and the horror of a near collision with 
a streetcar. The streetcar is driven, incidentally, by the character who ap-
pears from time to time in Kieślowski’s fi lms as a quasi-chorus—he speaks 
no lines and shows no fear, but simply looks at the crazily speeding vehicle 
as if the outcome (a collision or a near-miss) will be their choice. Will they 
tempt death? Is a deliberate crash their way of escaping from the tangled 
web of deceptions and disordered love in their lives? Eventually the police 
do stop them, but then let them go with the reminder, “It’s Christmas.” 
Remembering the Lord’s special day and sanctifying it require them to 
make decisions that thus far they have avoided only by swerving around 
obstacles as dangerous as the bus and the truth of their situations.
Ewa’s plotting brings them to her apartment, on the pretext of phon-
ing in a report about her missing husband. We are left to speculate about 
whether she wants to seduce Janusz, or perhaps to explain everything, in-
cluding her despair. She initially instructs Janusz to wait downstairs, just 
in case her husband has returned home. But she uses the time alone to try 
to make it look as though her husband has been living there, including her 
placement of a man’s shaving brush. When he does come up from the car, 
she pretends to fi le an accident report over the phone, but her hasty efforts 
to deceive him fail. She had not thought to change a razor so rusty that 
Janusz can now confi rm for himself that no man has used it for a long time.
Yet, he does not confront her with her lie. Is he still hoping to be se-
duced? They sit down for a cup of tea and begin to talk more honestly. 
They recall their decision to end their affair when Edward had walked in 
upon them while they were making love. Was it that Janusz himself had 
alerted Edward, to force her to choose? She explains that she had chosen 
Edward, but all of her actions this Christmas night suggest that it is Janusz 
she still wants.
The tortured and confl icted Ewa cannot keep in character. Having just 
turned from a distraught search for her husband to a desperate attempt 
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at rekindling an old fl ame, she suddenly turns again to blaming Janusz. If 
he has managed to make such a happy life for himself, she must be the 
true victim. He does not know what to say—to return to her now would 
mean betraying his family, even if the present status of his family life is not 
every thing he might want. She vacillates between truth telling and lies: “It’s 
Christmas Eve . . . sorry I lied to you.” But then she returns to her deceit: 
“I am with him [Edward] in the usual way.” They break a stick of gum in 
the very way that any Pole would fi nd reminiscent of the Christmas custom 
of the breaking of opłatki (wafers)—a ritual in which family members wish 
one another peace and forgiveness. But just as the viewer is expecting them 
to embrace, the buzzer alerts them to children at the door, caroling badly 
off-key and in funny costumes. The way in which Ewa romantically cuddles 
up close to Janusz during the song allows her for a brief moment to act out 
a fantasy. We cannot but be struck by how easy self-deception can be.
The spell now broken, they continue their search by heading for a de-
toxifi cation center, a reminder of the terrible problem with alcohol that 
has long plagued Poland. The drunk whom we saw dragging the Christmas 
tree earlier in the fi lm is still pitifully asking, “Where is my home?” The at-
tendant at the center, whose appearance and whose morbid curiosity about 
the ethnic origins of his charges suggests the inhumanity of the Nazis, 
sadistically douses the men lying naked in the cell with cold water so that 
Ewa and Janusz will be able to see if they recognize anyone. With a cruel 
laugh, he tries to amuse the visitors (“See how they jump?”), but in another 
act of mercy for these poor souls Janusz rips the hose from his hands.
Janusz has now had enough of this deceitful and manipulative evening: 
“It’s senseless, I’m going back . . . I’m going home.” What will he fi nd 
there? Ewa fi rst tries to calm him by laying her hand on his leg. When he is 
unresponsive, she grabs the steering wheel and the car jumps off the road, 
right into the Christmas tree on the traffi c island that they drove by earlier 
that night. The scene is fi lled with red light—is it the color of Christmas 
or are they still in a hell of their own making? Her desperation is clear, and 
she pleads with Janusz to drive her to one more place—maybe her husband 
is in the train station. Or perhaps she is still looking for the courage to take 
her own life and end the pain.
In the desolate train station, the camera centers on a Christmas tree 
standing alone. The scene is surreal—a security camera pans the eerily 
empty station while the guard sleeps. All of a sudden, another guard, a 
young woman on a skateboard, noisily rolls in and shows them her creative 
way to stay awake during her watch. When Ewa catches sight of an electric 
clock that moves from 7:02 to 7:03, Ewa fi nally tells Janusz the truth. What 
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she has been dying to explain suddenly comes tumbling out: She had found 
it impossible to be alone, especially on Christmas night, when everyone 
else has a family and a home. Edward left her years ago and now has a fam-
ily of his own in Kraków. She explains that she thought that she could keep 
from killing herself if only she could make it until seven o’clock.
Even while she is explaining, we see in the background the child whom 
we saw earlier in the fi lm. Apparently it was not one of his own parents who 
had caught him racing toward the Christmas tree, but a hospital attendant 
who was chasing him when he had tried to escape. The boy is now being 
caught in the same place where they have arrived, a train station. Ewa has 
fi nally managed to escape—at least for one night—from her horrendous 
fears. A train station is a place of departures as well as arrivals, a place of 
transitions from one place to another. Having watched the torturous trip 
that Ewa has undertaken this night, the viewer can only wonder where she 
is headed next.
The fi nal scene for Ewa and Janusz involves taking leave at the traffi c 
signal where she had left her car at the start of the night. There is no kiss 
and no embrace, but they fl ash the headlights of their cars toward one 
another—a wordless communication that manages to speak something of 
the truth about their affection, but at a safe distance.
At home, Janusz fi nds his wife asleep on the couch (Figure 5–2). She 
will not pretend that she does not know at least something of what has 
happened, and so she asks: “You’ll be going out again in the evening?” If 
there was anything noble or merciful in his decision to leave their home 
that night, if there was anything compassionate or charitable in his ac-
Figure 5–2. Janusz returns to his wife in Deca-
logue Three.
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tion, she offers no complaint. But by her question she reminds him that 
true compassion cannot spring from adultery or from the abandonment 
of his home. What she offers him is the peace and stability of a family and 
a household, but he must give up the stimulation of Ewa. The viewer may 
know that Janusz has not been unfaithful to his wife. But there is every 
reason to think that he had fantasized about the possibilities and perhaps 
even hoped for seduction. He needs to decide whether he will indeed live 
out the choice that his wife now offers.
The Third Commandment, Again
A well-told tale can make the questions of religion and morality come alive 
in a special way. The third of Kieślowski’s Decalogue fi lms provides the oc-
casion and the incentive.
The Sabbath, the Lord’s Day, and especially the feast day of Christmas 
are all sacred times. They require true worship of God, but the God who 
commanded that these be days of authentic worship also expects that we 
will learn to keep these sacred days holy in the full sense of holiness. The 
scriptural texts that record the obligations of the commandments speak of 
rest from work, and of turning our attention to home, to family, and to 
the commitments that we have made in love. But those love commitments 
are diffi cult and it is easy to stray. It is always possible to turn the leisure 
intended for our rest and family devotion into occasions for indulging our-
selves and rationalizing our duties by the most minimal and legalistic un-
derstandings of what religion and morality really require.
Kieślowski wisely refuses any moralizing tone, but he presses the moral 
questions. Mindful of the foibles of the human heart, he shows us the 
plight of those with mixed motives. Perhaps there never was a motive that 
was not mixed. The task is to sort our motives out and not be carried over 
dangerous shoals by easy rationalizing. Even on a day of a sacred nature, 
a day consecrated to the memory of the birth of the Savior and a day sup-
ported in the Polish setting of this story by timeless customs of family and 
worship, the protagonists of this story move by motives almost too mixed 
to sort out.
Does keeping holy a day that God has directed us to sanctify mean tak-
ing the risks necessary to do an act of compassion, or declining to do so 
because of the temptations that the person being asked to show compas-
sion will almost certainly feel? Do the pressing needs of someone who does 
not know how close she stands to suicide have a claim on an old lover now 
trying to live out his duties as a husband and a father? Could not Janusz 
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have asked his wife to join him in having the desperate Ewa as a guest in 
their home on Christmas night? There are countless ways in which we can 
hope that we ourselves would have shown the needed compassion, and real 
life will not leave us without opportunities to test our mettle.
But the explorations of the artist here give us reason to say what we 
have learned from his storytelling. There is a need for distinguishing be-
tween true and false compassion. There is reason for insisting that the 
commandments must never be taken extrinsically in the fashion of a legally 
acceptable minimum. And there is an incentive for undertaking a fresh ex-
amination of conscience on this commandment, as on the others to which 
Kieślowski has turned his cinematic gaze. Have we remembered the Sab-
bath, to keep it holy?
notes
 1. There are many fi ne studies on the fi lms of Kieślowski. I would like 
to acknowledge, in particular, two books for the insights they have provided 
about the interpretation of various scenes in this fi lm: Christopher Gar-
bowski, Krzysztof Kieslowski’s Decalogue Series: The Problem of the Protagonists 
and Their Self-Transcendence (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs; 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Joseph G. Kickasola, The 
Films of Krzysztof Kieślowski: The Liminal Image (New York: Continuum, 
2004).
 2. See, for example, Marek Haltof, The Cinema of Krzysztof Kieślowski: 
Variations on Destiny and Chance (New York: Wallfl ower Press, 2004), and 
“The Ten Commandments and the Decalogue” in the booklet accompany-
ing The Decalogue, DVD, directed by Krzysztof Kieślowski (Chicago: Facets 
Video, 2003).
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Decalogue Four: The Mother up in Smoke, 
or “Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother”
Gabriella Ripa di Meana
A young woman of twenty who lives alone with her father informs him one 
day that she has found a secret envelope that he has been hiding from her 
for years. The envelope contains a testamentary letter from her mother, 
who had passed away a few days after giving birth to her. The father has 
kept this letter, addressed to his daughter, inside another envelope contain-
ing, in turn, his own testament to her. On this envelope, the father, with 
the conscious intention of delaying its dreaded opening and disclosure for 
as long as possible, wrote these words: “To be opened after my death.”
In this way, the man, who had both evaded and feared the content of 
the letter, has now learned, from the daughter’s provocative account, that 
he is not her father. This revelation has upset him. The family system has 
broken down. The relationship between them has blown up. The incest ta-
boo has wavered. The father and the daughter have now become ensnared 
by desire.
It is only after a period of tumult between them that the young woman 
admits that she totally fabricated the contents of the maternal letter, and 
that she had, in fact, never opened it. This fi nally snuffs out the morbid 
curiosity with which the two had guarded the mysterious message for 
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years. Their spirits thus soothed, they decide to burn the letter. Only a 
few scorched fragments remain to recall the message that is now perma-
nently lost.
The Oedipal Trap
Between the father and the daughter lies, hidden, a mysterious yellowish 
envelope on which the father has written by hand, “To be opened after my 
death.” When the two are separated for a few days, the yellow envelope re-
mains at the bottom of a common-use drawer. One day, the father, who is 
about to travel somewhere, appears to forget it there, careless in a way he has 
never been before. Thus the amnesia of the father, Michał ( Janusz Gajos), 
puts the daughter, Anka (Adrianna Biedrzyńska), under pressure. She takes 
the initiative and arrives at a solution. She only has to cut the yellow enve-
lope open to discover the truth of the father’s postmortem injunction.
She indeed executes that cut, thus breaking the enclosure of the paternal 
word. Within it, however, she fi nds no revelation other than yet another 
sealed envelope with the words, “For my daughter Anna,” written on it. 
This time, the writing belongs to the mother who died giving birth to her. 
Thus, Anka fi nds a secret within a secret, a cut following a cut. Meanwhile, 
Anka, holding a pair of scissors and the letter in her hands, vanishes from 
the fi lm viewer’s fi eld of vision against a brilliant white canoe that a man 
approaching from the water carries over his shoulders (Figure 6-1).
We see her again when she furiously recites her mother’s arcane mes-
sage to the father: “My darling daughter . . . Michał is not your father.”1 
There is a slap in the face, some broken glass, and the two fi nd themselves 
Figure 6-1. The mother’s letter within the father’s 
in Decalogue Four.
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speaking of desire, jealousy, and love. What happens then is a sort of game 
of truth or dare, which follows all the conventions, mannerisms, and ter-
rors of truth itself.
We see Anka cry hysterically, now undressing to seduce her father, now 
curling up on her own—adolescent—bed, while he quivers with unex-
pressed desires. And yet, neither knows what to do with such an outpour-
ing of emotions, revelations, and accusations. In all of this, eros is only but 
a fragment of their truth. Exhausted, Michał leaves. Anka, upset, follows 
him. What ensues is another moment of half-truth. Anka confesses to her 
act of mise-en-scène. She has not opened the letter. She has plotted her 
deception and laid an Oedipal trap. She is a theater actress and has staged 
a truth . . . but only one of many possible truths.
Together they have always thought that the content of the mysterious 
letter—sanctioned by the dead mother, whom she never knew—would 
delegitimize their bond as father and daughter. Perhaps they have always 
suspected that they were victims of some sort of (male)diction by the 
mother, who disappeared too soon not to be jealous of the end of her own 
youth at the birth of the bond between her man and that little girl. But 
with time, their suspicion turns into a dark desire to know the Truth. And 
a similar desire leads them to invent ambiguous tricks to both reveal and 
conceal that letter. In any case, the letter always remains in the middle 
between them, like a mystery and a condemnation. Meanwhile, with the 
passing years, father and daughter work out, but do not communicate to 
each other, a form of shared knowledge rooted, day by day, in the mysteri-
ous origins of the relationship that binds them. For this reason, Anka cuts 
open the father’s sealed envelope, but confronted with the unknown of the 
mother’s white envelope does not cut it, preferring rather to unleash the 
obscure, infernal forces of incest.
Nevertheless, despite her jolts and agonizing recognitions, and despite 
pathetic moments of seduction by this frail and reckless girl, Michał does 
not give up his desire to be a father. At the same time, the daughter’s stag-
ing of this fi ction is a fearless and absolute fi lial act. Actually, while the 
father looks fearfully at the presumed maternal verdict, which undermines 
and denies everything their father-daughter bond is based on, Anka elects 
to give up her mother’s truth, whatever it may be. In fact, she dares to 
uncover and provoke precisely the unknown aspect of that truth, a truth 
that had threatened them both until then, nailing them to each other not 
by fi liation but by negation.
Anka thus decides to burn the letter that she had yearned for so long, 
in order to honor her father and her mother. The fi lm ends by leaving the 
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truth of the matter unresolved. Perhaps the letter enclosed the truth that 
they had imagined; perhaps it did not.
The pure and simple knowledge of the facts (whether Anka was or was 
not Michał’s biological daughter) would not have triggered the dark and 
indomitable forces of their subjective truth so powerfully. These forces 
break out precisely because that type of knowledge had remained impos-
sible. And this impossibility was always attested to by the presence/absence 
of the hermetically sealed envelope.
There is no truth without concealment, as there is no fi lial honor that 
has not somehow traversed the deceptions and pitfalls of truth. That sort 
of discovered truth, bequeathed as a legacy by the mother, needed to be, 
precisely, re-covered or covered again, not only by the husband through 
the yellow envelope and the lengthy deferral, but also by the daughter, by 
means of lies and by fi re.
The Knowledge of Origins
Therefore: a letter that contains but another letter; a message that holds 
but another, mysterious, message. The fi rst message is written in the fa-
ther’s handwriting: “To be opened after my death.” A deferment, a threat, 
a desire. Anka has her fi rst glimpse of the envelope, by chance, at fi fteen. 
The other is the message the father imparts to her whenever he takes the 
envelope with him when he travels, so that the daughter would not be 
tempted to open it if she found it. An unknown, a seduction, a betrayal. But 
these messages fall apart when one day, the father leaves the letter in the 
drawer, not absentmindedly but rather intentionally. And so the father’s 
desire comes into the fore, in its duplicity as both the desire to be a father 
to this girl and the desire of the man-father for the girl-daughter.
Another mysterious message is the one from the dead mother who 
writes on the envelope: “For my daughter Anna.” This message alludes to 
at least two things: the desire for a direct contact with her, lost in child-
birth, and the unveiling of a secret. All in all, the father seems unable to 
communicate to the daughter what only the mother can know and com-
municate to her, that is, the knowledge of her origin. It is knowledge that, 
according to an ancient biological hypothesis, only the mother is supposed 
to possess (mater certa, pater incertus).
If the father’s desire for the daughter is too intense and if his de-
fenses against it are organized in a way that is too rigid or dismissive, the 
daughter runs the risk of forfeiting the knowledge of her origin, for she 
can no longer trace her ancestry if her mother is no longer there to at-
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test to the generative act. Therefore, for a son or a daughter to be able 
to honor his or her father and mother as his or her parents, or procreators, 
it is necessary that the parents themselves also recognize their symbolic 
positions.
On the contrary, in this situation, Michał must fi ght against an initial 
disavowal—that which emanates from the sealed envelope of his woman, 
Anka’s mother. Apparently, just before dying, she had undermined the 
symbolic terms of Michał’s paternity, not only and not so much by deceiv-
ing him, but rather by implying on her deathbed that he is not her little 
girl’s father, while at the same time entrusting her to his fatherhood. This 
sets up an atmosphere of symbolic uncertainty that strikes a blow at the 
father’s heart as well as his paternal function.
Moreover, what certainty could there be about paternity and fi liation? 
For that matter, is there such a thing as symbolic certainty about maternity? 
As Decalogue Two shows, these are open questions for everyone. But here 
Michał confesses to his daughter that he has always suspected, although he 
was never certain, that he was not her “real” father. Therefore, from the 
beginning, Michał has lived a paternity always threatened by doubt, which, 
for the duration of the more dangerous period of the Oedipal stage, he 
decided not to resolve. Instead, he essentially drew from it the symbolic 
energies to love Anka as a daughter, to protect her and to guide her in her 
life. It is only when she fi nds a boyfriend that Michał decides to “forget” 
the mysterious letter and to take the risk of clearing up his doubt.
Anka literally declares to her father that, in her teenage years, she was 
deeply alarmed when she found out that there could be something that 
would be revealed to her only after his death. Anka would have to learn 
something mysterious about her origin and her identity after the death of 
both of her parents. Michał’s “oversight” predisposes his daughter to and 
sets off in him a veritable syndrome of failure. Therefore, once the alleged 
recognition is staged, there follows, inevitably, Anka’s question to her fa-
ther: “What shall I call you now?” “I don’t know,” Michał, the dishonored 
father, replies.
But the mother is also dishonored, as father and daughter throw them-
selves on her modest and fragile secrets, greedily rummaging through her 
papers in the cellar, blinded by the idea of fi nding the Truth there. Yet, 
in the end, the mother’s letter is put to fl ames. With it, the phantasms 
of delegitimization it was able to incite are also gone. But this resolution 
becomes possible only when Anka drops the deception inherent in her fi c-
tion. This is the only way she can honor the father again: by again recog-
nizing the father’s symbolic function.
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On the other hand, for this function to be recognized by the daughter, 
Michał in turn must succeed in resisting Anka’s explicit and implicit seduc-
tions and remain resolute in his paternal position, with regard to which 
the last words of his wife had weakened and disoriented him. In reality, by 
burning the letter Anka ends up, exactly, paying respect to her mother’s 
word, the word by which she had entrusted Anka’s paternity to Michał. In 
fact, the revelation of a presumed “biological truth” was perhaps nothing 
more but the dead woman’s revenge against her man, the man who would 
become a parent at very little cost of life or death, while she lost her parent-
hood in dying. And who knows? Perhaps that allusive, disquieting message 
was also an unconscious act of retaliation of the mother against her daugh-
ter, the daughter who, in being born, killed her.
Maternal envy does exist. It makes no sense to idealize things, and Kie-
ślowski does not idealize. With his fi lm, the agnostic Polish director seems 
to suggest that the act of honoring one’s father and one’s mother must 
traverse a similar terrain of knowledge. It is the knowledge of the profound 
imperfection of those who have brought us into the world: not only of 
their imperfection as subjects and individuals, but fi rst and foremost of the 
imperfection of love, upon which our utopias go up in smoke.
The Dead Letter
To burn the letter enclosing the mother’s secret appears, then, to be the 
most profound way to honor both the father and the mother. The mother’s 
secret can never be identical to the daughter’s secret. Instead, Michał en-
acted a morbid system of concealments and insinuations around that letter, 
and contributed to transforming what was a weak maternal message into 
a powerful Message from the Mother. But whatever the mother’s knowl-
edge, which constitutes the secret of her identity as a woman, may be, it 
must remain a dead letter to the daughter. It is only upon this condition 
that a daughter can succeed in piecing her own story together, that is, the 
story of her desire and, ultimately, her own secret knowledge, in its unique-
ness, peculiarity, and difference. In a sense, we could infer from this fi lmic 
narrative that in order to obey the fourth commandment, it is necessary to 
let go of the possession of the mother, or of the maternal Thing. And this 
can only happen if the Oedipal law functions well. But in order for this law 
to work, the father must identify both the limitation and the inadequacy of 
his position. And the fi lm shows this masterfully.
In other words, the father is incertus and remains such. He can function 
as father only within a nuclear, symbolic nexus of this kind.
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In conclusion, to honor thy father and thy mother means to live one’s life 
and one’s death fully, which one’s father and one’s mother have consented 
to inaugurate in the very act of birth. Therefore, the mysterious letter—
which should be opened only after the mother’s death and, subsequently, 
only after the father’s death—materializes the spiritual viaticum whereby 
the subject of desire is allowed to experience the life of his or her life and 
the death of his or her death. For this reason, Anka rightly threw that letter 
into the fi re. The material existence of this message made the peculiar-
ity of its origins appear disturbing and mysterious because of the allusive 
power of a secret that would be sooner or later unveiled. But burning the 
unopened letter eliminated this illusion once and for all. There cannot be 
any unveiling of our destiny: It is only from its ashes that we are born to 
the mystery of our identity.
Like everyone else, Anka is destined to experience some ontological un-
certainty and some psychological precariousness if she wants to achieve her 
own individuation or, better yet, to attain her sexual difference. This seems 
to be the only way she can truly honor her father and her mother.
In the Form of an Enigma
Elsewhere, I have pointed out the particular structural positioning of the 
title in each of the ten fi lms of Kie ślowski’s Decalogue.2 And, surely, we have 
had and will still have much to learn from their original articulation in 
relation to the story and the techniques of each fi lm. The director’s words 
highlight the essential arbitrariness of each title with regard to the merit 
and content of the individual story each fi lm is based on.
“To be honest,” Kie ślowski asserts, “I did not follow any rules because I 
simply wanted to relate ten stories. Their connection with the Ten Com-
mandments is not binding. . . . All good books can, in the end, be traced 
back to the Ten Commandments . . . . Essentially, any book about human 
or metaphysical nature can be related to one or more commandments. The 
same thing is true for theater and the fi gurative arts because these norms 
exist and, when we speak about our existence or human relationships, we 
end up implicating them.”3 There is no necessary relation between any 
given commandment and any given story, and there are alternative asso-
ciations one can think of. Nevertheless, the director continues: “We [Kie-
ślowski and Piesiewicz] wrote the screenplays in such a way that a link 
existed, however tacit or veiled, but we did not aim for a simple illustra-
tion at all” (“Perché siamo qui?” 29). Therefore, each fi lm’s relation to the 
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relevant commandment does not implicate its content, nor does it have 
any prescriptive, summative or defi nitive function with regard to the story 
that is being told. Rather, it has a maieutic and productive function. Thus, 
the commandments do not so much embody the moral message of Kie-
ślowski’s fi lms as constitute a signifying trace within each of them. And as 
we speak of signifying traces, let us put to rest any hypothesis of moralistic 
decryption and make way for the subject of ethics. The latter, on account 
of its subjection to language and desire, acts and suffers from sin, guilt, 
pleasure, and sanction, and, on occasion, even happiness.
Having articulated this premise, we are now left with the task of validat-
ing it in the case of the fourth commandment: “Honor thy father and thy 
mother.” The fi lm’s story, style, and language seem to assert the failure of 
this powerful ethical principle following a sequence of this kind: Dishonor 
the truth by means of Anka’s fi ction; dishonor the father by seducing him; 
dishonor the mother by burning her letter.
A different reading is, however, possible, one that exfoliates the meta-
psychological levels of narration and that seeks out the paradoxical knots 
within which the symbolic law is articulated. We already mentioned in the 
introduction that, according to the psychoanalyst and mathematician Dan-
iel Sibony, the paradox of the symbolic law is that it pretends to offer a uni-
versal cohesion to human beings but entails the impossibility of conform-
ing to it.4 And this reading allows for clarifi cation and articulation of some 
semantic connections between the style in which the story is narrated and 
the antirhetoric that is also immanent in the fourth commandment.
Even according to theological exegesis, “Honor thy father and thy 
mother” does not accentuate the aspect of the child’s submission to his or 
her parents, but rather the opposite.5 From a more unconventional per-
spective, to honor the father and the mother becomes an act of differentia-
tion and autonomy by means of which a child fulfi lls the most productive 
aspect of his or her parents’ desire of fi liation. This desire comprises both a 
voracious and destructive maternal/paternal component that tends toward 
the absorption of the child into sameness and a strong aspiration toward 
the alterity and difference of their progeny.
However, we can observe something more in Four if we treat the title as 
a meaningful card laid on the table during the aesthetic and ethical game 
that we are playing with the author. It is almost by chance that the fourth 
commandment corresponds to this episode, rather than the sixth (“Thou 
shalt not commit adultery”), the eighth (“Thou shalt not bear false witness 
against thy neighbor”), or the ninth (“Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s 
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wife”). Yet, when you see the fi lm through the prism of this card, its system 
of meanings coalesces around those signifi ers—“Honor thy father and thy 
mother”—to offer some pathways to knowledge that is unfamiliar, per-
haps, even to the author himself. All this makes Kie ślowski’s entire fi lm ar-
bitrary like the Saussurean sign and allows the subject of the unconscious, 
rather than the moral or moralistic subject, to emerge. Whereas the moral 
subject has the function of fi lling the message with meaning, the subject of 
the unconscious adds meaning only in the form of an enigma.
How can Anka honor her father and her mother?
First of all, by freeing herself from the unconscious desire for her father’s 
death, which until that moment represented to her the necessary condi-
tion of opening the mysterious envelope. Only in this way can she liberate 
her mother’s letter from the paternal interdiction. This letter, once liber-
ated from the yellow envelope that enclosed it, is capable of destroying, by 
its mere presence, the relative harmony between Michał and Anka, most 
likely because the prolonged state of repression, which it had been under 
until then, is suddenly lifted at that moment. Michał feared that the letter 
furnished evidence that he could not be the father: ultimately, his paternal 
dishonor. It was, therefore, necessary for the daughter to seize the “letter” 
of his message to escape this dead end. It was explicitly a matter of life or 
death: What was written on the envelope (“To be opened after my death”) 
set things up in these terms.
What could be done, then? One could put a stop to the agony of ambiv-
alence and accept the enigma. At the same time, Anka also took her mother 
literally: “You are my daughter” is implicit in her mother’s exact words, “For 
my daughter.” This is enough of a signal for Anka to shift her mother’s 
position from that of an imaginary avenger to that of the symbolic mother 
who recognizes her. The very fact that the daughter could perform such a 
shift of register with regard to the subjective ethical value of the forbidden 
letter is suffi cient to compel Michał to assume both the weight and the 
renunciations of his self-legitimation as a father.
All in all, the Maternal Message does not exist for the subject of the 
unconscious of “Honor thy father and thy mother.” However, if the father, 
by fearing it, brings the Message into being and gives it authority, he ends 
up being condemned to having to vacate his function as a father.
The Desire of/for the Cut
In the fi rst part of the fi lm, Michał and Anka perform a love game with 
water, in which there are clear echoes of an imaginary complicity, founded 
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on a phallic bond between them. The relation between father and daugh-
ter appears to be sustained by a mutual tension directed at the avoid-
ance of limits and of lack, of that foundational lack by virtue of which 
the object of desire, between father and daughter, exists only in gaps and 
defects.
After all, by using the expedient of fi ction and by exercising the more 
or less hidden pressures of mastery, Michał and Anka attempt to hide from 
each other the degree to which the questions of origin and acknowledg-
ment dig a void and signal a mystery in the constitution of their respective 
identities. Thus, both maintain a relationship of omnipotent control with 
regard to that sealed envelope, which is, for each, both a condemnation 
and a chimera.
The second part of the fi lm brings to light, as do all the episodes of Kie-
ślowski’s Decalogue, the explosive power of the effort to make the impos-
sible possible. The impossible is that dimension of the real around which 
the subject revolves and, around which it, for the most part, runs in circles. 
The term “the impossible” indicates, in this instance, that phantasm of 
revelation that ties around the fetish of the sealed letter like a knot. The 
phantasm of revelation, in turn, refers to the obscure auspices and pro-
phetic expectations that envelop the unknown message, hidden as well as 
revealed, of the father and of the mother.
In any case—whether the powerful utopia about the truth of origins 
takes hold, eliminating any dimension of mystery; or the presumed dogma 
of the letter eradicates any enigmatic root of the subject; or the power of 
absence and death invades the living space of the two protagonists—we 
always deal with the maternal Thing, of which it is impossible to say or 
predicate anything.
And so, in this story, the confi nes of the impossible are trespassed in at 
least three different areas: in the fi eld of Truth, in which minor vestiges 
of language and meaning remain; in the fi eld of Dogma, where mysteries 
vanish and the intermittences of the heart dissolve; and, analogously, in the 
dizziness of Absence, where loss allows for a few fl ashes of bodily presence 
to persist. In this way, the maternal Thing predominates.
In other words, Anka decides, in the name of the Mother’s dead end, 
immediately to marry a man whom she does not love. She does so under 
the aegis of the maternal Dogma, which holds the key to annulling pater-
nity at any moment. Michał, for his part, falls into the all-powerful hole 
of Absence, kicking and screaming like an automaton. The visual frame is 
then fi lled by the dazzling white shape of a canoe, carried by a featureless 
man, at the very moment when Anka is about to cut the mother’s envelope. 
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It is an asymmetrical diamond form that simply draws on the screen four 
enigmatic and disquieting polarities (Figure 6-2).
Only later do we fi nd out that Anka, following this vision, in fact re-
frains from the act of unveiling as if she understood, right at that moment, 
its impossibility or its fundamental uselessness for her soul. For Anka to 
cut open the father’s envelope meant to undercut the extortion over origins 
and to weaken her imaginary complicity with him; on the contrary, to cut 
open the mother’s envelope would be equivalent to making the mother’s 
absence intrusive, thus fi lling in the void of her lack.
In the third phase of the fi lm, father and daughter sink into anguish. 
Their situation effectively illustrates how the fantasy of touching the truth 
of the mother is, simultaneously, an irresistible temptation and an insuffer-
able experience.
At this point, the fourth phase of the fi lm begins. The imaginary tri-
angulation, at fi rst constructed around the phallic pole of the avoidance 
of lack, later develops, once it has suffered the cut infl icted by Anka, into 
another pole predicated on the symbolic components of insuffi ciency and 
void. This is the only mental space in which the inscription of desire and 
language is possible. In short, the triangulation of complicity closes ranks 
around the void that the maternal letter has created, once it is accepted that 
it always remains unknown.
The magic and the logic of absence now begin to exert an effect. And so 
Anka’s incestuous desire dissolves into the mystery of origins. Perhaps this 
mystery will permit her to fi nd herself. The father’s incestuous desire—
which initially overfl owed, by identifi cation with the much hoped for and 
much feared maternal verdict—now begins to fl ow within the embank-
ments of an intense and diffi cult paternal desire. The squaring of these 
Figure 6-2. The diamond-shaped canoe in 
 Decalogue Four.
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triangles opens up the space of the lost object, the object that is lost pre-
cisely because it has never been possessed. This space opens up in the fi lm 
at the moment when Anka admits that she did not open the letter and that 
she ignored the truth therein. Therefore, the truth that until then she had 
boasted to have held in her hands was nothing but a dose of that lost truth, 
never ever possessed.
At the very moment when Anka makes this admission to her father, the 
man with the canoe passes by again. But, for us, the image is no longer the 
same from a logical and metapsychological perspective. What has hap-
pened? It is now time for the white diamond of the canoe to be wounded 
(Figure 6-3).
Although its whiteness is untouched and its geometry unchanged, 
the absoluteness of its silhouette against the space is even more essential 
because it has sustained what I would like to defi ne as a transversal cut 
through/of lack. This cut breaks the phallic bond and introduces an ele-
ment of openness and contamination into the integrity and invulnerability 
of the original Object.
To Honor the Truth
In conclusion, Kie ślowski’s Four ends with a signifi er that burns. The un-
known of the unconscious emerges in the very act of signifying itself.
“Honor thy father and thy mother” corresponds, for Michał, literally to 
a fi re that still burns him: “The letter is burning (me).” In this way, Michał 
is surprised by his own enigma, with which, in the end, he will not be able 
to do anything but continue living: “Is he or is he not the father of that 
daughter?” In truth, there is a barrier that resists meaning and divides the 
Figure 6-3. Anka’s resolution in Decalogue Four.
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signifi ers of the unconscious from the semantic body of signifi cation. As 
for us, in the last frame we leave Michał before the fi re, while he is inciner-
ating, with that letter, that which still infl ames him in vain.
“Honor thy father and thy mother” corresponds, for the dead woman, 
literally to a fi re that goes beyond her own demise. It is a fi re of love and 
hate, a fl ame that makes her soul migrate without giving her peace: “May 
the letter burn (you)!” The echo of another enigma lights up in this mes-
sage: the enigma of that which burns the heart of a mother.
“Honor thy father and thy mother” is, for Anka, the signifying material-
ization or, better, the letter of her desire to be: “I burn (for) the letter.” In 
other words: “I yearn for the letter that holds the secret of my identity.” In 
all truth, the letter of identity rises from the ashes of incestuous desire: an 
unreal desire that mutates, leaving in the hands of each individual only the 
unknown with which they honor both the progeny and the progenitors.
“Honor thy father and thy mother” is “the letter” of Four. What is writ-
ten in it is that the symbolic weight of origins is our most immanent mys-
tery. And, thus, all this talk about it only weaves our stories together (up) 
in smoke.
Translated by Eva Badowska 
and Francesca Parmeggiani
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c h a p t e r  7
Decalogue Five: A Short Film about 
Killing, Sin, and Community
Michael Baur
Decalogue Five tells the story of Waldemar Rekowski ( Jan Tesarz), a jaded 
taxi driver, Piotr Balicki (Krzysztof Globisz), an idealistic, newly-licensed 
attorney, and Jacek Lazar (Mirosław Baka), a young and troubled drifter, 
whose lives intersect with one another as a result of fate, or contingent 
circumstance, or some combination of both. With brutal detail and de-
tachment, the fi lm depicts Jacek’s seemingly aimless wanderings through 
Warsaw, his senseless killing of Waldemar, his interactions with Piotr (his 
court-appointed attorney), and his eventual execution after a failed defense 
in court. Like other fi lms within the Decalogue series, Five illustrates what 
happens when human beings are forced to confront ethical dilemmas (and 
thus are forced to confront themselves as responsible moral decision makers) 
in a world that seems to offer little in the way of moral direction, meaning, 
purpose, and community with others. Discussing the overarching aim of the 
Decalogue series as a whole, Krzysztof Kieślowski refers to the sense of alien-
ation, aimlessness, and loneliness that often describes the human condition:
Decalogue is an attempt to narrate ten stories about ten or twenty 
individuals, who—caught in a struggle precisely because of these and 
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not other circumstances, circumstances which are fi ctitious but which 
could occur in everyday life—suddenly realize that they’re going round 
and round in circles, that they’re not achieving what they want.1
Of the three main characters in Five, two in particular—Jacek and Wal-
demar—seem to illustrate the directionless, alienated form of existence 
that constitutes the subject matter of the Decalogue series as a whole. Paul 
Coates describes Jacek’s aimless and menacing wanderings throughout the 
city as the wanderings of someone who “stalks Warsaw like an edgy, exis-
tential angel of doom.”2 While Waldemar appears to be better off in some 
respects—he is married and employed, after all—it is apparent that he 
does not share much affection with his fellow citizens. When we fi rst meet 
Waldemar, we see him walking around the housing complex where he lives 
and narrowly escaping being hit by a clump of wet, dirty rags thrown down 
at him from a resident above.
In general, Jacek and Waldemar seem not to care much about the world 
that surrounds them, and the world, in turn, seems to care little about 
them. Neither Jacek nor Waldemar is especially likable, and both are seen 
to be capable of violence and callousness as they interact— or fail to inter-
act—with their fellow citizens. For example, we see Jacek attack another 
young man in a public restroom and throw him violently into a urinal, 
all for no apparent reason. Also for no apparent reason, Jacek runs into a 
crowd of pigeons being fed in a public square, scaring the pigeons away 
from the woman who had been trying to feed them. While on a highway 
overpass, Jacek places a rock on the overpass ledge and nudges it until it 
falls off into traffi c below, causing what sounds like a serious and perhaps 
even fatal accident. After fi nishing his coffee and cake in a local café, Jacek 
leaves a large dollop of spit in his empty coffee cup; then, before leaving the 
café, he fl ings a large spoonful of leftover food at the café’s window, where 
two little girls had been standing and looking in on him.
Although Waldemar is a more established and gainfully employed 
member of society, he also has his moments of callousness and cruelty. 
While washing his taxicab, Waldemar takes his time and shows no sympa-
thy or concern for the couple (Dorota and her husband from Two), who, 
after asking for a ride, waits patiently for him at the taxi stand. Once he is 
fi nished washing his taxi, he drives off without saying a word to the couple, 
leaving them stranded in the cold. While driving his taxi, Waldemar honks 
his horn at a man and his two dogs as they pass by, for no reason other 
than to witness the frightened reaction of the man and his dogs. In another 
scene, while Waldemar waits near the taxi stand, we see him ogling the 
F6707.indb   123 4/7/16   6:58:01 AM
124 Michael Baur
young girl at the nearby vegetable kiosk and trying to look up her skirt as 
she reaches to receive vegetables from a delivery truck. And in a selfi sh act 
that will indirectly lead to his demise, Waldemar quickly drives off rather 
than giving a ride to an obviously inebriated man being helped by a friend 
to the taxi stand. In so doing, Waldemar keeps himself available to pick up 
Jacek as his next and—as it turns out—fi nal passenger.
While both Jacek and Waldemar are unlikable in many respects, they 
display at least a few redeeming qualities. For example, Jacek shows genu-
ine affection for others, especially for young girls, as is evident from the 
way he pensively observes the images of young girls being displayed in the 
window of the photography shop, and by the way he thoughtfully looks on 
as the street artist draws a portrait of the young girl sitting for him. There 
is at least a hint of genuine humanity and kindness in Waldemar when he 
decides to share half of his sandwich with a hungry stray dog. However, we 
should not think that these better and worse impulses reside in Jacek and 
Waldemar alongside one another as two entirely distinct and separable sides 
of their characters. It is an undeniable fact of human nature and psychol-
ogy that some of our cruelest and most antisocial impulses are intimately 
bound up with our impulses toward genuine affection and community with 
others. Thus, Jacek’s fl inging of food in the direction of the little girls at the 
café window may certainly be understood as a sign of aggression, but just 
as plausibly it may also be understood as an attempt—though perhaps an 
awkward one—at sharing a laugh with them. The dual character of Jacek’s 
act is clearly indicated by the ambivalent reaction of the little girls. As they 
turn to run away from the café window, the girls laugh, but their laugh is 
not an entirely comfortable one; while they laugh, their faces also show 
the uneasy awareness that Jacek’s act of fl inging food in their direction was 
not just (potentially) funny, but menacing and aggressive as well. A similar 
duality can be seen in Waldemar’s act of sharing half of his sandwich with 
the stray dog. On the one hand, Waldemar’s act may be understood as 
a sign of genuine kindness and concern for another needy, living being. 
On the other hand, as the fi lm makes clear, the sandwich that Waldemar 
shares with the stray dog is a sandwich that had been prepared for him 
by his wife; and so, this very act of sharing might equally be understood 
as a sign of disdain for the wife, as if Waldemar were telling himself that 
the sandwich prepared for him by his own wife is really only fi t for a dog.
Of course, we cannot be entirely sure what to make of these acts by Jacek 
and Waldemar. They are acts that seemingly and inextricably bind together 
cruelty and kindness. But this seems to be one of the points that Kieślowski 
wishes to make about the human state. Given our alienated and warped 
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condition, it is often the case that we humans simply do not know how to 
actualize our better impulses without also giving reign to our worse im-
pulses. That is, we simply do not know how to reach out to others and seek 
community with them, without also introducing into our actions certain 
elements of callousness, cruelty, or aggression.3 Indeed, one of the overrid-
ing lessons that emerges in Five and in the rest of the Decalogue series is that 
the systems or institutions which we humans have created for ourselves—
systems that are supposed to enable us to achieve our better aspirations and 
goals— often conspire to frustrate our better strivings and to convince us 
that our strivings are in vain. In Five, the problematic systems within which 
we live—including our political systems, our systems of modern science 
and technology, the system of incentives and punishments known as the 
law, and the system of organized religion—are visually hinted at through 
Warsaw’s Infl ancka housing complex, which is the setting for much of the 
action in the Decalogue series as a whole. Like the housing complex, these 
systems often give people shelter for living, but not for living well; like the 
housing complex, they allow large numbers of people to live together, but 
they often frustrate our strivings for genuine togetherness and commu-
nity. And so we often fi nd ourselves trying to actualize our better impulses 
precisely in ways that seem destined to fail; and thus in ways that lead to 
a sense of frustration, aggression, and lack of direction. Just as Kieślowski 
said of the characters in The Decalogue, we too fi nd ourselves “going 
round and round in circles” and “not achieving what we want” (KK, 145).
The Roman Catholic tradition (including the tradition that is very 
much part of Kieślowski’s native Poland) has a name for the mechanism 
by which systems of our own making regularly frustrate, stunt, and warp 
our better aspirations toward genuine sharing and community with oth-
ers. The tradition’s name for this mechanism is original sin. Of course, 
we should be very careful about attributing to Kieślowski a theological 
outlook that is foreign to his own. It is well known that Kieślowski did not 
feel great attachment to the Roman Catholic Church, and—as one critic 
has observed—he did not have “much use for institutional Christianity” in 
general.4 But in spite of his own critical self-distancing from institutional 
religion in general and from the Roman Catholic Church in particular, it 
is possible that Kieślowski’s view of the human condition does indeed re-
fl ect certain views espoused, though in some cases also misunderstood, by 
proponents of institutionalized religion.
The point of original sin—as opposed to sin that is not original—is 
that it affects us in our very beginnings, our very origins, our very coming-
into-being. It is not the kind of sin that arises out of misjudgments or bad 
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choices by the individual alone. It is original in the sense that it character-
izes the human condition through which we have our very being. But what 
is this human condition? Signifi cantly, the human condition is a condi-
tion of interpersonal interdependence and socialization. The philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre has described the human condition as the condition of 
“dependent rational animals”:5 We depend on others not only because our 
biological needs have to be met (though that is certainly the case), but also, 
and more important, because we need others in order to acquire the virtues 
without which we could not be the rational, human agents that we aspire 
to be. The human being is by nature a social animal, and thus we humans 
need others in order to become what we truly are as human beings. When 
we do not have the help and support of others, we quite literally do not 
have ourselves. I have my being and my humanity by virtue of the com-
munication, mutual support, and sharing that I have with others, but be-
cause of this, if there is any failing, perversion, or distortion in the means 
and mechanisms of my sharing and communicating with others, there is 
equally a failing, perversion, or distortion in my very own being. This is 
what original sin refers to: the perversion or distortion that is inscribed in 
my very being, insofar as my very being depends on systems of communi-
cation and sharing that are themselves perverted or distorted.
Furthermore, original sin cannot be eradicated through the initiative of 
individuals (even if this initiative were widespread or even universal among 
individuals) to treat each other better and more humanely. The point of 
original sin is that the failed, alienating systems within which we live will 
always persist at disguising themselves, justifying themselves, and co- opting 
for their own ends the very weapons that we might fashion in order to op-
pose them. The problem of original sin is helpfully explained by Herbert 
McCabe, one of the twentieth century’s most refreshingly creative and yet 
reliable expositors of the Roman Catholic faith. As McCabe writes,
The point is that we are born into a society which in various ways fails 
us as we stand in need of love. And for this reason we are born crippled 
(using the word “born” in a more extended sense). And our society does 
not fail us simply because of the ill will of individual members but be-
cause of the structures it represents, because of the role it assigns these 
members. You could be born and brought up in a group who were all 
individually saints and you would still be subject to the deprivation we 
call the Sin of the World.6
We depend on others for our own humanity, and yet the systems that 
we create for our own humanity systematically fail us, not because of any 
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particular shortcoming on the part of individuals, but because of the dis-
tortions and perversions embedded within the systems and media through 
which we relate to each other and communicate with each other. These 
systems cannot be corrected by better, kinder decisions by individuals, 
because the distorting powers embedded in these systems exceed our abil-
ity, individually and collectively, to control them. They will always co-opt 
our best efforts to counteract them, since each of us (dependent on such 
systems of communication and socialization for our very humanity) can-
not escape operating from within the means provided by these systems 
themselves.
The problem is illustrated by the change in Piotr’s thinking over the 
course of Five. Near the beginning of the fi lm, Piotr suggests that the 
law (or “the application of justice”) might “correct the mistakes” of “a gi-
ant machine” which tends to dominate our lives. By the end of the fi lm, 
however, Piotr has grown to realize that the law itself has been co-opted 
by and made to do the bidding of this giant, anonymous, and ineluctable 
machine.
It is worthwhile to say more at this point about the connection between 
original sin and our need to live within systems of socialization and com-
munication with others. On one level or another, all material beings in 
the universe interact with their environments, which is to say that they 
exist in community or in communication with other material beings. But 
the character of such interaction and communication varies, depending on 
the degree of excellence represented by the kind of being in question. In 
general, the higher or more excellent kinds of material beings are capable 
of more excellent kinds of communication (more complete and more inti-
mate kinds of sharing) with other beings. But it is precisely because of their 
more excellent and higher degrees of communication with others that such 
higher beings also face greater risks, greater vulnerabilities, and greater 
chances for failure and perversion than lower beings do. One might say 
that there is a dialectical relationship between degrees of excellence and 
degrees of risk within the universe of material beings, and it is this dialecti-
cal relationship that helps us to better understand what original sin is, and 
how it is shown to manifest itself in Five.
Consider, for example, the ways in which animate beings are more ex-
cellent than inanimate beings and thus capable of greater degrees of com-
munication and sharing with other beings. Unlike inanimate things, liv-
ing beings maintain themselves in existence (qua living) precisely by not 
limiting themselves to being determined by the material components that 
happen to constitute them at any given moment, but instead by actively 
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engaging in the process of metabolism, or the ongoing exchange or sharing 
of energy and matter with beings in the surrounding environment. Com-
pared with nonliving things, living beings display a greater degree of excel-
lence or a greater degree of immateriality, that is, a greater degree of free-
dom from being determined by their underlying material conditions. It is 
by virtue of this greater degree of excellence and immateriality that living 
beings are capable of sharing and communicating with other beings more 
fully and intimately. Thus, living beings maintain their existence, not by 
insulating themselves against the physical and chemical intrusions of other 
beings, but precisely by inviting such intrusions, or by making themselves 
relatively permeable and by participating in an ongoing process of material 
and caloric exchange with the environment. But because of their greater de-
gree of excellence and immateriality (and thus  because of their greater ca-
pacity for communication and sharing), living beings also face greater 
risks, greater vulnerabilities, and greater chances of failure or perversion 
than nonliving beings do. Simply stated, there are more things that can go 
wrong with the living being; the living being can fail in many more ways 
than nonliving beings can. Thus if the living being should cease to engage 
in the active exchange of energy and matter with its environment, it will 
die, which is to say that it will fail at being a living being. By contrast, 
nonliving beings maintain themselves as what they are, precisely by being 
inert, by not engaging in the exchange of matter and energy with their 
environments. The difference between living and nonliving beings helps 
to illustrate why a greater degree of excellence and immateriality entails 
a greater capacity for communication and sharing with other beings, but 
also a greater degree of vulnerability and a more daunting set of challenges 
for succeeding at being the kind of being that one is.
The same general observation can be made about the contrast between 
sentient living beings (animals) and nonsentient living beings (plants). 
When compared with plants, animals display a greater degree of excel-
lence and immateriality, and thus a greater capacity for communication 
and sharing with other beings. Unlike plants, animals are capable of ac-
quiring sensory knowledge about other beings in their environment. This 
sensory knowledge, in turn, allows animals to direct themselves toward 
sources of nourishment and away from sources of danger. On account of 
such motility, animals are not limited to nourishing themselves (they are 
not limited to engaging in metabolic exchanges) with material resources 
that happen to be contiguous with their own bodies. Because they are 
sentient, animals can also be motile, which is to say that they can move 
under their own power away from the spatial regions in which they imme-
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diately fi nd themselves, and into regions where the ongoing availability of 
nourishment will depend not just on what the environment provides, but 
also on the animal’s riskier and less assured performance of several higher-
 order, sensory-based interactions with the environment. Thus, in order to 
survive, the animal must be attentive at the right times, it must be able to 
move about in its surroundings with relative ease, it must be able to fi nd 
food and evade predators; notice that the success of the animal’s interac-
tions with the environment will depend, crucially, on what other animals 
do as well. To extend an observation made earlier: There are simply more, 
and more varied, ways in which the animal can fail at being an animal than 
there are ways in which the plant can fail at being a plant. Because of its 
greater degree of excellence and immateriality, the animal communicates 
and interacts with its environment in a more excellent way than plants 
do, but also, on account of its greater degree of excellence, it also faces 
greater risks and dangers. Animals purchase greater freedom, greater self-
 determination, and a greater capacity for interacting with other beings, 
but only by exposing themselves to the possibility of failing more miser-
ably, and in more ways, at being the kinds of beings that they are.
The preceding set of observations can now be extended to illustrate the 
difference between nonrational (nonhuman) animals and rational (human) 
animals, and to explain the signifi cance of this distinction for the notion 
of original sin. When compared to nonhuman animals, humans display a 
greater degree of excellence and immateriality, and this, in turn, entails a 
greater capacity for communication and sharing with other beings. Thus, 
it is on account of their rational (i.e., their conceptual or linguistic) capaci-
ties that human beings can understand and share in meanings and perspec-
tives that would be entirely closed off to them if left to their own devices 
as merely sentient beings. Human beings become genuinely rational and 
free, that is, they become capable of apprehending the nonparticularized 
meanings of particular things or events, only because of their capacity to 
communicate with others conceptually and linguistically.7
Now we saw above that living beings succeed at being what they are 
(they remain alive) only by maintaining themselves as active sites for the 
processing of material and caloric resources that are drawn from environ-
ments that are not of their own making and not subject to their exclu-
sive control as individuals; hence the unavoidable risk and vulnerability 
attendant upon all animate beings. In a similar fashion, we can say that 
human beings succeed at what they are (they are rational and free) only by 
maintaining themselves as active sites for the processing of conceptual and 
linguistic resources which are drawn from traditions and communities that 
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are not of their own making and not subject to their exclusive control as 
individuals. A mind that is not open to the give-and-take of such engage-
ment with other minds is a mind that is not fully rational or free. But it is 
precisely because of the human being’s greater degree of excellence and 
immateriality—the human being’s openness to sharing in the narratives, 
meanings, thoughts, and theories of others—that the human being is also 
subject to greater risks and dangers. We have seen that the animal’s own 
heightened degree of freedom and self-determination (its ability to move 
itself ) made the animal more vulnerable to the workings of its environ-
ment and to the potentially destructive activities of other animals. We can 
now see that, in a similar way, the human being’s own heightened degree of 
freedom and self-determination (its ability to share and participate in the 
meanings and narratives afforded by other human beings) also makes the 
human being more vulnerable to the potentially perverting and destructive 
effects of those meanings and narratives that he or she unavoidably shares 
with others. As human beings, we depend intimately and inescapably on 
the thoughts and narratives of others for our own rationality and our own 
self-understanding. But it is this more intimate and more complete kind of 
sharing and communication, which makes us truly free and rational in the 
fi rst place, that also makes us vulnerable to being co-opted by the distort-
ing, demeaning, and alienating systems of meaning within which we fi nd 
ourselves and which we as fi nite rational individuals can neither control 
nor altogether abandon. The condition of being dependent and vulner-
able in this way is the condition of being tainted by original sin. The sin is 
original because it is an infi rmity that penetrates to the core of our being as 
rational and free beings; but it is still a sin, because it is not something that 
happens to us apart from our own agency, but rather something that we 
bring upon ourselves as the dependent, rational beings that we are.
Five indirectly addresses the problem of original sin—though without 
the off-putting doctrinal label—when the fi lm raises the question of how 
seemingly random and insignifi cant events can play such an important 
role in determining the trajectory of a person’s life. In a scene that fol-
lows Jacek’s conviction and death-sentence, Jacek sits down with Piotr and 
speculates about why he has become the destructive, self-loathing person 
that he is. Five years earlier, Jacek and a friend had been drinking together. 
While drunk, the friend climbed into a tractor and ended up killing Jacek’s 
younger sister as a result of his reckless drunken driving. Jacek clearly feels 
that he is at least partly to blame for the death of his sister, and openly won-
ders whether things might have been different for him if the fatal accident 
had not occurred. On the face of it, it may seem silly to wonder whether 
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such a random accident could have turned Jacek into the directionless, 
nihilistic, murderous person that he has become. But that is not the point 
of Jacek’s rueful musings about the accident; these are not the musings of 
a detached scientist or philosopher wishing to know more about how one 
random event might bring about a chain of other, seemingly unrelated 
events in our causally ordered world. Rather, the point of Jacek’s specula-
tions is that seemingly random and insignifi cant events in our lives (such as 
the act of getting drunk with a friend) can engender unbearable meanings 
for us, meanings that exceed our capacity for coping and for making sense 
of things. Such meanings can exceed our capacity for coping and for mak-
ing sense of things, not because of the intrinsic character of the events out 
of which they arise, but rather because the events take place within systems 
of socialization and communication which are distorted and inadequate, 
and thus incapable of helping us to actualize our proper strivings as human 
beings. When those strivings are frustrated or distorted, they do not cease 
to exist altogether; rather, they become strivings for the wrong sorts of 
things: domination, destruction, and self-aggrandizement at the expense 
of others.
One of the systems of socialization and communication that has a regu-
lar tendency to frustrate and distort our true strivings is the legal system, 
which is ostensibly the primary subject matter of Five. The fi lm opens with 
an image of Piotr as he prepares for his fi nal law-licensing exam, accompa-
nied by a voiceover of Piotr discoursing on the nature and purpose of law. 
In the voiceover, Piotr argues,
The law should not imitate nature, the law should improve nature. 
People invented the law to govern their relationships. The law deter-
mined who we are and how we live. We either observe it, or break it. 
People are free; their freedom is limited only by the freedom of others. 
Punishment means revenge, in particular when it aims to harm, but it 
does not prevent crime. For whom does the law avenge? In the name of 
the innocent? Do the innocent make the rules?
Like the other systems within which we must live, the legal system also has 
a tendency to pervert and distort our proper strivings as human beings. 
The law does not make people better as it should (it does not “improve 
nature”), but in fact makes people worse by reinforcing their destruc-
tive, antisocial behaviors (it “imitates nature,” and in particular the hu-
man being’s baser nature). Since punishment—and in particular, the death 
 penalty—does nothing to prevent or deter crime, the only justifi cation 
for it can be retribution. But retribution, Piotr suggests, amounts to little 
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more than revenge, which is destructive of human beings and their nobler 
aspirations toward love and community.
After Jacek’s trial, conviction, and sentencing, we can see how the re-
tributive, vengeful character of the law harms Jacek and destroys the last 
remaining shreds of humanity that he is trying to salvage in himself. In 
response to his being convicted and sentenced to death, Jacek rightly infers 
that the overriding message of the law is that he is altogether worthless and 
thus unworthy of continued existence as a human being. Piotr tries to cor-
rect Jacek by distinguishing between the crime and the criminal, but Jacek 
will have none of it:
JACEK: They were all against me.
PIOTR: Against what you did.
JACEK: Same thing.
Rather than help Jacek to be the human being that he ought to be, the legal 
system—like so many other systems that mediate our socialization and 
communication with one another— only serves to reinforce Jacek’s self-
loathing and self-destructive behavior.
Jacek is not the only victim of the legal system. Five shows us how the 
legal system can begin to take its toll on people, like Piotr, whose calling is 
ostensibly to dedicate themselves to the law itself. At the beginning of the 
fi lm, we get to know Piotr as someone whose sense of meaning and direc-
tion seems to make him very different from Jacek and Waldemar. Piotr, 
after all, is an idealistic lawyer who believes in the higher goals that the law 
apparently professes for itself; and, as we learn a bit later in the fi lm, he is 
a proud new father. As the fi lm progresses, however, we begin to wonder 
whether the legal system is not also conspiring to undermine Piotr’s ideal-
ism and sense of purpose. After Jacek’s trial, conviction, and sentencing, 
Piotr realizes that he has failed to save a human life from the death penalty, 
even after he had given what, according to the judge, was “the best argu-
ment” against the death penalty that had been presented in a long time. 
At the very end of the fi lm, we see Piotr sitting in his car in a grassy fi eld 
and shouting in anger and desperation, “I abhor it!”—apparently refer-
ring to the legal system that has failed him and failed Jacek. But while the 
legal system has failed him, Piotr feels that he too has failed. Thus he asks 
the judge whether Jacek’s case might have turned out differently, if he had 
made a stronger case for Jacek or if the case had been assigned to another 
defense lawyer. When Piotr learns that he was dining in the café precisely 
at the time that Jacek was in the same café planning his crime, he begins 
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to wonder whether he himself could have acted differently then in order 
to help Jacek. Like Jacek, Piotr has come to show the beginning signs of 
self-doubt and self-loathing, wondering whether things could have turned 
out better if he had only acted differently. Once again, Piotr’s musings 
about what might have been are not the detached, speculative thoughts of 
someone wishing to know about how the causal laws of our universe oper-
ate; they are the musings of someone whose idealism and sense of direction 
are being slowly warped and crushed by our ever-distorted and distorting 
systems of interpersonal communication and socialization.
It was suggested earlier that original sin refers to the perversion or dis-
tortion inscribed in our very being as individuals, insofar as our being as 
individuals depends on systems of interpersonal communication and so-
cialization which are themselves perverted or distorted. The odd thing 
about original sin is that it reverses our otherwise healthy strivings toward 
communication and community, and turns them into their virtual oppo-
site; thus, original sin has the tendency to isolate us and drive us away 
from each other. But insofar as we are alone and isolated, we are deprived 
of community and the nurturing support of others, and thus ultimately 
deprived of what we need to be our true selves. It is altogether appropri-
ate that one of the Christian tradition’s greatest representations of hell—
Dante’s  Comedy—portrays the most forlorn in the inferno (Lucifer) as en-
tirely silent and cold, chest-deep in ice and possessing three mouths which 
are stuffed with the bodies of other sinners ( Judas Iscariot, Brutus, and 
Cassius).8 In the inferno, Lucifer appears to be in the presence of others, 
but he is utterly unable to enjoy any real community or communication 
with them. For the Catholic tradition, hell is not other people (as Jean-Paul 
Sartre would have it) but rather, complete separation from other people, 
the complete failure of community with others.
But when we are alone, when we fail to achieve genuine community 
with others, we also fail to achieve ourselves; we fail to be who we are. 
Thus, there is an intimate connection between sin and self-loathing; and 
in turn, there is an intimate connection between self-loathing and self-
deception. McCabe makes the point nicely:
The root of all sin is fear: the very deep fear that we are nothing; 
the compulsion, therefore, to make something of ourselves, to con-
struct a self-fl attering image of ourselves we can worship, to believe 
in  ourselves— our fantasy selves. I think that all sins are failures in 
being realistic; even the simple everyday sins of the fl esh, that seem to 
come from mere childish greed for pleasure, have their deepest origin 
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in anxiety about whether we really matter, the anxiety that makes us 
desperate for self-reassurance. To sin is always to construct an illusory 
self that we can admire, instead of the real self we can only love. It is 
because we fail in realistic self-love that we fail in love for others. So 
sin, too, means being terrifi ed of admitting that we have failed.9
It might be added here that if sin is rooted in the fear of being alone, it 
is equally rooted in the fear of not being with others and not being loved 
and accepted by others for who we really are. This fear of not being loved 
for who we are is what leads us to manufacture false selves that we try to 
sell to others. Even if we succeed in winning the attention and affection 
of others through such false selves, we nevertheless remain fundamentally 
alone—and we are often obliquely aware of this aloneness—because what 
we have offered to others for their love and acceptance is not our true self, 
but rather an idol or image that allows us to remain fundamentally hidden, 
isolated, and alone.
It follows from this that sin or sinfulness represents a kind of slavery 
or thralldom. In our sinfulness, we enslave ourselves to false images, and, 
correspondingly, to false gods that we manufacture for the sake of cover-
ing up our nakedness, our fear and our need. The discovery of the genuine 
God, the God who stands opposed to all forms of idolatry, is the discovery 
of a God who calls us out of such thralldom and invites us to the freedom 
of accepting ourselves and others for who we and they are, even in our and 
their neediness and failure. As McCabe explains:
The only true God is the God of freedom. The other gods make you 
feel at home in a place, they have to do with the quiet cycle of the sea-
sons, with the familiar mountains and the country you grew up in and 
love; with them you know where you are. But the harsh God of freedom 
calls you out of all this into a desert where all the old familiar landmarks 
are gone, where you cannot rely on the safe workings of nature, on 
springtime and harvest, where you must wander over the wilderness 
waiting for what God will bring. This God of freedom will allow you 
none of the comforts of religion. Not only does he tear you away from 
the old traditional shrines and temples of your native place, but he will 
not even allow you to worship him in the old way. You are forbidden 
to make an image of him by which you might wield numinous power, 
you are forbidden to invoke his name in magical rites. You must deny 
the other gods and you must not treat Yahweh as a god, as a power you 
could use against your enemies or to help you succeed in life. Yahweh is 
not a god, there are no gods, they are all delusions and slavery.10
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At this stage, another word of caution is in order. For we need to be care-
ful about attributing to Kieślowski any theological views or metanarratives 
that are foreign to his way of thinking. As noted above, Kieślowski main-
tained a critical distance from institutional religion in general and from the 
Roman Catholic Church in particular. He believed that the systems within 
which we live and have our being, including the system of institutionalized 
religion, are often the problem rather than the solution. For Kieślowski, 
institutionalized religion, like the other systems within which we have our 
being, has a tendency to distort and frustrate our longings for meaning 
and community with others, and so it is not surprising that the only priest 
we encounter in Five says prayers just before Jacek’s execution and thus 
lends an air of divine approbation to the heinous act of killing (Figure 7–1).
Furthermore, through Jacek’s fi nal conversation with Piotr, the fi lm re-
minds us about the Church’s traditional policy of denying Catholic burial 
rites to certain people, thus suggesting that Jacek’s praiseworthy yearning 
for community with his deceased sister (i.e., his desire to be buried near 
her) might well be thwarted, in the end, by the requirements of institution-
alized religion. This is not to say that Kieślowski denied that there may be 
some system or metanarrative (religious or otherwise) within which we 
might fi nd some genuine meaning and liberation. But even if there is such 
an overarching system or metanarrative, Kieślowski seems to hold that the 
meaning provided by any such system or metanarrative, whatever it might 
be, remains just beyond our grasp.
The existence of an overarching yet ever-elusive meaning-providing 
metanarrative is suggested by the recurring appearance of a character 
identifi ed in the script only as “the young man” (Artur Barciś). At decisive 
moments in eight of the ten Decalogue fi lms (he is absent only from Seven 
Figure 7–1. Saying prayers before the execution in 
Decalogue Five.
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and Ten), “the young man” appears as a silent, detached witness who seem-
ingly observes or understands the purpose that mysteriously escapes the 
comprehension of those who are being portrayed in the fi lm, and us who 
are watching the fi lm. In One, “the young man” sits at a campfi re near the 
pond where a young boy will later drown; in Two, he is a worker in a hos-
pital where the fi lm’s protagonists are confronted with issues of birth, life, 
love, fi delity and death; in Three, he drives a city tram that narrowly misses 
colliding with and killing the protagonist; in Four, he is seen kayaking on 
the Vistula River and then later carrying the kayak on his back shortly 
before the protagonist makes her fateful decision about whether or not to 
open a mysterious letter; in Five, “the young man” is seen fi rst as an inspec-
tor surveying the road that Waldemar traverses on the way to being killed 
by Jacek, and then later as a ladder-carrying painter in the prison where 
Jacek is to be executed; in Six, he appears fi rst when the protagonist is 
joyously running home after learning about an upcoming date, and then a 
second time when the protagonist runs home after he has been humiliated 
by the date; in Eight, he is a student who listens as the protagonist presents 
a lecture; and in Nine, he is a cyclist who witnesses the attempt by the fi lm’s 
protagonist to commit suicide.
The regular appearance of “the young man” at decisive moments 
throughout the Decalogue series serves to convey the important message 
that there may indeed be an overriding (theological) purpose at work in 
our fallen and alienated world. But his mysterious expression and strange 
silence also convey the sense that any such metanarrative or purpose—
assuming that one is discernible at all—may inescapably remain beyond 
the scope of all possible comprehension by us. Furthermore, Five adds a 
sinister and unique complement to this character who silently witnesses 
events as if from a God’s-eye perspective. In the episode, the appearance of 
“the young man” is echoed and perhaps undermined by the appearance of 
another silent witness: the hideous ornament—a disembodied head with 
a toothy grin—dangling from the windshield of Waldemar’s taxi. At key 
moments in the fi lm, the camera’s perspective calls our attention to the 
presence of this small, silent witness, as if to suggest that the purpose to be 
observed or the metanarrative to be told about the event taking place is not 
a benevolent one at all. As we observers view the regular, silent presence of 
Waldemar’s windshield ornament, we are led to wonder, as Robert Frost 
wonders in his poem, “Design,” whether the purpose behind the seemingly 
random confl uence of events, if there is any such purpose at all, might not 
be malevolent rather than benevolent: “What but design of darkness to 
appall?— / If design govern in a thing so small?”11
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Figure 7–2. Waldemar’s Christlike bloody face in 
Deca logue Five.
In spite of the ambiguity confronting us in regard to the overarching 
system or metanarrative that might give Five its meaning, there is no doubt 
that Kieślowski makes use of overt religious imagery and wants us to think 
about the possibility of an overarching religious system or metanarrative. 
Thus, when Jacek is in the midst of carrying out his murderous deed, Wal-
demar’s bleeding, upturned face presents us with an undeniable image of 
the crucifi ed Christ (Figure 7–2).
As Christopher Garbowski observes:
In the face of the cabdriver victim, who has been strangled and clubbed 
on the head with an iron bar, we seem to see the face of the crucifi ed 
Jesus with blood streaming down his face as if from a crown of thorns. 
The victim appears to look at the murderer as if to forgive him. After 
the deed, the slayer eats the victim’s food, just as the soldiers cast lots 
for Christ’s clothes.12
In response to the Christ imagery that is present in Waldemar’s face, 
Jacek utters the words, “Oh, Jesus” in amazement and in apparent recogni-
tion of the terribleness of his deed. But instead of halting his deed, Jacek 
reacts with renewed violence and uses a large stone to fi nish off what he 
started. In response to the unconditional love and acceptance represented 
by the Christ fi gure, Jacek tenaciously holds on to the false gods and false, 
antisocial sense of purpose that he has created for himself. In this respect, 
he is like the rest of us. As McCabe writes:
As a matter of history one of the peculiar things about man is that when 
he is left to do exactly what he likes he straight away looks around for 
someone to enslave himself to, and if he cannot fi nd a master nearby, he 
will invent one. The Hebrew discovery of God (or God’s revelation of 
F6707.indb   137 4/7/16   6:58:02 AM
138 Michael Baur
himself to them) begins in their recognition that man historically is a 
slave, and enslaved by his own preference. The true God reveals himself 
as he who summons man out of this degradation that he clings to, who 
summons him to the painful business of being free. (Law, 115–116)
For Kieślowski, as for the Judeo-Christian tradition, the only remedy 
for our sinful condition is the saving grace of a God, but not one who 
would save us by giving us the falsely comforting shelter of a security 
blanket. The true God is the God who liberates us to face the appalling 
fearfulness of our neediness and our fi nitude head-on. Kieślowski seems 
to be saying—as Martin Heidegger says in his famous aphorism—“only 
a God can save us.”13 But also like Heidegger, Kieślowski does not have 
the  metaphysical confi dence to assert that such a God actually exists. His 
reticence about making any such theological pronouncements is rightly 
motivated, for religious talk about God can all too easily devolve into the 
idolatrously comforting talk about gods. If there is to be salvation for us, 
it is to be had—Kieślowski seems to be saying— only if we undertake the 
frightful but fulfi lling activity of entering into genuine community with 
others. For what is the kingdom of God, announced so often in the gospels 
through the image of a wedding party, other than such community with 
others?
In Five, Jacek’s thoughtful yearnings for his deceased sister convey a 
similar message. Jacek’s desire to have an enlarged photograph of his de-
ceased sister implies the desire to bring her back to life (to see her grow 
again), and thus to be in community with her once again. Other moments 
in the fi lm similarly illustrate Jacek’s desire to resurrect his sister and rees-
tablish the only form of community that he ever knew. As we viewers watch 
the fi lm, we, like Jacek, are forced to confront the challenges and pos-
sibilities of genuine community. We are forced to ask ourselves whether 
Jacek, in spite of his terrible crime, is someone in whom we can recognize 
our own humanity, and thus someone with whom we might see ourselves 
in community. In asking these questions, we are in effect asking whether 
Jacek Lazar is alive or dead to us, or, perhaps better, whether his seemingly 
lost humanity, like that of his namesake Lazarus, can be resurrected for 
us. Like the photograph that Jacek wishes to have enlarged, Kieślowski’s 
fi lm depicts the outward manifestations of a human individual who may be 
alive or dead to us. And just as Jacek suggests with regard to the photo, it is 
impossible to discern from the fi lm alone whether the individual depicted 
is alive or dead; everything depends on how we view the fi lm, and how we 
allow ourselves to be affected by it.
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c h a p t e r  8
States of Exception: Politics 
and Poetics in Decalogue Six
Eva Badowska
When the state of exception (stan wyja̧tkowy), also known as the state of war 
(stan wojenny), was declared in Poland on December 13, 1981, Krzysztof 
Kieślowski sought to “record the tanks, clandestine news-sheets, and anti-
communist slogans daubed on walls.”1 Trained in the venerable tradition 
of Polish documentary cinema, Kieślowski was driven by the documen-
tary impulse—the desire to stand witness—even long after he had shifted 
entirely to making fi ction fi lms. In 1981, the director aimed to chronicle 
political trials that took place under martial law: Thousands of political 
activists were “interned” in makeshift prisons and detained for long pe-
riods before they were brought to trial, often in military courts that by-
passed even the Soviet-style court system. Courts were handing out severe 
sentences for minor infractions, such as painting anticommunist graffi ti, 
participating in public assemblies, leaving home without proper identifi ca-
tion, or breaking the curfew, and the fi lmmaker was “keen” to capture “the 
faces of both accusers and accused” (D, ix).2
The authorities, however, took a long time to grant him permission 
to enter the courtroom with his fi lm crew, and Kieślowski did not begin 
fi lming until November 1982. When he did, something unexpected took 
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place. Instead of playing the role of passive witness, the camera became 
an actor in the proceedings, and even a “desirable and welcome presence” 
for the accused (D, x). When it was present in the courtroom, jail sen-
tences were either not imposed at all or were suspended. The camera had 
this effect whether or not it was loaded with fi lm and the effect continued 
when Kieślowski began to use a second, dummy camera, a token cinematic 
presence.
The anecdote is, in fact, chilling. It stands as an example of what Gior-
gio Agamben describes in his work on The State of Exception as “the original 
structure in which law encompasses living beings by means of its own sus-
pension.” 3 It is both a fi tting image of Poland’s exceptional historical times 
and the prism through which the effect of Kieślowski’s cinematography 
may be grasped at all times. The presence of the camera in the courtroom 
at fi rst glance counteracts the repressiveness of the regime and helps the 
unjustly accused remain at liberty. Although the camera seems to compen-
sate for the immediate human costs of martial law, it, in fact, multiplies 
them, as it demonstrates how easy it is to place the legal system— on which 
individual human fates depend—in a “state of exception” that inevitably 
results in tragic lawlessness. According to Leland de la Durantaye in “The 
Exceptional Life of the State,” such a state is “the legal suspension of the 
distinction between legality and illegality” and “the political point at which 
the juridical stops and a sovereign unaccountability begins.”4 For Agam-
ben, this state of exception constitutes the terrifying essence of modern 
statehood. In the case of Kieślowski’s unfi nished martial law documentary, 
the camera augments the suspension of legality: The law is fi rst under-
mined by the imposition of a state of emergency by the pro-Soviet regime, 
which created laws that were unconstitutional, and then, again, by the pres-
ence of the camera where such illegal laws were to be implemented. In the 
courtroom, the gaze of the (dummy) camera, bogus and blind, exposes and 
intensifi es the crisis of the process of judgment that was at the heart of stan 
wojenny and that constitutes one of Kieślowski’s abiding preoccupations in 
the later Decalogue series as well.
In this way, we are led to what is fundamental about Kieślowski’s cin-
ematography. On the one hand, he insists that good fi lmmaking is essen-
tially documentary. In a TV interview about his documentary beginnings 
in the 1960s and 1970s, Kieślowski called the documentary genre a “mar-
vel,” for it allowed him during these diffi cult times “to describe a world 
that had not been . . . described at all” and “to say something about his 
relationship to what is, to what exists.”5 At the same time, Kieślowski is 
keenly aware that documentary fi lms are open to certain risks and limita-
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tions. One of “the traps of documentary fi lms” is the possibility that the 
fi lmmaker could end up disturbing the world he is trying to document at 
the very moment of documenting it. Surely, most fi lmmakers hope that 
their fi lms will transform the world. But this is not the kind of impact 
Kieślowski is concerned about. What he fears as a “trap” is what could be 
called the documentary’s uncertainty principle: the effect of being fi lmed 
on the fi lm’s subject. Kieślowski is emphatic that documentaries “shouldn’t 
be used to infl uence the subject’s life either for the better or for the worse. 
They shouldn’t have any infl uence at all.”6
But Kieślowski knows well, at least since the unfi nished stan wojenny 
documentary and since Camera Buff (Amator, 1979), a fi ction fi lm, that the 
act of fi lming is never without an effect. In the fi lm, a young married man, 
Filip ( Jerzy Stuhr), buys an 8mm fi lm camera to document his daughter’s 
childhood and gradually becomes a local celebrity as the only owner of any 
fi lm equipment in a small town. Eventually, Filip turns the camera on him-
self, but in the process he becomes so obsessed with the act of fi lming that 
his private life begins to disintegrate. So much for the camera as passive wit-
ness that does not exert “any infl uence at all.” Yet, this is not a contradiction 
or double bind. Instead, Kieślowski’s cinema always displays a dual artistic 
and ethical imperative, since the role of fi lm is both to witness neutrally and 
to highlight critically the state of exception in front of the camera.
Further, the documentary form imposes even more interesting limita-
tions. As Kieślowski explains to Danusia Stok:
[The documentary] catches itself as if in its own trap. The closer it 
wants to get to somebody, the more that person shuts him or herself off 
from it. And that’s perfectly natural. It can’t be helped. If I’m making a 
fi lm about love, I can’t go into a bedroom if real people are making love 
there. If I’m making a fi lm about death, I can’t fi lm somebody who’s 
dying because it’s such an intimate experience that the person shouldn’t 
be disturbed. (KK, 86)
Kieślowski conjectures that this is why he started making fi ction fi lms. The 
shift to feature fi lms is thus motivated by the continuation, rather than the 
discontinuation, of the documentary impulse, an impulse so strong that 
it begins to look for outlets in fi ctional setups. Let us listen to Kieślowski 
once again, this time in a nearly literal translation from the Polish- language 
version:
I managed, on a couple of occasions, to photograph a real tear. . . . But 
now I’ve got glycerin. I’m afraid of these real tears—I don’t know if I 
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have the right to photograph them. I feel like a man who’s entered a 
realm that’s really forbidden.7
What is at stake in the move from “real tears” to “glycerin tears”? Slavoj 
Ž iž ek, whose book The Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieślowski between 
Theory and Post-Theory (2001) borrows its title from these remarks, com-
ments that “it was precisely a fi delity to the Real that compelled Kieślowski 
to abandon documentary realism—at some point, one encounters some-
thing more Real than reality itself. . . . At the most critical level, one can 
render the Real of subjective experience only in the guise of fi ction.”8 It 
is certainly not surprising that Ž iž ek aims to “redeem” Kieślowski from 
“post-secular obscurantist readings” by means of a Lacanian approach that 
emphasizes how the director is caught up in the “tension between reality 
and the Real” (FRT, 7, 66). He accurately identifi es what is a signifi cant shift 
in Kieślowski’s fi lmography and sheds interesting light on its dimensions, 
but he does not emphasize enough a key aspect of Kieślowski’s framing of 
these remarks. It is not that real tears cannot be fi lmed or even grasped—
they can, and Kieślowski has—but, rather, that fi lming real tears is a sort of 
transgression into “a realm that is really forbidden.” Why is the fi lmmaker 
“afraid of these real tears”? First, the Polish is softer than the English 
translation implies: The fi lmmaker is merely “afraid” and not “frightened” 
(KK, 86). Second, the emphasis is on the fi lmmaker’s affect in the presence 
of real tears rather than on the possibly apotropaic effect of the sight itself. 
Ž iž ek argues that “we cannot ever acquire a complete, all-encompassing, 
sense of reality—some part of it must be affected by the ‘loss of reality,’ 
deprived of the character of ‘true reality,’ and this fi ctionalised element is 
precisely the traumatic Real” (FRT, 66). The context, however, points to a 
slightly different set of issues: Kieślowski’s emphasis falls on the question 
of whether the fi lmmaker has “the right” to shoot “real tears” (or, in the 
Polish version, the pearl-like, singular “real tear”). There is an untranslat-
able aspect in the punctuation of the Polish syntax here, since an attempt 
to preserve the Polish punctuation of the sentence would give a comma 
splice in English: “I’m afraid of these real tears, I don’t know if I have the 
right to photograph them.” In the English translation, Danusia Stok splits 
this into two separate sentences, which is a standard translatorial move, 
but it obscures the intimate syntactical connection between the “fright” 
Ž iž ek overemphasizes and the question of what the director has the right 
(not) to do. Ž iž ek forecloses on the issue by folding it back into the the-
matic of representation and visibility: “Kieślowski seems to share the Old 
Testament injunction to withdraw the domain of what really matters from 
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degrading visibility” (FRT, 74). In my reading of these passages, however, 
there is nothing degrading about visibility per se; and it is not the vis-
ibility of real tears that needs to be shielded from the light of day, but 
rather the “intimate experience” of a person crying, making love, or dy-
ing, a person who has the inviolable right not to be “disturbed” in the act. 
Kieślowski does not seem to think that the Real (or, simply, reality) cannot 
be witnessed, whether because such witnessing is impossible or because 
it is traumatic, but rather that it sometimes ought not to be witnessed, out 
of respect, perhaps, for the privacy of the subject’s individual experience. 
There is something particularly arresting about the idea that a person who 
is dying might be engaged in an “intimate experience” that should not be 
interrupted. In a fairly literal translation, this passage reads: “If I’m making 
a fi lm about death, I cannot fi lm the person who is truly dying, because this 
is such an intimate activity that one must not disturb him” (A, 73). The 
Polish insists on the “I” of the fi lmmaker and on whether the fi lmmaker 
has the right to shoot what is “truly” taking place. The other person, the 
one dying, is engaged not in an abstract and generalizable “experience” of 
the English-language version, but in an intimate and personal “activity.” 
What does it mean, anyway, not to disturb a person who is dying? (Could 
you wait to disturb him or her when they are done [dying]?) Kieślowski 
does not elaborate, but the example suggests that certain experiences are 
to be viewed as sacrosanct—closed off, as it were—even if it means that 
they are forever lost to the camera. But this is not necessarily a moment 
of biblical iconoclasm or Platonic distrust of mimesis: The prohibition is 
not against representation, but rather against intervention into another’s 
intimacy. Kieślowski does not shy away from the suffering that real tears 
represent; what is troubling is, instead, the temptation real tears present to 
the fi lmmaker to commit a mortal transgression by infl uencing or inter-
rupting—by means of the camera’s uncertainty principle—the subject’s 
privacy.
Still, Kieślowski wants to make psychological fi lms in which he “at-
tempts to scratch a few skins off of [his] characters.”9 Given his reserva-
tions about privacy in the documentary realm, he can accomplish this goal 
only in the world of fi ction fi lms. Certain exfoliations of character can only 
be staged in a fi ctional arena, if, that is, one wishes to protect the private 
realm of intimate experience. Kieślowski is rather lighthearted about it: 
“Of course, it may be diffi cult to fi nd an actress who’s willing to take off her 
bra, but then you just fi nd one who is” (KK, 86). Fiction works not because 
it is more real, but because it patently is not so: The dead “get up again” 
(KK, 86). This matters to Kieślowski, I suggest, partly because the status 
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of private experience is a topic with a particularly painful resonance in the 
Polish 1980s, in the context of the state of exception and its aftermath.
Ž iž ek is right that Kieślowski’s work straddles the terrains of particular-
ity and universality, allowing for a historical reading but resisting “the his-
toricist trap” (FRT, 7, 8), whereby only someone steeped in the history of 
that era could understand it. In fact, such historically situated universality 
is one of Kieślowski’s intriguing directorial achievements: His particularity 
does not undercut his universality, and vice versa. This is apparent also in 
the director’s own blunt description of the Decalogue’s situation in Kieślowski 
on Kieślowski: “I’m sick of Polish realities because everything’s running its 
course in spite of us, above us and there’s nothing we can do about it” (KK, 
145). Even so, the fi lms can be read, almost against themselves, in histori-
cist terms, as an indirect, multifaceted meditation on the Polish 1980s, in 
which historical refl ections appear on the screen like shadows in Plato’s 
cave. Rather than fi lming political struggle or grim existence, Kieślowski 
spotlights individuals in “extreme, extraordinary situations” (D, xii). Refus-
ing to fi lm the State of Exception, he fi lms states of exception instead. The 
director presents this choice as a stark opposition between fi lming politics 
versus fi lming individuals:
During martial law, I realized that politics aren’t really important. In a 
way, of course, they defi ne where we are and what we are and aren’t al-
lowed to do, but they don’t solve the really important human questions. 
They’re not in a position to do anything about or to answer any of our 
essential, fundamental, human and humanistic questions. (KK, 144)
The seemingly unambiguous contrast between “individuals in diffi cult situ-
ations” and “anything as horrible as politics” (KK, 145) is itself an ideologi-
cal effect, so blunt that it begs the question when rehearsed by a director 
otherwise keenly attentive to such nuances. In communist propaganda, the 
words “individual” and “individualism” acquired a pejorative cast and were 
often prefaced by two distancing adjectives: “rotten” and “bourgeois.” Un-
der social realism, the arts had to represent collective realities and mo-
tivations. Though these social-realist norms were no longer enforced in 
the 1980s (they reached their zenith between 1949 and 1956), Kieślowski’s 
polarization of individuals and politics bears the mark of its times. Simul-
taneously, his unapologetic credo about the inherent value of the individual 
as individual, rather than leader or activist, registers as a breath of fresh air 
in a cinematic landscape dominated by sweeping political allegories, such 
as Ryszard Bugajski’s Interrogation (1982) or Andrzej Wajda’s Man of Iron 
(1981) and Danton (1983). Kieślowski’s smaller-scale, made-for-TV fi lms 
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indicate an alternative prospect for critical intervention: “I believe the life 
of every person is worthy of scrutiny, containing its own secrets and dra-
mas. . . . Behind each of these windows, we said to ourselves, is a living 
human being, whose mind, whose heart and, even better, whose stomach is 
worthy of investigation” (D, xiii). This statement is remarkable equally for 
its poetics and its politics. The visceral image of stomach contents being 
examined by the fi lms defamiliarizes the “heart” metaphor that precedes it 
and more forcefully suggests the unpoetic interior depths that the direc-
tor is offering to reach into. At the same time, The Decalogue may refuse to 
make an outright political statement, but its emphasis on lives as individu-
ally rather than collectively lived, its minute exploration of what goes on 
behind closed doors rather than in public squares, and its critical atten-
tion to contrary pulsations of individual desire make an effective—because 
nearly inaudible—political statement. While men and women of iron were 
being interned and interrogated, regular men and women were falling in 
and out of love; affi rming or losing their religion; giving birth and dying, 
often of nothing more politically signifi cant than cancer and car accidents. 
In the context, to represent these “unhistoric acts” on screen was to make 
a profound artistic and ideological shift, because the private had so long 
been regarded as the domain of “rotten bourgeois individualism.”10 But, as 
I will soon show, it is never possible to isolate the private from the histori-
cal completely, so that even Kieślowski’s metonymic stomachs are never 
unhistorical.
In the fi lms of The Decalogue, the presence of the camera has an impact 
similar to that which it had in the courtrooms of stan wojenny, deepening 
our awareness of the constitutive human unrest Kieślowski always valo-
rized. In a 1979 interview, the director tells his interlocutor, Hanna Krall, 
that it is “unrest [niepokój] that makes [him] get up in the morning, and 
not love, hope, or whatever else you mentioned. Within unrest, there is 
always a question.”11 The “unrest” at stake here is not to be confused with 
the “moral unrest” or “anxiety” of the so-called “cinema of moral anxiety” 
(kino moralnego niepokoju), notwithstanding the use of the same term. In 
fact, Kieślowski liked to be defi ant about it and on more than one occasion 
claimed that he “does not feel any moral anxiety. I do not like this name, 
which stuck to the cinema of the late 1970’s. . . . It’s a name that only 
pigeonholes.”12 The “unrest” Kieślowski values is that experienced by ordi-
nary participants in everyday dramas. The ten vignettes of the fi lms of The 
Decalogue appear as an array of fi ctional courtrooms in which the spectacles 
of judgment are played out, to be witnessed—but also to be highlighted and 
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deepened—by the gaze of the camera. The fi lms are set up to underscore 
the apparently documentary role of the camera as an arbitrary witness, an 
apparatus, itself without agency or deliberation, that fi lms whatever gives 
itself to be fi lmed. The character of the “silent witness” (played by Artur 
Barciś) that recurs throughout the series may well be an image of the role 
of the fi lm camera itself. According to the director, the opening of each 
episode is written to “suggest that the lead character had been chosen by 
the camera almost by accident” (D, xiii). Having initially entertained the 
idea that the camera might focus on a face selected at random from a large 
stadium audience or follow a chance character in the street, Kieślowski and 
Piesiewicz eventually selected a large apartment complex in Warsaw, “with 
thousands of similar windows framed within the establishing shot” (D, 
xiii), as the setting of the TV series. As in the courtroom, the camera was 
to fi lm whatever action, whatever life, took place within its eyeshot, rather 
than roam in search of something worthy of documentation. In this way, 
the camera was set up as a witness—it happened to fi nd itself wherever it 
found itself—and the key concept of the series crucially depends on this. 
At the same time, the camera is set up as a voyeur that commits the very 
transgressions that Kieślowski warned against. In a fi ctional form, then, 
The Decalogue explores the possibilities as well as the risks of the docu-
mentary point of view. The very premise of the series relies on the idea of 
the camera as a Peeping Tom that examines the entrails of the apartment 
block. The ten episodes of the series scrutinize the human dramas that take 
place within the different apartments, in a manner that appears to be docu-
mentary in its outright refusal to moralize or even interpret. The camera 
is there to view, and the fi ction is set up in such a way as to underscore its 
voyeuristic dimension. Many have argued, Laura Mulvey most infl uen-
tially, that fi lm as such is a voyeuristic medium.13 But this is not my point 
here. Kieślowski’s Decalogue emphasizes and plays with this voyeurism in a 
self-conscious and consequential way. It begins by destroying the illusions 
on which classic cinema usually depends. For instance, instead of begin-
ning an episode inside an apartment or with a classic establishing shot and 
then leading through a doorway into the building, allowing us to forget 
that we do not usually get to see what goes on in other people’s lives, nearly 
every episode of The Decalogue begins with the camera dwelling, in one way 
or another, on the concrete walls of the apartment building before pierc-
ing them, as it were, and heightening the voyeuristic effect of the fi lmic 
medium. The director plays with the idea of an establishing shot, only 
to demonstrate the opposite effect: There is no natural way—no natural 
door or window—through which we could pass into these apartments. I 
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argued earlier that Kieślowski valorizes the private as worthy of protect-
ing and examining, and in this way counteracts its offi cial devaluation. But 
we can now appreciate that, by the same token, Kieślowski undercuts this 
privacy—albeit in a fi ctional setup—by rendering it visible. The two mo-
tives are inseparable. The camera in The Decalogue, just as it did in the real 
courtrooms under martial law, becomes an agent that turns the uninves-
tigated life into the embodiment of a more profound, constitutive unrest. 
It creatively induces states of exception, which it then critically examines. 
In the series, the act of fi lming recasts the mundane here-and-now of the 
dwellers of a communist-era apartment block into that not-quite-local/
not-quite-universal mode characteristic of Kieślowski’s work. The direc-
tor describes the series as “an attempt to narrate ten stories about ten or 
twenty individuals, who—caught in a struggle precisely because of these 
and not other circumstances, circumstances which are fi ctitious but which 
could occur in every life—suddenly realize that they’re going round and 
round in circles, that they’re not achieving what they want” (KK, 145).
The camera’s dual role as witness and critic is particularly pronounced in 
the most metacritical of the fi lms, Decalogue Six, also released in a revised 
feature-length version as A Short Film about Love, which explicitly the-
matizes the role of the fi lmic eye.14 Six goes further than any other epi-
sode by doubling the voyeuristic gaze of the director’s camera in the main 
character’s telescopic obsession; in this limited sense, the main character 
is a fi gure of the author/director. In the television version, Tomek (Olaf 
Lubaszenko), a young postal worker, steals a telescope lens in order to spy 
on an attractive older woman, Magda (Grażyna Szapołowska), who lives 
in the apartment block opposite his. Every night he watches as she comes 
back home, receives visits from her lovers, and contemplates a large tapes-
try she is in the process of weaving. Tomek, a modern-day Peeping Tom, 
has been spying on Magda for a while when the fi lm begins. He inher-
ited the pastime from an absent friend, whose room he now occupies and 
whose mother is his landlady (Stefania Iwińska). Not only is he a substitute 
son to his landlady, he is also a substitute voyeur. But unlike his friend, who 
conceived of Magda solely as the object of a private sex show, Tomek falls 
in love with her and is pained to see her go about her life, of which he is not 
a part. He even confesses at one point that he no longer masturbates when 
watching her having sex, suggesting that he may be consumed not just by 
desire but also by guilt, or, alternatively, that he has begun to sublimate and 
idealize his feelings for the object of his daily voyeurism. In a way, Tomek’s 
transgressions against privacy are exactly of the kind that made Kieślowski 
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choose glycerin tears over real ones: A fi lm camera could not record such 
offenses without committing an even greater, because public, transgres-
sion against the individual’s inviolable right to self-possession. In addition 
to spying through a telescope, Tomek sends Magda forged money order 
notices, calls in emergency services to interrupt her lovemaking, steals and 
reads love letters addressed to her, and so on. Eventually, he confesses to 
her that he has been watching her, and, against all odds, he succeeds in 
manipulating her into going out on a date with him, but the night ends in 
humiliation so devastating to him that he attempts to commit suicide by 
cutting his wrists. This is when the point of view is reversed, and it is now 
Magda’s turn to pick up a pair of old-fashioned (and ineffectual) opera 
glasses to look for Tomek’s return from the hospital. When he does return 
and she goes to see him at the post offi ce where he works, he only tells her 
that he does not spy on her any more. Clearly, in this fi lm the passive act of 
witnessing is revealed to have a critical impact on both the witness and the 
witnessed; divestments of privacy are very costly to all.
The fi lm opens with the same setting. From a contextual perspective, 
the post offi ce in the fi lm’s opening sequence is a trace representation, a 
shadow, of the pervasive system of communist bureaucracy, in which the 
two actors are caught, as it were, from before the beginning of the fi lm 
(Figure 8–1). The system assigns them roles that inform as well as subvert 
their “real-life” roles as lover and beloved. In the post offi ce, they are clerk 
and client (which, in the communist context, is more appropriately termed 
the petitioner or the supplicant). The fi rst shot is a medium close-up of 
Magda as she approaches the window where Tomek serves as a clerk. She 
Figure 8–1. Magda shakes out a shoe at the post offi ce 
counter in Decalogue Six.
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steps in front of the window, and we see her from Tomek’s point of view, 
from behind a glass partition. There is a circular opening in the glass, 
which is nearly transparent, except for some refl ections. In a way, the cir-
cular opening heightens the presence of an obstruction, as it emphasizes 
that the glass is there. Magda’s approach to the window is confi dent: She 
is nonchalantly fanning herself with an awizo, a notice, usually left in one’s 
mailbox, that a money order can be claimed at the local post offi ce. At 
this moment, she is not yet a supplicant; she expects to be able to claim 
the money presumably owed to her and issues only a haughty one-word 
command, “Awizo!” as she comes up to the window. Because Tomek, the 
clerk, is taking a while to search through a nearly empty index-card fi ling 
box on his desk, Magda coolly takes off a shoe, which we later learn to be 
an iconic black stiletto, in order to shake out some painful bit of detritus. 
The image is arresting, in that she appears to be simultaneously vulnerable 
(unselfconsciously removing a source of discomfort from her femme-fatale 
heel) and aggressive (since she makes no attempt at being inconspicuous 
when she taps the shoe on the counter, at the clerk’s face level). When she 
looks up from her shoes, it is not at Tomek but at some nowhere point 
above. Whenever we see Tomek from Magda’s point of view, her own re-
fl ection in the glass window is superimposed on the image. In one of the 
frames, both of Tomek’s eyes are caught in the opening, as he looks Magda 
up and down, in a stereotypical once-over. Magda has no expectation that 
this will be a human encounter, and she is not cowed by her contact with 
the bureaucratic apparatus, either. But Tomek’s gaze lingers on her for a 
few seconds too long, injecting sexual signifi cance into an administrative 
encounter, and breaking the mold in which it is supposed to be cast. His 
response to her one-word demand is a foreboding “Nie ma!” (translated in 
the subtitles as “Nothing”), which, as I will later discuss, echoes through 
the entire fi lm, as does this initial nonmeeting.
The signifi cance of the post offi ce setting in Six becomes more pro-
nounced when viewed against Kieślowski’s early documentary, Urza̧d (The 
Offi ce, 1966). The six-minute fi lm, produced when the director was still a 
student at the Lodz Film School, exhibits many of the features of his later, 
mature documentaries and shares remarkable visual and thematic similari-
ties with the post offi ce scenes in Six. According to fi lm critic Marek Haltof, 
Kieślowski’s documentaries were sociological in nature and much infl u-
enced by his fi lm school teacher and important documentary fi lmmaker, 
Kazimierz Karabasz, author of such shorts as Sunday Musicians (1960). In 
these early fi lms, Haltof writes, “Kieślowski deals with several individual 
cases representing a universal meaning: they are, pars pro toto, studies of the 
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communist system. Unable to criticize the system openly, he focuses on its 
several micro-aspects in the hope of presenting its unveiled, true nature.”15 
The Offi ce, in particular, trains the camera on communist bureaucracy at a 
local branch of the PZU (a national social security agency).16 As soon as the 
fi lm’s title, in stark white lettering on a simple black background, is off the 
screen, the viewer is assaulted by a high-pitched female voice demanding 
that a certifi cate be presented for inspection. The screen is fi lled with me-
dium to extreme close-ups, shot from the back of the room, of petitioners 
waiting in line, shifting in place, and craning their necks toward the front 
of the room. The particular petitioner to whom the sharp voice directs its 
demand for a certifi cate is not visible and neither is the clerk who issues 
the request. In the PZU offi ce, the clerks are young women, coiffed in the 
fashion of the 1960s, and obviously comfortable in their role as holders of 
the keys. There is nothing rebellious about their youth: They have been 
absorbed by the apparatus, so that even their methodical pencil-sharpening 
and unhurried tea-making, shown in lingering and disconcerting close-up, 
are unaffected by the scope and multiplicity of human tragedy on the other 
side of the offi ce window. The petitioners, on the other hand, are indistin-
guishable from one another, forming a dense crowd of old people; their 
faces, unretouched by editing, are covered with lines and wizened by hard 
work. As though unaware of being fi lmed, they pathetically scratch their 
faces, pat their hair, and let their mouths droop. Their passivity, waiting a 
turn in front of the window, is staggering; they are there, it seems, to per-
form an act of supplication rather than to have their needs met. Though 
there are seemingly several windows at the PZU offi ce, we only hear one 
clerk, who, emphatically, is never shown. The bureaucracy has only one 
voice, a voice that comes from nowhere in particular and that resembles 
a robot’s uninfl ected monotone, rather than a human being’s modulated 
speech. In fact, all the voices in the audio track are out of sync with the 
visual sequence: Petitioners speak, the one clerk responds, but we only ever 
see silent faces or mouths whose speech is drowned out by the shrill female 
voice at another (invisible) window. Formally, the technique of shot-reverse 
shot is used here in a deconstructive manner, since the removal of the ac-
companying auditory channel (and the continued broadcast of the jarring 
voiceover throughout) destroys any illusion, normally produced by shot-
reverse shot, that a human dialogue is taking place. This discontinuous ef-
fect is further strengthened by the addition of a third point of view, which 
is that of the camera (as it shoots, for instance, from the back of the room). 
The documentary’s achievement is to portray the voice of the bureaucratic 
institution, the voice of the state, as a disembodied, shrill, and merciless 
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demand, which cannot be questioned because it issues forth from nowhere, 
a demand that casts the person as petitioner whose human condition reg-
isters only insofar as it is transposed into standardized bureaucratic forms. 
The fi lm ends with the female voice, telling various petitioners, eight times 
over, to fi ll a “form in which you enumerate what you have done through-
out your entire life.” The echoing voice is heard against the panning (and 
Kafkaesque) image of a disordered and tattered archive, of presumably just 
such forms. The bureaucracy demands a standardized and total account-
ing of oneself, but the fi lm shows that these accounts crumble, disused, to 
dust. This archive does not memorialize what it contains. To the contrary, 
it turns “entire lives” into crushing insignifi cance.
The visual echoes between the PZU offi ce in Urza̧d and the post offi ce 
in Six are remarkable, as is the fi lm technique deployed in both. The post 
offi ce scenes in Six are shot using the same shot-reverse shot technique, 
with the addition of a third point of view (the camera’s). But what is most 
striking is the photographic likeness between the offi ces. Both scenes are 
defi ned by the presence of a window that divides the clerk from the pe-
titioner. This partition is made of transparent glass, punctured with two 
openings: a circular one above, at the level of the client’s face (to allow for 
conversation), and a semicircular one below, at the level of the counter (to 
facilitate the exchange of documents and money). This was, to be sure, the 
standard bureaucratic setup at the time, but Kieślowski’s choice of the set-
ting goes beyond the requirements of realism. In fact, Six is a fi lm in which 
the dividing pane of glass constitutes the defi ning visual signifi er: Tomek 
spies on Magda through a telescope trained at her apartment’s windows, 
and meets with her at the post offi ce, separated from her by a window 
pane. The parallels are yet stronger: The circular opening in the post offi ce 
window is echoed by the mysterious circular object, most probably a wide-
angle mirror, hanging in the window of Magda’s apartment. Both the post 
offi ce window and the apartment window are marked with circular shapes 
that interrupt their unity. These orifi ces, like bodily ones, mark the sepa-
ration between the inside and the outside and constitute an opening to-
ward communication or sexual encounter. Yet the fi lm seems to be asking 
whether they are enough of an opening toward either, and thus whether 
dialogues and encounters can ever result. In this way, the post offi ce setting 
is, I argue, integral to the artistic signifi cance of the fi lm, which is not so 
much about voyeurism as it is about divisions between viewer and viewed, 
client and clerk, lover and loved. Interestingly, in the screenplay, the initial 
post offi ce encounter does not occur until much later; it is the sixth scene in 
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the published script. In the TV fi lm, the post offi ce sequence is the opening 
one, and this change clearly emphasizes its signifi cance.
Scenes at the post offi ce trace, in fact, a sort of arc through Six. They 
stand as the fi rst, the middle, and the last scenes of the fi lm, demarcating 
its formal narrative trajectory in a perfectly Aristotelian fashion (forming 
the beginning, the climax, and the resolution of the plot). The opening 
sequence sets the tone and introduces the characters: It is only Tomek’s 
protracted gaze that alerts viewers to a connection between him and the fe-
male client. The second post offi ce sequence, which occurs almost exactly 
halfway through the fi lm, brings the plot to a climax as it leads to Tomek’s 
confession to Magda that he has been spying on her. Magda’s awareness 
of being watched fundamentally changes the nature of the looking that 
takes place in the fi lm, as Magda becomes, in the fi lm’s second part, fi rst a 
self-conscious actor on a stage that she is beginning to control, and then 
herself an onlooker in search of a view of Tomek. The fi nal post offi ce se-
quence provides closure to the plot. A changed Magda comes to the post 
offi ce looking for Tomek after his recovery from a suicide attempt, but he 
conclusively tells her that he no longer watches her, whereby the link con-
joining the characters and driving the plot is untied.17
In what way, then, is the post offi ce a fi tting locus in a fi lm that ap-
parently focuses on personal and romantic, rather than administrative and 
bureaucratic, relationships? The image of the post offi ce is profoundly 
ambivalent. On the one hand, the postal service is a textbook and nearly 
universal allegory for the successes and breakdowns of communication, 
delivering—and failing to deliver—love letters or money orders. As an 
image of human relationships, it demonstrates the desire to connect as 
much as the diffi culty of connecting. On the other hand, the post offi ce, 
in its resemblance to the PZU offi ce from Kieślowski’s early documentary, 
is the embodiment of specifi cally communist bureaucracy, which subtly 
permeates the characters’ lives. All in all, the post offi ce establishes an im-
age both of connection and of disconnection, both of personhood and of 
depersonalization. It captures the complexity of human relations under 
communism (the historicist aspect) and gestures to their opacity at any 
time (the universalist aspect).
Ž iž ek uses the post offi ce scenes in Six as a quintessential example of 
what he calls “the function of interface” (FRT, 39). The visually arresting 
characteristic of these scenes—the fact that the character of Magda is 
doubly present, both physically “there” but also visible as a refl ection on 
the glass partition—constitutes, from a technical point of view, nothing 
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more complicated than “a simple condensation of shot and reverse-shot 
within the same shot” (FRT, 52). For Ž iž ek, this has a psychoanalytic and 
metaphysical signifi cance. But what if we attend to the specifi c context of 
Six, where the spectral refl ection appears as part not of any drab reality, 
but the richly and specifi cally resonant reality of the post offi ce? It is help-
ful to look at Tomek here as both the clerical subject of the post offi ce 
and the amorous subject of the fi lm’s romance plot (for he is both). His 
intense interiority, of which his secret voyeurism is a perverse manifesta-
tion, could be seen as the not entirely unpredictable obverse of his noth-
ingness within the bureaucratic structure of the post offi ce, rather than 
an individual sexual perversion. His inwardness and awkwardness can be 
read not as character fl aws but rather as symptoms of a social system that 
methodically devalues individuality and privacy. Human beings as postal 
clerks—we could speak, perhaps, of postal subjects—are alienated in the 
world-as-post-offi ce to the point that their personal desires and individual 
acts assume exaggerated and perverse forms; but this perversity is a social, 
not an individual, condition. These forms may be an extreme manifesta-
tion of the intense interiority that communist bureaucracy, in its intent on 
producing sociability, paradoxically enforces.
It is entirely plausible to read the overly intense atmosphere of the 
apartment buildings where the series takes place—the concentration, as 
it were, of inner drama within the walls of these residences—as a real-
ist portrayal of the heightened signifi cance of the private life under com-
munism. Communism, among many other things, was a social system in 
which the private itself was made perverse by the meaninglessness of the 
social and the system’s intentional devaluation and destruction of privacy. 
It is a system in which an individual Peeping Tom cannot begin to compete 
with Big Brother, who is always watching, too. The entire episode does, 
in fact, make sense in these terms, though it can still be read as a universal 
tale about a failed romance. The characters strive to escape the post offi ce 
that defi nes their existence, but they never escape it entirely, and they end 
up reenacting the meaninglessness and patterns of their offi cial encounters 
in their private lives as well. Or, the other way around, the patterns of post 
offi ce interaction reveal a dimension of the private that would otherwise 
remain hidden from view: The private world cannot provide a genuine 
alternative to the bureaucratized world (it either does not escape it or is 
itself not that different). The post offi ce raises but does not answer the 
question: Is the separation and alienation of postal subjects a political effect 
or a universal fact?
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The ghostly apparition on the glass that both connects and divides 
Tomek and Magda constitutes a visual manifestation of the ineluctable dis-
tance between persons or would-be lovers. The post offi ce is the form, the 
structure, through which we ought to apprehend this relationship or any 
relationships; it is where they are constituted as a couple, where they are 
before they become themselves. The questions the visual stratum poses 
are multiple: What does Magda see when she looks at Tomek? Does she 
see him, or does she see her own spectral image superimposed upon him? 
Is the circular cutout in the glass enough of an opening for one person to 
reach through and touch another? Is there always a shield of glass between 
people, especially between lovers? While the series relies on the concept 
of a certain transparency—the idea that things can be seen by the fi lm 
camera, lives investigated, even stomach contents analyzed—it is repeat-
edly revealed that privacy ought to be guarded and that human subjects are 
somehow fundamentally opaque to one another, and to the camera, and 
jealous of their opaqueness. This nontransparency is epitomized in the se-
ries by means of glass obstructions such as those that pervade Six: counter 
windows, apartment windows, glass doors, glass objects (such as bottles, 
cups, paperweights), and TV screens.
Similar questions are entertained in other contexts as well, through the 
fi lm’s settings, motifs, and dialogue. When Magda fi rst arrives at the post 
offi ce, she comes with a demand for money, and it is met not so much with 
a refusal as with a void: “There is nothing . . . see for yourself.” The im-
mediate reason why the money is not available is simple enough: Tomek 
has placed a forged money order notice in Magda’s mailbox. Magda comes 
bearing a counterfeit, which she does not know to be one, and discovers 
that it cannot be cashed. When she later visits the post offi ce with another 
awizo, she requests to see the manager, who in turn accuses her of the 
intention to defraud the state institution. This injustice is what prompts 
Tomek to run out after Magda and confess to her that the money notices 
were forged and that he had been watching her. In the scene that leads 
up to Tomek’s confession, the forces are aligned in two opposed camps. 
On the one hand, we have the postal institution, which can, presumably, 
differentiate between real and forged money notices (real and glycerin 
tears?), and whose offi cial stamps exist to guarantee that such distinctions 
are maintained. But the institution also exercises here its sovereign power 
to bring about a state of exception, an impasse of legality and illegality, by 
destroying evidence in the case. The shrill manager, who invokes the shrill 
voiceover from The Offi ce, emphasizes the post offi ce’s standing as an organ 
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of the state only seconds before she tears up the notices that could have 
been given to the police. The manager’s accusation of fraud and forgery, 
leveled at Magda, is left hanging at the end of the scene, forever without 
any prospect of resolution: Neither a guilty nor a nonguilty verdict is now 
possible. On the other hand, we have Tomek and Magda whose attitudes 
evince a much more porous conception of the difference between real and 
forged, though in disparate ways. Tomek, to begin with, is a double agent, 
who misappropriates the offi cial seal for personal reasons. Tomek passes 
a counterfeit money notice not for monetary gain or to dupe Magda with 
its face value of 24,000 zlotys but in order to make her show up at the post 
offi ce—literally, to conjure her up like a visitation—and to “forge” a rela-
tionship. While Tomek issues this love summons, Magda assumes that she 
is in possession of a token of entitlement, and she arrives to demand the 
promised fulfi llment, only to be told that she is holding a counterfeit. We 
have to wonder why she feels entitled to funds from an unknown source, 
but we should not overestimate the sum itself.18 Magda cannot expect any 
real windfall and the actual amount is likely not signifi cant, even to a textile 
artist without obvious daytime employment.
All in all, neither Tomek nor Magda share the institution’s self- important 
interpretation that a counterfeit is always a counterfeit, or that a counter-
feit is a forged or false version of the real. The counterfeit money order 
reveals its richest possibilities if allowed to signify as an image of human 
relations, like the glass partition at the post offi ce. Read in this way, the 
counterfeit notices exemplify some of love’s promises and pitfalls. Entering 
a relationship may well resemble coming to a post offi ce bearing an awizo 
in one’s hand: You assume you are holding a good check, but you may well 
fi nd that you have a bad one. The awizo evokes all the unfounded expecta-
tions, the demands that cannot be met, the values that can be trusted but 
not demonstrated, and the hopes against all odds that there must be some-
one on the other end who will present you with a true gift and who will ask 
for nothing in return. That is, in short, Magda’s situation. On the other 
hand, Tomek’s approach to the awizo manifests the naïve and magical be-
lief that love interests override all other interests, and that the appearance 
itself of the beloved will lead to a substantiation of desire in the currency 
of mutuality.
One of the most striking linguistic features of this dialogue, which con-
nects it with other moments in the fi lm, is the echoing repetition of the 
phrase “it’s not there” (also translated in the subtitles as “nothing”). In this 
dialogue, the phrase is used six times and it brings the viewer back to its 
previous appearance during Magda’s fi rst attempt to cash the money notice 
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in the fi lm’s opening sequence. In the Polish dialogue, the phrase is shorter 
and more ambivalent: “nie ma.” For instance, in this earlier scene:
MAGDA: Awizo.
TOMEK: Nie ma. (“Nothing.”)
MAGDA: Ale ja mam wezwanie. (“But I’ve got an awizo.”)
TOMEK: Nie ma. (“There is nothing.”)
“Nie ma” is an idiomatic and ubiquitous expression that literally means 
“no/not has,” where “ma” is the third-person singular of the verb “to have” 
(mieć ). The fact that the phrase has no word in the subject slot is not in itself 
surprising: Polish allows the subject to be omitted because the verb itself 
usually carries enough grammatical markers to prevent misunderstanding. 
But this is not the case here: The sentence equivalent “nie ma” does not 
point to a subject. There is no substitute here for the comforting “it” that 
English uses as a placeholder in expressions such as “it’s not there.” Tech-
nically, “nie ma” is a subjectless sentence. It could acquire a logical subject, 
which, if expressed, would follow the expression in the genitive (possessive) 
case: For instance, “nia ma pieniȩdzy” (there’s no money) or “nie ma chleba” 
(there’s no bread). But this logical subject—money or bread—is not the 
grammatical subject of the sentence, not the human subject we would ex-
pect to be the solid basis of all “having.” The fi rst thing to say, then, is that 
“nothing” can constitute only a very loose translation for the Polish “nie 
ma,” which conveys something simultaneously less portentous and more 
elusive than the English noun. “It’s not there” does not work, either, as it 
is too concrete and grammatically complete to convey the unsettling open-
endedness and subjectless dispossession that inheres in the Polish phrase. 
“Nie ma” indicates a state of deprivation that is not expressible by means of 
a conceptual noun (such as “nothing” or “lack”), a state of being-without or 
having-not. In the post offi ce scene, “nie ma” names the state of exception 
that the scene illustrates: There is no money to cover the awizo because the 
notice is forged. The state of illegality is magnifi ed when the notice is torn 
up, and there is no longer evidence that a forgery has taken place: Nie ma 
pieniȩdzy (money), nie ma dowodu (evidence). The person who is accused 
of forgery and fraud—Magda—is the only one who committed no crime 
(the notice was forged by Tomek and torn up by the manager), and yet she 
fi nds herself the subject-without-grammatical-subject of a double depriva-
tion. Tomek, too, fails to conjure up a mutuality for which he broke the 
rules: Nie ma miłości (love).
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The fi lm is, ultimately, about the state of exception described by this 
“nie ma.” It raises two fundamental questions, pertaining to the logical and 
grammatical subjects of the phrase: What is missing? And, who or what is 
missing that which is missing? The questions may be unanswerable, but 
they can be usefully contextualized in another key sequence of the fi lm. 
The fi lm entertains the question of love—it is, after all, a “short fi lm about 
love”—in the most unlikely of ways, out of what looks very much like a 
voyeuristic perversion (or the “adultery” of the sixth commandment) that 
brings together two people who should have never met, and who make the 
very possibility of mutuality seem impossible, risible, or sinful. But this 
makes the question all the more urgent. The essential dialogue of Six takes 
place when Tomek delivers milk to Magda’s apartment. Does the action 
represent Tomek, an orphan, delivering milk to his absent mother in order 
to be fed? Is she a mother who failed to lactate (and who is previously seen 
spilling milk) and who needs milk so that she can feed her child (or her-
self )? Is Magda a child thirsty for the milk of Tomek’s love, his semen? Is 
milk what is absent, what is not there—the absent subject of the fi lm’s “nie 
ma”? Tomek’s symbolic delivery and the lovers’ meeting occur in an un-
likely space (a public corridor in the apartment building) and at an unlikely 
time (in the bright light of early morning). Magda, in dishabille, suddenly 
opens the door when she hears the clinking of a milk bottle, and the swing 
of the door causes Tomek to fall back, infl icting another wound on top of 
the black eye he had acquired the night before from Magda’s lover. When 
Magda asks, “Why . . . why do you peep at me?” Tomek establishes the 
fi lm’s credo by stating, “Because I love you. . . . I really love you.”
Tomek does not “really” love her, and Magda does not learn the meaning 
of love by the end of the fi lm, either. There is no chance of mutuality here, 
but the fi lm still engages the question of love with utter seriousness. Six 
examines love through its suspensions and absences, through its crises and 
states of emergency. It may simply be that Tomek is naïve or romantic, and 
the fi lm goes to great lengths to underscore the mismatch of ages between 
the pair. But it is important that Tomek does not spy on Magda simply or 
only out of perverse sexual need. When he inherits his friend’s voyeuristic 
toolbox, he fails—and this is important—to become a true voyeur himself. 
Though at fi rst he watches her having sex and masturbates at his telescope, 
he eventually gives it up, and he even averts his gaze when sexual activity is 
taking place. This may well be sublimation, but the point is that his interest 
in Magda, at the moment when we encounter him in the fi lm, is no longer 
defi ned solely by its sexual component. He does not respond to Magda’s 
overt proposition: “Do you want to kiss me? . . . Perhaps you want to go 
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to . . . perhaps you want to make love to me?” To all these questions he re-
plies with a simple “no.” When queried, “And what . . . what do you want?” 
he replies that he does “not know,” and when she again probes, incredu-
lously and insistently, “What do you want?” he emphatically states that he 
wants “nothing”: “Nothing?” “Nothing!” Nothing—not because he is too 
young or too shy, and not because he prefers to be aroused from behind a 
telescope than in the fl esh. (This instance of “nothing” is correctly trans-
lated. It renders the Polish abstract noun “nic” rather than the previously 
discussed phrase “nie ma.”) He really does not want simply to bed her, and 
he seems frankly taken aback by her questions. It is not that he really wants 
“nothing,” but rather that what he desires is not simply the sexual thing. It 
is nothing concrete or nothing easily articulable. And though this dialogue 
is beginning to sound very much like a textbook example of Lacan’s theory 
of desire and lack, it is important to my reading to dwell in the trivialities of 
how desire is, in fact, represented in this scene. We would do well to take 
Tomek at his word—this is, I would venture, the fi lm’s urgent demand 
on us as viewers. What does the young man want? In responding to this 
apparently psychoanalytic query, he wavers between “I don’t know” and 
“nothing,” and these responses, too, should be taken seriously. Tomek asks 
Magda: “Could I invite you to a café? . . . For ice-cream?” The frank, ado-
lescent nature of this invitation is sexual but it also transcends the sexual. 
As he did by counterfeiting a money notice, Tomek again plays a conjurer: 
He wants to conjure up an encounter. For one, Tomek’s question—he 
wants to invite her out—respects, in its very grammatical structure, 
Magda’s separateness as a person. He does not presume to know her, even 
though he had watched her and violated her privacy in other ways as well 
for a year. In Polish, while Magda addresses Tomek in the familiar second-
person singular (“you”), Tomek continues to address Magda, to the very 
end of the fi lm, in what is the formal mode, using the third-person singu-
lar “Pani” (Madam): “Could I invite [Madam] to a café?” The difference 
in registers is partly dictated by—and it underscores—their difference in 
ages, but it is also the received grammar of social exchanges that are not 
yet intimate. Only close friends address each other in the second-person 
singular.
Magda’s response to Tomek’s invitation is not shown, lost on the editing 
fl oor or deliberately omitted—nie ma odpowiedzi (there is no response)—
but we glean what it might have been by Tomek’s ecstatic, possibly erotic 
reaction: In jubilation, he goes in circles, with the clinking milk wagon in 
tow, in front of the apartment building. This cacophony of milk bottles is 
set to the haunting melodies of Zbigniew Preisner’s score, and the scene is 
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bookended by extreme high-angle shots that frame it as taking place at a 
crossroads, where four paths meet by the side of a weeping willow. When 
the camera begins to track Tomek’s movement in close-up, the image of 
the world beyond him dissolves into spinning smudges of light. This is 
both a triumph of Kieślowski’s fi lm art and an intimation that within the 
fi lm’s “nie ma” there inheres at least a potential for something very much 
like ecstasy. Without invoking the entire problematic of José Ortega y 
Gasset’s essay on love, Tomek’s emotional carousel is a fi tting image of 
the philosopher’s idea: “Love is all activity. Instead of the object coming 
to me, it is I who go to the object and become part of it. In the act of love, 
the person goes out of himself. Love is perhaps the supreme activity which 
nature affords anyone for going out of himself toward something else.” 
Unlike desire, whose aim is possession, love is “centrifugal.”19
In his autobiographical refl ections, the director affi rms that the most 
interesting aspect of the fi lm is its “perspective”: “We’re always looking at 
the world through the eyes of the person who is loving and not through 
the eyes of the person who is loved” (KK, 166). Further, “this love is always 
tied up with some sort of suffering, some sort of impossibility” (KK, 169). 
The problem the fi lm elaborates is then more the problem of love’s (im)-
possibility than of whether it exists or not: The question is not whether 
love is, but whether these characters and any characters can “have” it (it 
is the question of “nie ma”: absence cast in terms of (not) having). In Six, 
the suffering love generates is intimately connected to absence (“nie ma”). 
When Tomek, dressed in a formal dark suit and white shirt, meets Magda 
at the café, the conversation confronts these issues head on:
MAGDA: You said that morning . . . what did you say?
TOMEK: I love you.
MAGDA: It doesn’t exist.
TOMEK: It exists.
MAGDA: No.
Again, much is lost in translation. Tomek’s confession of love follows the 
formal pattern of his speech: “I love [Madam]” (not an informal “you”). 
Also, Magda’s “It doesn’t exist” includes the fi lm’s linguistic key: “Tego nie 
ma.” Magda’s is a sarcastic remark about what is missing. These are perfor-
mative rather than philosophical statements. Within Magda’s bitter irony, 
there can be no love. Tomek’s “It exists” is also, in Polish, a much simpler 
“jest,” the Polish equivalent of “is” (third person singular of the verb to 
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“be”). Love is, says Tomek, and his warm whisper brings about a moment 
of intimacy. Like the warm embrace that illustrates love in One, this love is, 
even as it may be missing at the same time. The rest of the conversation fo-
cuses on concrete instances of missing love: Tomek is an orphan who does 
not remember his parents, even though he otherwise “remembers every-
thing from the start;” his best friend is “not here now” and is currently 
stationed with the UN troops in Syria; Magda’s previous lover, whom she 
describes as a “thin boy,” “left and never came back,” going to Austria and 
then Australia, while his alliterative absence takes Magda on a longer trip 
through the ABC’s of longing.
The lover’s suffering reveals, however, a destructive and violent po-
tential.20 Tomek’s longing leads him into the relatively benign territory 
of confi scating Magda’s mail and reporting nonexistent gas leaks to the 
authorities; at the café, Magda complains that he had backed her into a 
corner. Magda’s actions toward Tomek are, however, more profoundly 
traumatizing. Back at her apartment, dressed in a negligée and freshly 
showered, she encourages Tomek to touch the moist evidence of her desire 
for him. His “delicate” hands disappear under her silk slip, and he quickly 
climaxes, still fully dressed in the same dark suit and white shirt. From the 
moment their hands touch, the whole scene takes about thirty seconds; 
his weak moaning, more like a child’s complaint than a man’s release, lasts 
about twenty seconds and then turns into tears. Though they may well be 
glycerin, the brevity contributes to the scene’s emotional impact. Magda’s 
seductive warmth now changes into a cutting challenge: “Already? Was it 
good? That’s all there is to love. Wash in the bathroom, there’s a towel.” 
Tomek’s humiliation and devastation are such that he attempts suicide by 
cutting his wrists the same night. The question of whether love exists— of 
whether it is—is beyond the scope of such a scene. Even this much cuts 
uncomfortably close to the territory of “real tears.”
Though the roles now switch, and Magda seems to begin to thaw inter-
nally as she takes up a pair of opera glasses earnestly to look for Tomek’s 
return from the hospital, love continues to be “tied up with . . . some 
sort of impossibility.” These are extreme circumstances, but Magda’s inef-
fectual attempts register more as an ironic commentary on the changed 
perspectives than as a genuine intersubjective opening. When Tomek 
comes back from the hospital, Magda returns to the post offi ce, making a 
full circle back to the paradigm that has defi ned the relationship, and the 
fi lm’s social context, from the start. Cupping her hands around her eyes 
to try to see better through the glare of the windows, Magda now plays 
the lover in search of the beloved. The glass panes, however, continue to 
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Figure 8–2. Magda learns that Tomek does not watch her 
anymore in Decalogue Six.
separate them. The smile gently playing on her face is wiped out, when 
Tomek states, in a monotone and barely lifting his head: “I do not watch 
[Madam] any more.” Magda is reduced to a hopeful supplicant in a state 
bureaucracy of the postal institution (Figure 8–2). The suspension of voy-
euristic activity, of watching, does suggest that genuine erotic possibility 
has been closed off as well. Ž iž ek writes that Six shows that “there is only 
an immense need for love; every actual love encounter fails and throws us 
back into our solitude” (FRT, 115). But Ž iž ek’s “concise formula of the 
fi nal lesson” of the episode omits to acknowledge what was learned on 
the way. Peeping, Kieślowski taught us, constituted an opening of the self 
to another, and it offered perhaps more than just a mirage of transcen-
dence: The movement toward the other remained a possibility within it. 
Though at the end of Six we are left in the state of exception marked by 
“nie ma” (the dearth of love, money, milk), the fi lm speaks to more than the 
necessarily frustrated “need for love.” In the post offi ce of human connec-
tions, the fi gures of Kieślowski’s Decalogue are “going round and round in 
circles, . . . not achieving what they want” (KK, 145), but they keep going 
without settling into solitude. His emphasis falls on this movement, and 
his cinematic artistry is to bring critical urgency to the states of everyday 
exception he documents.
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 5. “Krzysztof Kieślowski Pegaz cz. 2” (video), http://www.youtube.com /
watch?v=Ig3Wswp41Vc (accessed March 3, 2012). Trans. Eva Badowska.
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c h a p t e r  9
Decalogue Seven: A Tale of Love, 
Failing Words, and Moving Images
Francesca Parmeggiani
According to Krzysztof Kieślowski, his task as a fi lmmaker is “to fi nd out 
what lies behind [one’s] actions,” what makes one “get up in the morning” 
and go about one’s life, and to engage the viewer in this heuristic process.1 
He also explains that only love, understood as desire (“that which moves 
one towards something”), grants meaning to and rules human life. As he 
states, “all books and fi lms speak of love. Or the absence of it, which is 
the other side of love.”2 Yet, “captur[ing] what lies within” the characters, 
namely their feelings and emotions, the desire—a moving toward—caus-
ing and molding their actions, is no easy task; and the director admits that 
“there’s no way of fi lming it. You can only get nearer to it.” The consider-
ation of the inadequacy of cinema in this regard leads Kieślowski to praise 
the nuance, depth, balance, and effectiveness of literature, seemingly argu-
ing for a superiority of the descriptive written word over the “too explicit” 
and “too equivocal” moving image (KK, 194 –195). The viewer of The 
Decalogue thus embarks on the complex and fateful journey each character 
undertakes with no apparent expectation: All stories are about love, or lack 
or loss of it; images will come close to representing such experience of (ab-
sent) love, but will inevitably fall short. Seven seems to be no exception.
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Seven is the story of a mother, Ewa (Anna Polony), and her daughter, 
Majka (Maja Barełkowska), fi ghting over six-year-old Ania (Katarzyna Pi-
wowarczyk), who is the child of both: Ewa has raised Ania as her own 
daughter although Majka is Ania’s biological mother. After careful plan-
ning, Majka takes Ania away and tells her that she is her real mother, 
desperately yearning for the child’s recognition and love as her mother. 
Kieślowski reveals the ambiguous nature of Ewa’s and Majka’s need for 
love—for loving and being loved. In his representation, the two women 
mirror each other in their attempt to assert their motherhood. Both are 
strong and tender, manipulative and affectionate, equally determined in 
their questionable claim for the ownership of Ania—motherly love turned 
into a jealous possession, vengeful and mutually hurtful.3 Through the 
characters’ broken dialogues, we glimpse the depth and complexity of their 
relationship: Ewa and Majka have become estranged over the years, exas-
perated by each other’s exclusion from Ania’s love. More important, both 
of them have grown to consider motherhood as defi ning their identities; 
hence their desire to be acknowledged and loved as mothers not only by 
Ania but also by each other.
If one considers the temporal and spatial twists and turns and gaps in 
the story, it comes as no surprise that Kieślowski himself once expressed 
uneasiness at this episode: “À vrai dire,” he said, “c’est le fi lm auquel je suis le 
moins attaché. Selon moi l’histoire est un peu trop compliquée, trop bavarde et mal 
racontée par moi-même” (To tell you the truth, this is the fi lm I am the least 
attached to. In my opinion, the story is a bit too complicated and long-
winded, and I don’t recount it well).4 Most scholars have used his candid 
and rigorous self-criticism to point to the fi lm’s stylistic fl aws, confusing 
plot and overly dramatic characters rather than the representational chal-
lenges it deals with. In so doing, they have also diminished the importance 
Kieślowski ascribes to the sound in the fi lm’s opening. I argue instead that 
this powerful beginning (a child’s disarticulated crying) and the equally 
powerful end it leads to (Ania’s silent gaze at a train station) magnify the 
disquieting psychological and emotional complexity of interpersonal re-
lationships and human actions at the core of the fi lm, articulate the fi lm’s 
distinctive perspective among the episodes of The Decalogue (particularly 
if viewed in comparison with the opening and concluding frames of One), 
and ultimately challenge the viewer’s diminished expectations. Moreover, 
the narrative style and techniques the director employs in Seven demon-
strate cinema’s ability not only to “get nearer” to the surface of perceived 
reality but also to uncover what lies beyond it, and not by means of mere 
imagination, perhaps more persuasively and effectively than words could 
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do. Fragmentation composed into unity, separation revealing proximity, 
a childlike perspective fueling adults’ knowledge and understanding, and 
characters refl ecting each other as mirrors are among Kieślowski’s tools 
to transform representation into meaning, and to address implicitly the 
question of the cognitive potential of cinema and the fi gurative and emo-
tional challenges it offers to viewers when it speaks of love and life. While 
Seven provides an effective test environment for the dynamic interpretive 
relationship the director seeks to establish with his viewer, it also draws 
attention to Kieślowski’s effort—successful, in my view—to create a visual 
language of love, loss, and desire.
The Decalogue originates in Kieślowski’s belief that life is a daily con-
frontation with one’s loneliness and diffi culty of relating to others. It is a 
struggle generated by the absence of love, a yearning for loving and be-
ing loved that, even when expressed or acknowledged, will most likely re-
main unfulfi lled. The fi lm series records random instances in which an 
individual claims her freedom, makes a choice in view of compelling cir-
cumstances, and acts upon it, only to realize that she cannot break out of 
the prison of her own self—fi lled with passions, determined by physiol-
ogy and biology and ruled by conscience or a “sense of sin against your-
self” (KK, 149–150)—nor escape the constraints of familial and societal 
conventions and norms. Majka’s tale in Seven is a powerful illustration of 
such an attempt at breaking free, an act that also defi nes her initiation into 
adulthood. Majka, the central agent in the story, is caught between the 
two worlds of childhood and adulthood. She is simultaneously a child (for 
Ewa) and a mother (for Ania), a circumstance that intensifi es her suffering 
and increases her responsibilities while also eliciting the viewer’s empathy. 
Furthermore, her story is a powerful exploration of the emotional world 
that generates and fulfi lls her radical gesture, a world of unspoken love for 
herself and others that parenthood and family—the former understood as 
the establishment of a loving yet authoritative presence in a child’s life (re-
gardless of actual biological ties), the latter viewed as a microcommunity, 
as a place of relational functions both supportive of and normative for an 
individual’s development—may stifl e rather than nourish.5
Similar to other episodes of the series, Seven is characterized in the 
beginning by a fragmented narrative that the editing emphasizes, and 
by close-ups and shots that underscore the isolation, separation, and dis-
tance of one character from another, or their confi nement within a spe-
cifi c space, whether real or symbolic, which in fact is always shared. In 
the episode’s opening, the camera scrutinizes the exterior of the Warsaw 
apartment complex—by now all too familiar to the viewer of the series—
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but appears almost indifferent to the eerie screams breaking the silence 
of dawn. Although it briefl y zooms in when a light turns on, the camera 
does not stop tilting nor moves to identify the source of the cry, and the 
sequence ends with a distance shot of the uniformly impenetrable apart-
ment buildings—indeed a barrier, but one that the camera and the view-
ers will soon break through. Kieślowski then cuts to a different setting 
and a different yet unspecifi ed time, to a bespectacled, fair-looking young 
woman—her whiteness in stark contrast not only to the gloom of the pre-
vious frame but to the somber tone of the entire fi lm—who is returning 
her student book. The viewer learns that she has been expelled from the 
university for reasons that remain unknown, and has decided not to appeal 
the decision; the last ten pages of her student indeks are missing.6 A new 
cut returns the viewer to the sound of the unidentifi ed crying of the open-
ing, this time from inside a place: A man, working on a pipe organ, does 
not seem to hear or remains unaffected by the screams. Kieślowski’s fi lmic 
language underscores the daunting tone of the episode and introduces its 
core motifs: The camera’s fi rst indifference foreshadows the man’s apathy; 
the acts of ignoring, erasing and hiding, which are performed by each adult 
character at different moments in the fi lm, are introduced by the young 
woman’s resolute attitude, her unknown reasons, and the torn pages in 
her student book. The viewer does encounter Majka for the fi rst time, the 
story’s protagonist still unnamed at this point, but what can or should be 
said is left untold and unexplained.
Yet, as the story unfolds and time contracts, as the narrative turns from 
fragmented into linear, and then climaxes into the emotionally charged 
unity of time and space of the concluding sequence, the viewer realizes that 
what separates, obstructs, or confi nes is immaterial. All barriers, whether a 
bedside, a window, the leaves of a tree, a fence, or a gate, are transparent; 
they affect communication but do not distort nor prevent it, and at times 
they even provide a physical support for the characters to hold on to, and 
an incentive to seek further. For example, Majka puts on her glasses and 
looks at Ania playing with her friends and glancing at her from the dis-
tance, among the bushes fencing the school’s playground; Wojtek, caught 
in the traditionally feminine occupation of hanging the wash to dry in the 
air, meets his child for the fi rst time at the gate opening onto his property. 
In general, these barriers represent a threshold; they mark an emotional 
proximity rather than a distance, at the moment when an individual is con-
fronted with the choice and responsibility of moving closer to or pushing 
away from another. The only instance of an insurmountable obstacle that 
cannot and will not be overcome, a distance disguised as proximity, is given 
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in the beautifully choreographed open-air scene of the encounter—almost 
a duel—between Wojtek and Ewa, searching for Majka and Ania. Coming 
from different directions, the van of Wojtek’s friend and the car of Ewa’s 
husband stop on the opposite sides of a deserted country road. Wojtek and 
Ewa emerge from their vehicles and approach each other, but neither one 
ever steps into the physical and psychological space of the other. No touch 
occurs between them; no word of sympathy or concern is exchanged. An 
agreement is stipulated, sanctioned by Ewa’s ironic fl eeting reference to 
the circumstances that brought them together. The frame, which displays 
a symmetrical positioning of the two characters, reminding the viewer of a 
fi gure refl ected in a mirror, is extraordinary precisely because no material 
object separates or hinders them, and yet they are irremediably distant. 
Kieślowski thus suggests that it is not physical reality that confi nes these 
characters to loneliness, but the inner walls that their pride, acquiescence 
or fear have built.
By contrast, and to return to the fi lm’s beginning, if fragmentation 
and concealment, engendering frustration as well as curiosity as Annette 
Insdorf explains,7 are the dominant characteristics of the opening shots 
of the episode, the extreme close-ups of hands and faces of the following 
sequence—which presents the story’s main characters, three generations 
of women distinguished by their age (maturity, youth, and childhood) and 
their reciprocal relationship—convey isolation, confi nement, and author-
ity, but also proximity and sharing, love, suffering and fear. Here the cam-
era discloses and exposes rather than covering up or remaining indifferent, 
inducing the viewer’s emotional involvement: The closeness suggested by 
the camera’s eye is both that of the viewer to the story’s characters and 
of the characters to one another. The scene plays out in the small, in-
timate but magnifying space next to a bed; the loud cry reveals that its 
source, a child, is nearby. First, the camera focuses on Majka, who tries 
unsuccessfully to calm down the child; the camera is at the child’s level. 
Majka is not wearing her glasses; her sight is, one would infer, blurred, 
and she is unable to act decisively and effectively.8 The camera then fi xes 
on Ewa’s hand, which brusquely pushes away Majka and vigorously pulls 
down the bed’s bar. Ewa’s gesture of eliminating the physical boundary—
the  bedside—between her and Ania is charged with meaning: While both 
women are initially confi ned to the same space, separated from the child, 
only  Majka—still a child albeit being a mother—seems unable to over-
come that separation and console the child. Later in the story, when Majka 
and Ania spend some hours at Wojtek’s home, the viewer will be reminded 
of that initial scene; this time, however, Kieślowski shows that Majka is 
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Figure 9–1. Ania awakening from a nightmare in 
Decalogue Seven.
being assimilated to the adult world: Her stern gesture to shake Ania out 
of her dreams and her mention of the wolves to appease her, yet again cry-
ing in her sleep, replicate Ewa’s acts and words—her language of codifi ed, 
normal or expected motherhood.
The child’s bedside in the beginning is the fi rst of the only two scenes—
the other being the fi lm’s fi nal sequence at the train station—in which 
the three female characters are shown together, interacting in the same 
frame. Between Ewa’s two gestures— one to reject, the other to embrace, 
both revealing her authority and determination—Kieślowski interjects the 
close-up of a child’s hand, Ania’s, grasping the net of the bedside. The 
fragmented way Kieślowski introduces Ania, deferring our viewing of her 
as a child among other children until a later shot, is utterly disturbing: 
Ania is not presented as a whole person, but only as a scream, a clasping 
hand, and fi nally a face, whose impenetrable expression is signifi cantly cap-
tured in her wide-open, sightless eyes, her face almost fi lling up the screen 
(Figure 9–1).
Ania is the most enigmatic character of the story. She inhabits a de-
ceptively happy world. The children’s theater where Majka takes her away 
is a money-making enterprise; the merry-go-round, on which she learns 
who her biological mother is, is abandoned in the woods; and the piles of 
teddy bears that her biological father, Wojtek, has handmade and among 
which she fi nally falls asleep will be given away and sold.9 These places 
and objects—crafted by adult hands to welcome and entertain children, 
but in fact fulfi lling adult interests and self-centeredness—perform the 
confl icting functions of amusing and reassuring Ania while also bewilder-
ing her. The adult world, which she observes with her stunning blue eyes 
and interacts with through her piercing cries suddenly waking up from her 
sleep, turns her into an object of contention and revenge. By associating 
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her with the unnatural world of animal and human fairytale characters—
when she dances with them on the theater stage—and the stuffed bears 
emitting strange sounds at the touch of their belly, Kieślowski implies 
that, diegetically, Ania is like a puppet, which is taught to call someone 
“mother” and to love and kiss upon command, or a toy, in fact a beautiful 
doll, and a piece of property that can be shared and eventually inherited, as 
Ewa proposes to Majka, or else abandoned. Paradoxically, Kieślowski him-
self, like his adult characters, victimizes Ania by reducing her to an object 
(initially fragmented), to being the material of his and our gaze, and worse: 
After all, no matter how dramatic and heartbreaking her fi rst appearance 
is on screen, Ania is a plot device that makes it possible for the fi lmmaker 
to unfold Majka’s story. Perhaps Kieślowski’s admitted perplexity at his 
own  storytelling in this episode originates in his misuse of this little girl. 
However, Ania’s seeming lack of character development in the fi lm, her 
being only a contended child, is framed between two disquieting shots, 
namely her sightless, inaccessible eyes in the beginning and her inquisitive 
gaze at the end, the latter recalling and seemingly reversing the former. 
Kieślowski’s narrative strategy—extremely compelling, I maintain, rather 
than objectionable—prevents viewers from dismissing her character, and 
stirs them to “experience something,” whether emotional or intellectual.10 
In fact, his representation ascribes the child-character a particular form 
of agency and viewpoint, while also engaging the viewer to articulate a 
response to it.
The depersonalization that marks Ania consistently throughout the fi lm 
until the end, her being divested of her own will, may show her objectifi ca-
tion and exploitation by the grownups around her and the camera alike. 
But, more important, it reveals how profoundly Ania affects the world she 
lives in. Ania is like a mirror in whose refl ection Majka—but also Ewa 
and Wojtek—comes to terms with her past and confronts her future. In 
Kieślowski’s skillful hands, she may indeed be a ploy, but she is also a per-
spective linking the gaze—the act of seeing, learning, and understanding, 
but also of doubling and mystifying—to the processes of identity forma-
tion and recognition both within and outside the text. I would argue that 
it is Ania’s particular role in Seven that makes the presence of the witness 
(the mysterious character, played by Artur Barciś, who appears through-
out The Decalogue) unnecessary, except for one moment, at the fi lm’s end, 
when Ania begins her own transition from childhood into youth, and 
Kieślowski ceases to narrate and opens the text up by drawing the viewer 
into it.11 Moreover, it is the human inability to decipher what lies beyond 
a perceived reality or reasonable experience, in addition to the indefi nite-
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ness and innocence of childhood to adult eyes, that Kieślowski intends to 
express with Ania. In the episode’s screenplay, Kieślowski and Piesiewicz 
explain that Ania’s screams in her sleep originate “less from pain than from 
fright,” and are “full of a terror which adults no longer experience.”12 Their 
words fail to provide an actual justifi cation for Ania’s fright. Likewise none 
of the adults around her understand what causes her crying, and thus proj-
ect upon her their own rationalizations or personal alibi: She is afraid of 
the wolves in her dreams as Ewa believes, or she fears for her future as 
Wojtek suggests. It is the adults’ blindness toward what lies beyond the 
surface of their known reality and belief system, their existential inepti-
tude, caused by reason and passions alike, that Kieślowski brings into focus 
with Ania—in the screenplay too—thus pressing the viewer to confront 
it. Rather than show the characters’ regression to the irrationality of child-
hood in order to demonstrate the irresponsibility of their actions13—an 
interpretation of the episode that builds on the notion of human existence 
as a taxonomy of behaviors substituting childishness for childlikeness, and 
a value system stifl ing human agency—Seven articulates the idea not only 
of a persistence of childhood in the experiences of adults, but also of adults’ 
need for childhood’s continuance in order to maintain or reclaim their 
freedom, although there is no guarantee that they will be successful in 
their pursuit of self-determination.
Kieślowski’s move is deliberate and essential to our understanding of 
Seven and the entire Decalogue. Ania plays a dual role in the fi lm. On the 
one hand, she is a character in the story, the object of Majka’s and Ewa’s 
love, and the motivating factor for their actions; only in the fi lm’s conclu-
sion will she become a person in her own right, initiated to the diffi cult and 
painful experience of love. On the other hand, rather than a ploy, she pro-
vides an estranging perspective that demands attention and understanding. 
Kieślowski further underscores the importance of this perspective when he 
fi lms low-angle shots, causing the viewer to assume an upward viewing po-
sition. However, in order to preserve the cognitive and affective mystery 
Ania embodies as a child and her dual function in the text, Kieślowski’s 
camera does not always identify with her eyes. In some instances, the di-
rector prevents a simplistic or unrealistic identifi cation with the character 
out of empathy, and calls instead for the assumption of a childlike perspec-
tive, the sharing of a different cognitive standpoint. In so doing, he also 
preserves the viewer’s ability to independently observe, empathize with, 
or object to the way all characters, Ania included, are treated, ignored, or 
responded to.
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Kieślowski’s use of this particular camera position is most noticeable in 
the scenes fi lmed in Wojtek’s house, when Kieślowski raises the question 
of the interpersonal connection necessary for a family to exist beyond bio-
logical bonds, gender roles and societal conventions, blinding passions, or 
apparent reasonableness. This secluded, cozy house, immersed in nature 
and away from the alienating architecture of an overcrowded city, is the 
place where Majka takes Ania to negotiate the terms of her freedom with 
both Wojtek and Ewa, but it is also the space where the biological family 
reunites and where an opportunity for reconciliation, love, and acceptance 
could arise. The low-angle medium or close-up shots showing Majka’s 
conversations with Wojtek and their interaction with Ania describe the 
experience of reciprocal love in the intimacy of family as an unconfessed 
wish or an unfulfi lled possibility. In the end, Wojtek chooses the shelter-
ing, risk-free prison of his received identity, that of being a seducer (“a 
really terrible, powerful sorcerer—and wicked, too” in the metaphorical, 
all-too-adult language of fairytales14), over the painful freedom that love 
would give him if he admitted to Ania that he is her father, thus dispelling 
the cloud of lies that surround her and exasperate Majka. He is a lonely 
scriptwriter and a toymaker, a producer of fake but compensatory reali-
ties, fearful of things to come, his parenthood ironically signifi ed in the 
retrieval not of his child, but of her teddy bear at the riverbank.
Thus Kieślowski has set the stage for the concluding act of this drama, 
when the three female characters are reunited, for the second and last time 
in the fi lm, in the same frame. The tension characterizing this fi nal en-
counter is intensifi ed by the silence of the scene; the only words uttered are 
Ewa’s, calling Majka and perhaps, in a whisper, naming her “daughter.”15 
The hopelessly dividing and distancing confrontation, which their gestures 
and words as well as Ania’s screams reveal in the fi lm’s beginning, turns 
at last into a silent gaze—a moving toward—that draws them together, 
for they fi nally experience love. Each woman, including Ania, not only 
recognizes herself in the other but also sees the other as an intrinsic part 
of her self—the female lineage warrants this mirror game of sameness and 
difference, no longer mere proximity—at the very moment when they 
all either release or lose one another, and ultimately bequeath each other 
freedom. In the concluding sequence, the camera cuts from Ewa calling 
Majka to Majka looking out of the train window to Ania silently staring at 
the moving train. For the fi rst time, Ewa sees Majka as her daughter and 
mournfully, perhaps remorsefully, looks at her two daughters, one leaving 
while the other is standing in front of her, both severed from her. From 
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within the train, Majka looks back at whom she has left, her daughter and 
her mother both longing for her. Last, Ania stands alone between her two 
mothers. She is still the cause and source, but also the medium of Majka’s 
and Ewa’s actions and passions, hatred fi nally turned into sorrowful love; 
she is neither a scream nor a toy nor an object of contention, but a person 
who learns about love through the experience of loss. Standing alone on 
a station platform, she still reminds us of the teddy bear left on the river-
bank; in fact, she is not abandoned, since Ewa and Stefan are with her. A 
close-up of her face, on which the fi lm ends, shows her eyes as no longer 
lifeless and sightless, but as inquiring.
Two main, interconnected sets of questions arise from viewing the fi lm 
and looking into Ania’s eyes. One concerns Kieślowski’s exploration of the 
world of interpersonal and familial relations, focusing primarily but not ex-
clusively on motherhood presented through the lens of a mother-daughter 
relationship. The director engages the spectator in refl ecting on what a 
mother does to care for her child, and indirectly suggests these questions: 
Can a mother’s love for her child be selfi sh? When does this love become 
a form of narcissistic possession of the child, necessary for a woman’s self-
fulfi llment and identifi cation? Can such love ultimately be destructive of 
the biological and psychological bonds between mother and child? In her 
study of Seven, Italian psychoanalyst Gabriella Ripa di Meana addresses 
these questions and persuasively argues that Ania is to Majka the gateway 
allowing her to detach herself from her home and family, and thus to be a 
free self. According to Ripa di Meana, Majka acts upon hate for Ewa rather 
than love for Ania. In the episode’s conclusion, however, the motivation 
behind Majka’s behavior changes: Majka senses—we remain within the 
realm of emotions—that owning Ania sanctions her dependence, not her 
freedom. In other words, by keeping Ania, Majka would be like Ewa, for 
her apparent independence would come at the expense of another woman, 
Ania herself. The cycle of selfi sh love and hatred would never be broken, 
and the legacy of one generation of women to the other would only be that 
of fi erce, mutual exclusion and enduring, unspoken pain. Thus, Ripa di 
Meana concludes, by leaving Ania, Majka both sacrifi ces and exalts herself 
as a woman and a mother.16
Like the characters in Seven, the viewer is entrapped in the same all-or-
nothing logic of love as possession and also wonders: To whom does Ania 
belong? Who is the thief in this story? Who gets deprived of what? Who 
gets robbed of her or his life and love?17 And last, are biological bonds 
stronger and more important than those formalized in social conventions 
and norms? The viewer may provide an answer almost effortlessly, only by 
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listening to Majka’s words asserting her biological right over Ania when 
she tells a skeptical Wojtek, “Can you steal what is yours?” (meanwhile the 
camera shoots a tender yet intrusive close-up of Ania asleep) or when she 
confronts a distraught, yet cold and aggressive Ewa on the phone: “Listen, 
you’ve stolen my child. It was meant to be different. You’ve stolen my child. 
And the fact that I am a mother, love . . . You’ve both stolen yourselves from 
me . . . everything” (emphasis added).18 Kieślowski encourages his viewer to 
participate in the story, to analyze it and to empathize with one character 
or the other; primarily with Majka, but also with Ewa, and possibly with 
both fathers since, whether in the past or in the present, all characters 
experience the loss of a child (or childhood itself ), and along with it, the 
loss of a part of their selves. Whether the viewer also condones their ac-
tions is irrelevant to the director, who is solely interested in portraying the 
causes and implications of the act of stealing— of taking away, depriving, 
or subtracting—namely pain, and the denial of the humaneness of the per-
petrator and the humanity of the victim alike. The roles of the victimizer 
and the victim appear to be interchangeable when passions and feelings are 
involved, as they always are, and it becomes unclear, then, who is who (a 
question Kieślowski will confront in Eight).
Kieślowski’s cinema poses questions but does not provide answers; it 
shows tensions, not solutions. In this story, a conclusion, not a resolution, 
may perhaps be drawn in compliance with the director’s idea of cinema, 
according to which the experiences of suffering, searching, and love con-
verge in the construction of the gaze.19 Ewa’s and Majka’s blinding ob-
session triggers questionable actions and words, defi es the very notion of 
motherhood in relation to them both, denies Ania’s personhood, which is 
the source and evidence of it, and ultimately causes further unspeakable 
grief. Yet, their thefts also increase the value of what each of them has actu-
ally lost but eventually retrieves, when they look and fi nally see each other 
again: In the action of painfully longing and mourning, they recover the 
ability to love and the possibility of being loved by another. But what about 
the viewer, left, in the end, mirroring a child’s bewildered and inquiring 
gaze (Figure 9–2).
The last frontal-view frame of the fi lm is particularly effective because 
it brings back the memory of Ania’s unsettling crying and broken imag-
ing of the beginning, while also recalling another story of love and sor-
row, Paweł’s in One. In the fi lm’s opening, the camera and Paweł’s aunt 
look at a ghost, namely Paweł’s virtual image, enclosed in a TV screen 
behind a shop window. This shot accentuates a distance and engages the 
viewer emotionally by emphasizing the distress, the inability to make sense 
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Figure 9–2. Ania at Jozefow train station in Decalogue 
Seven.
of what has or will happen, and the sense of limitation and defi nitiveness 
caused, as the viewer fi nds out, by death. The fl ux of life has come to a 
stop, as suggested by the freeze-frame shots of Paweł, which begin and 
conclude the episode, the frozen waters and the winter setting. By contrast, 
by silently staring into the camera in the very fi rst frames, the witness sit-
ting near a pond challenges the viewer intellectually, prompting questions 
about his identity, the role that he will play in the story, and the reason for 
his looking at us.
Seven tells no less sad a story, but a story of fl uid experience, of running 
trains and fl owing waters rather than freezing memories of a death—in 
this respect, Ania’s close-ups are in stark contrast to the TV broadcasts of 
Paweł’s face, shouting with joy, that frame his tale. In Seven, Kieślowski still 
distinguishes between an emotional and an intellectual way of experienc-
ing life as cinema represents it, but he does so through one character alone, 
little Ania, to demonstrate that these modes are not mutually exclusive, al-
though a progression from one to the other is implied. Ania’s unexplained 
screams and sight appeal to the viewer’s emotions in the beginning while 
her inquiring gaze—like that of the witness in One—instigates a particular 
intellectual dialogue at the end.
In the concluding shots of Seven, the camera, positioned to face Ania, 
functions as a porous interface between the world the fi lm gives life to and 
the world the viewer experiences. It explores a distance and a proximity by 
constructing the gaze as an empirical space shared by the character and her 
viewer. Therein, the exchange and interchange between the virtual and the 
real become possible. We are summoned to respond to Ania’s inquisitive 
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silence and participate in her sorrow and confusion. No answer is given; 
eyes look into other eyes, formulating questions to respond to other ques-
tions, which all remain unspoken. Cinema stages the failure of words and 
exploits it to produce meaning. Before the stories of Véronique, Julie and 
Valentine, among the director’s mounting suspicions about the intrusive 
and trivializing ability of fi ction cinema to turn affects into a spectacle and 
the virtual into the real,20 Seven is a compelling and original example of 
Kieślowski’s radical vision of the complexity of life-experience as cinema 
appropriates and refl ects upon it. The fi lm shows that by means of love one 
overcomes fright, breaches loneliness, and opens oneself up to a dialogue 
with others, which may well be broken, diffi cult, or even inconclusive, and 
yet is and does not end. Like Majka, Ania, and Ewa at the end of the epi-
sode, we cannot be indifferent. Whether we are left or leaving on one of 
the many tracks or trains of existence, we live on our own lasting and un-
fulfi lled desires, whose objects must elude us.
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DVD, directed by Krzysztof Kieślowski [Cinisello Balsamo: Multimedia San 
Paolo, n.d.]). In the original Polish released in the United States, Ewa’s words 
remain indistinct, almost inaudible.
 16. Gabriella Ripa di Meana, La morale dell’altro. Scritti sull’inconscio dal 
Decalogo di Kieslowski (Florence: Liberal Libri, 1998), 165–188.
 17. With gentle irony (and a slight gender bias), Kieślowski even con-
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Indeed reading may lead one to blur the boundaries between reality and the 
imagination, between what one perceives and what one believes, and to act 
accordingly. As we shall see, the fi lm’s conclusion will add an interesting ap-
pendix to what this character calls to mind, namely the association of reading 
and seeing, the idea of representing in words or images, and the responsibil-
ity that the interpretation of any texts, verbal or visual, entails.
 18. Chapters 4 and 5, The Decalogue: Decalogue Seven, DVD.
 19. Kieślowski once stated, “If I had to formulate the message of my 
‘Decalogue,’ I’d say, ‘Live carefully, with your eyes open, and try not to cause 
pain.’ ” Insdorf, Double Lives, Second Chances, 124.
 20. Amiel, Kieślowski, 72.
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c h a p t e r  1 0
Decalogue Eight: Childhood, 
Emotion, and the Shoah
Emma Wilson
The eighth part of Krzysztof Kieślowski’s Decalogue begins with a brief 
fl ashback sequence where a child is led down a passageway. The scene, a 
liminal image of a missing child, is missing from the screenplay and not 
part of the initial conception of the fi lm.
I want to begin by looking at these images more closely.1 The shots 
fi rst encountered in the fi lm privilege movement and touch as a handheld 
camera passes along a passageway to the echoing sound of footsteps. The 
camera appears to share the viewpoint, and embodied angle of vision, of a 
small child. This illusion is undone, however, as two hands, a child’s and 
an adult’s, move into the frame. The camera follows in fact just behind the 
fi gures it tracks, as it keeps their clasped hands its object of attention (Fig-
ure 10–1). Color has bled out of the images; the skin of the child’s hand is 
pallid against the gray of her gabardine sleeve. Colorless walls passed are 
scratched and pitted. The ground is scored with chalk. The visual quality 
of the images, and the somber setting, conjure the dust and decay of old 
photographs or fi lm footage. The fi lm creates a sense of fragility and inter-
mittence, a sense of the shots as mirage, as they dissolve from time to time 
into the black screen that highlights the titles of the fi lm. As the shots re-
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Figure 10–1. Holding hands in Decalogue Eight.
Figure 10–2. The fl eeting image of a child in 
Decalogue Eight.
turn, we see two fi gures silhouetted. The small child is a dark shape against 
a blue-gray ground. Before the close of the sequence, there is a glimpse of 
her spectral face, in a backward glance. The fl eeting image of the face is 
seen against darkness. Light highlights her cheeks, her nose, and her upper 
lip, but her eyes appear only as shadowed sockets, and her open mouth is 
shown as darkness. Her face, looking back, appears as an apparition or a 
ghostly death mask in the alley (Figure 10–2).
The visual composition of the shot invites comparison with certain im-
ages from Christian Boltanski’s later installation, Jewish School of Grosse 
Hamburgerstrasse in Berlin in 1938 (Marian Goodman Gallery, New York, 
1994). Using a found image of schoolgirls, a photo of Jewish children 
in Berlin in 1938, Boltanski enlarged the shots of the girls’ laughing or 
mouthing faces, reproducing them individually on separate screens. The 
enlarged images have the same spectral presence and imprecision found in 
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the Kieślowski frames. The blurring of the images, their reduction to an 
imprint of light and shadow, heightens their immediacy and visceral appeal 
to the spectator. As Didier Semin writes: “Boltanski places great impor-
tance on the patina of his works. The photographs he uses are by now ‘nth’ 
generation prints, reprints of reprints or photocopies of photocopies; the 
loss of focus and cleanness that results from mechanical reproduction adds 
mystery and aura rather than taking them away.”2 From the particularity of 
the anecdotal school photograph, a quotidian item, Boltanski has retrieved 
and made visible emotive and anonymous images that look toward a future 
horror of child mortality. The images retain the original index of presence, 
showing real children, at a real Jewish school before the war, but, through 
photographic process and changes to scale and context, they project an 
intimate foreboding of the future that awaits these children. Although it is 
part of a feature fi lm, and not found footage, in my invocation of Boltanski 
I want to suggest that the image of the child in Decalogue Eight looks for-
ward to the aesthetic found in Boltanski’s installations and anticipates their 
memory work and refl ections on the future perfect and the commemora-
tion of the dead.
Kieślowski has several times allowed the opening of his fi lms to be ab-
sorbed with animate images of mourned children. In Three Colors: Blue 
(1993), images of Julie’s ( Juliette Binoche) daughter Anna, who dies in a 
car accident, are glimpsed in the fi lm’s opening shots.3 The links between 
Eight and One are stronger still. In the opening of One, we see retrospec-
tive shots of the dead Paweł (Wojciech Klata), a child who drowns in the 
course of the fi lm. He is glimpsed in footage playing in a shop window. As 
in Eight, and in the Boltanski installation, his face is shadowed and blurred. 
The footage is stilled at its close, so we see Paweł, like the child in Eight, 
as a spectral image. These points of comparison raise a question about the 
status of the images viewed at the start of Eight: Has the little girl we see 
here survived?
Eight is preoccupied, in various ways, with the question of the survival 
of the child. While the survival of children is a concern running through 
Kieślowski’s fi lmmaking, in Eight the concern is explored in interrelation 
with questions about the Shoah. This question is bound up with issues 
about whose story is told in this fi lm and how the Shoah is approached. The 
representation of children, in fi lm and photography, will be seen to open 
onto questions about the emotions and about remembered infant selves.
Eight is rare in Kieślowski’s corpus in treating the Shoah and in refl ecting 
on this era in Polish history. Annette Insdorf cites the director:
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He explained that the wartime context of 8 was indeed factual: “By 
chance, one of my friends told me the story of a [ Jewish woman] to 
whom someone had promised help and who fi nally didn’t give it. I 
understood that the subject was close to me, and that it wasn’t bad to 
speak very naturally about Polish-Jewish relations in daily life without 
giving Polish or Jewish identity preponderant roles.”4
Like the other fi lms of The Decalogue, Eight is set in the present in War-
saw and apparently meditates on one of the Ten Commandments, in this 
instance: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exod. 
20:16 RSV). Departing quickly from its opening shots of a child in the 
past, the fi lm unfolds in the leafy surrounds of the housing estate that is 
the setting for the whole series. It follows Zofi a (Maria Kościałkowska), a 
philosophy professor, as she exercises in the morning and prepares for her 
day. There is a sense of calm, order, and levity as the fi lm observes Zofi a’s 
solitary routines. Her serenity is carried into the classroom, a privileged 
space in this fi lm, and arguably for The Decalogue as a whole.
Like the courtroom in Kieślowski’s trilogy, the classroom in Eight, like 
that in One, forms a type of metatextual space in which the narratives of 
the series may be opened up for debate. Zofi a’s classes create a forum for 
the discussion of ethical questions. We witness a class about “ethical hell” 
in which Kieślowski approaches questions about the Shoah. The class is 
visited by Elżbieta Loranz (Teresa Marczewska), a Polish-born American 
who works for an institute that researches the fate of Jewish war survivors.
The fi rst example that is presented in class is effectively the narrative of 
Two. A young woman narrates the story of the wife of a dying man:
It turns out the woman [his wife] is pregnant. The father is another 
man and her husband doesn’t know about it. Furthermore, she has 
never been able to conceive before. The woman loves her developing 
child but she also loves her husband. If he is going to live, she must have 
an abortion. If he will die, she may have the baby. The doctor realizes, 
like it or not, he must decide on the baby’s life.
After the narrative and before discussion, Zofi a adds: “To complicate your 
task, I can tell you that the child lives and probably this is what really 
counts in the story.” This meaning is offered with some trouble or dis-
turbance as Elżbieta interrupts the class, getting up, as if to leave. But we 
see instead that she moves forward, to a place in the lecture theater from 
which she can record the teacher’s words. She causes Zofi a to repeat herself 
and to state again: “It lives and I consider that the most important factor.” 
While, in this repeated interpretation, Zofi a may offer tools for the under-
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standing of Two, a more interesting connection is forged with the narrative 
that unfolds in Eight. The statement that the child lives affords a story that 
Elżbieta will seek permission to relate to the class.
Elżbieta’s story, which she relates dispassionately, is about a six-year-old 
Jewish girl. It is the winter of 1943. She has been temporarily sheltered in 
a Polish family’s cellar. She is found another hiding place, but her future 
guardians lay down the condition that she must have formal documenta-
tion proving she has been baptized. The girl’s protectors seek a couple to 
become the girl’s fi ctional godparents, and thus to claim she has been bap-
tized. Everything is arranged for her, and she is taken to the place where 
her fi ctional godparents live. While Elżbieta has previously interrupted 
Zofi a, at this point in her narrative she herself is interrupted by the arrival 
of an intruder in the classroom. His sudden eruptive presence breaks the 
attention of the class and intimates the disruptive emotion that Elżbieta 
has brought into this space. The containment and calm of the class are 
discomposed. Zofi a regains order through questioning Elżbieta before en-
couraging her to continue. Elżbieta goes on:
Finally, the woman says what he fi nds so diffi cult to say. They must go 
back on their promise. After careful consideration, they cannot bring 
themselves to lie to Him they believe in who orders them to be chari-
table, but forbids false witness. The false witness they were about to 
commit consciously was incompatible with their principles.
As she is speaking, the camera, as if animate, pans sideways down the rows 
in the lecture hall. It has done this before, moving among the students, 
but now it moves in search of the fi gure of the angel (Artur Barciś), the 
silent witness who appears in all but one of the Decalogue fi lms. Here he 
is a student in Zofi a’s class. He looks out at his teacher as Elżbieta reaches 
her words about false witness. Zofi a’s face, which we look on to, is framed 
as the object of his attention. By the end of Elżbieta’s account, the camera 
has slid back along the rows to rest again on her.
Elżbieta’s narrative invites discussion of the commandment at the cen-
ter of the fi lm. One student says: “The motivation seems impossible, if 
they were true Catholics. Such witnessing wouldn’t have been dishonest.” 
Another student suggests a different motivation: “Fear, if an hour earlier 
a Jewish child had been found in the house, its brains bashed out and the 
family which hid it shot in the courtyard.” While the camera is on Zofi a, 
Elżbieta returns: “Do you think fear justifi es it?” The student replies: “A 
motive, not a judgment.” Zofi a curtails discussion, saying: “We are going 
too far.” She continues: “The ethical problems posed will be worked out 
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by all of you individually. Please try to present us with the woman’s point 
of view. Try to understand her.” Eight challenges us to understand this 
woman. And the short fi lm moves further to explore implications of its 
embedded narrative of the Jewish child.
Elżbieta sits alone as the class empties out, and we hear the same music 
that played over the sequence with the child at the start. In telling her 
story in Zofi a’s class, Elżbieta has chosen to confront another woman with 
a truth from their shared past. The editing of the shots in the classroom 
sequence and Zofi a’s bodily reactions have made her connection to the 
story clear. The scene closes with the blurred shapes of students passing 
Elżbieta. The fi lm cuts to similarly indistinct images, now net curtains in 
near darkness. The camera again pans to the left until it fi nds Zofi a in lone 
refl ection. As she later paces the corridors of the university, in shots that 
might only refl ect her inner life, she fi nds Elżbieta waiting for her. “It’s 
you,” Zofi a says. “You are alive. I’ve wondered all my life.” The shadow of 
the corridor here and the light glimpsed at its end offer an aura of unreality 
to the scene and the encounter it stages.
The rest of the fi lm charts the awkward fascination between the two 
women as they confront the apparent fact of Elżbieta’s survival after Zofi a’s 
refusal to act as her godparent. Zofi a tells Elżbieta the truth which is hid-
den behind her lie about false witnessing: Her husband was in the counter-
espionage section of Poland’s Home Army and they received information 
that the people who were due to hide the child were agents of the Gestapo. 
She acted to protect her husband’s resistance work. Her political choice 
brought affective consequences, as Zofi a states: “I didn’t know you were 
alive. I left you alone. I sent you to an almost certain death.” She repeats 
again: “No ideal, nothing, is more important than the life of a child.”
Discussing this episode, Slavoj Ž iž ek writes of the irony of the woman’s 
actions during the Second World War in contrast to her current beliefs; he 
suggests: “One can speculate that she became a professor of ethics, dedicat-
ing her life to philosophy, in order to clarify her mistake, i.e. to account 
for why and how, at a crucial moment, she made the wrong choice.”5 The 
fi lm itself suggests that Zofi a acted with courage at other times. Elżbieta 
remarks: “Your activities, even after me, are well known. Thanks to you, 
several people of my world are still alive.” But the fi lm offers little sense 
that Zofi a’s later actions have offered clarity or recompense. As the state-
ment about the life of a child is repeated several times by Zofi a, so the fi lm 
fi nds different ways to show her conviction endorsed. While the survival 
of a child is made the matter of prime importance through the fi lm, Eight 
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draws on the summoning and survival of the emotions of childhood to do 
justice to its subject.
In Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions, Martha Nussbaum 
argues that we should consider emotions as a deep-rooted part of the sys-
tem of ethical reasoning. She ties one strand of her argument specifi cally 
to questions about childhood, suggesting that the upheavals of thought 
that “constitute the adult experience of emotion involve foundations laid 
down much earlier in life, experiences of attachment, need, delight, and 
anger.”6 For Nussbaum, “early memories shadow later perceptions of ob-
jects, adult attachment relations bear the traces of infantile love and hate” 
(6). She elaborates: “In a deep sense all human emotions are in part about 
the past, and bear the traces of a history that is at once commonly human, 
socially constructed, and idiosyncratic” (177). She argues particularly that 
emotions reveal us as vulnerable, and vulnerable to events and encounters 
that we do not control. Her thinking works to treat childhood emotion and 
attachment with due seriousness, and to refuse their detachment from the 
realm of the composed adult. In moments of vulnerability, the adult may 
be exposed to the discomfi ting rush of emotion, bringing or responding to 
a loss of control over feelings and events. What is important for Nussbaum, 
the extremity of emotion does not remove it from the realm of thought. 
Rather, “the peculiar depth and the potentially terrifying character of the 
human emotions derives from the especially complicated thoughts that 
humans are likely to form about their own need for objects, and about their 
imperfect control over them” (16).
It is through its examination of childhood and the emotions that Eight 
draws out its possible meanings. Kieślowski uses two particular fi lmic 
tropes to conjure emotion and make it part of the system of thought of 
the fi lm: movement and touch, both privileged already in the sequence at 
the start of the fi lm. It is through returning to the features of these liminal 
images that Kieślowski draws childhood emotions forward into the pres-
ent. This happens signifi cantly in a scene that follows the initial encounter 
between Elżbieta and Zofi a.
Having invited Elżbieta home for supper, Zofi a drives her instead to 
the location where they met previously. Zofi a invites this traversal of the 
past, yet quickly loses control of the returning scene. Elżbieta leaves the 
car and, echoing her childhood footsteps, walks through an external arch 
into a complex of tenements. The fi lm shows her departing, watched from 
Zofi a’s perspective. As Elżbieta moves on through the recognizable con-
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fi nes of the alley, her emotions are not revealed. No attempt is made to tie 
the child experience we see at the start of the fi lm to the adult perceptions 
we watch here. This act of association is withheld until Elżbieta herself 
withdraws, hiding near the entrance to the complex. Leaving the car to 
locate her missing guest, Zofi a in turn now enters the building, witnessed 
by Elżbieta from the shadows. Zofi a’s stature is slighter than Elżbieta’s and 
her movement through this dark space more timorous. It is Zofi a, rather 
than Elżbieta, who retraces the footsteps and summons the emotions of the 
missing child. She goes further than Elżbieta, entering the tenements as 
she searches for the missing adult. She goes inside, and asks for her friend, 
but is met with hostility and mocked as a madwoman. A man she encoun-
ters tells her that there is no other exit, and that maybe her friend never 
entered the building. Zofi a cries out Elżbieta’s name and fi nds her voice 
echoed by the returning taunts of a neighbor. Zofi a’s bearings are lost, and 
her gravitas is diminished. She exits the space to fi nd Elżbieta outside, sit-
ting in her car. Zofi a says: “I was afraid you were lost. You weren’t there.” 
Perhaps she speaks here both to the woman she has found and to the child 
she abandoned previously. Her loss of control over her environs, revealed 
through her violent emotion at the loss of Elżbieta, endorses the avowal 
that there is no cause or ideal more important than the life of a child. As 
Zofi a is reminded of the speechless anguish of the child she had abandoned 
in this locale, as she traces the child’s path and momentarily shares her lack 
of control over her life, the fi lm attaches emotional understanding, the 
shock of sensation, to ethical statements. Emotion is brought out through 
motion. As the fi lm echoes its own opening, childhood sensations of loss 
and fear are brought from the past to govern the recognition and repara-
tions the narrative will entertain.
Annette Insdorf argues that “Elżbieta’s vengeful hide-and-seek game 
has forced Zofi a once again into the role of fearful protector” (112). This 
reading overlooks the different effect of Zofi a’s infantilization. As the fi lm 
continues, however, we do see Zofi a seeking to play some protective role 
to Elżbieta. Before exploring this, its links to touch and the pursuit of the 
fi lm’s engagement with the emotions and ethics, I want to raise here a fur-
ther question about the memories of the Shoah the fi lm conjures.
The sequence at the start, which appears the only literal fi guration of 
the endangered Jewish child, and her fearful emotions, is never specifi -
cally placed or anchored. As Mroz writes of the opening shots: “There is 
not much to indicate that this scene is a fl ashback, it is just something that 
does not yet fi t into the narrative” (175). Although it bears a relation to 
Elżbieta’s narrative—we see a child led along by her guardian—we do not 
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learn whether the scene fi gures the approach to Zofi a’s house or the depar-
ture of the child and her guardian after the baptism has failed to take place. 
Elżbieta speaks of the place later as the witness, in bricks and mortar, to her 
humiliation. The returning music, after Elżbieta’s narration, may link the 
early shots to a memory now in her mind. But there is no further evidence 
to confi rm this. Her seeming lack of emotion as she revisits the location 
creates a wedge between what might be remembered and what is relived 
now. Zofi a’s more visceral reaction to the locale hints instead that these 
early shots may be her imagining of the scene, of the child’s arrival at her 
home or forlorn departure. Perhaps the shots are (as Gilles Deleuze has 
put it) a “memory for two” that the two women construct between them 
in their remembering.7 Or perhaps they are anchored in the subjective 
perception of neither protagonist, but merely hover like a screen memory 
for the fi lm, implying, but yet concealing, the full horror of the event that 
has taken place.
Indeed the fi lm is rife with concealment or doubt. Initially the open-
ing shots appear to have no connection to the equanimity of the morning 
shots in the present. Zofi a’s routine does not belie her emotional trouble 
(though a picture falls insistently aslant in her apartment). Her encounter 
with Elżbieta Loranz at the university is seemingly tranquil. It is only in 
the classroom, in the thick of her ethical statements about the life of a 
child, that connections between the opening and the ensuing narrative are 
felt. While the narrative of the woman deciding whether her unborn child 
will live or die summons the narrative Elżbieta offers, we may also wonder 
whether Elżbieta’s identity as (or confusion with) the child Zofi a failed to 
save is a reparative fantasy fostered forth by the initial story.
The fi lm offers no obvious indications that the drama we view is one of 
wish-fulfi llment rather than one of supposed actuality. But some hesitation 
about this may add to a sense of the complexity, and ethical interest, of 
the story that unfolds. Consider the scene where Zofi a enters the housing 
block where she has lived formerly. None of the other residents sees or 
hears Elżbieta. This may be entirely inconsequential. But the inexplicable 
absence of Elżbieta takes hold of the fi lm for a few moments, compounded 
by comments that she may never have been there. At a loss, Zofi a may imi-
tate or recall the emotions of the missing child. Yet she also faces further 
the possibility that the child’s survival, and adult presence, is only a repara-
tive fantasy. In the delusion of her moves through this enclosed space in 
search of Elżbieta, she may face the truth of her fears. Even though we 
have seen her hiding, the achievement of the scene is to make us wonder, 
for a few minutes, if Elżbieta was really there.
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Zofi a fi nds her again in her car and quickly takes her home to her apart-
ment. Still, the scene seems marked by the wish to revisit a past event 
and play it differently, even with the mature adult the missing child has 
become. Zofi a serves Elżbieta hot tea in an ornate cup. In the earlier nar-
rative, Elżbieta has mentioned that the child was chilled and that hot tea 
was served, but she had no time to drink it. The encounter between the 
two women in Zofi a’s apartment has the aura of a wish-fulfi lling moment, 
a lapse in time when Zofi a can show tenderness to Elżbieta. As they talk of 
the past, Zofi a goes to stand behind Elżbieta. Elżbieta’s image is blurred 
in the foreground; Zofi a, standing behind her, cannot look into her face. 
What she does instead is put her hands on Elżbieta’s shoulders, touching 
her, holding her, and feeling her presence. Elżbieta’s head is bowed and 
her eyes are closed, as they will be later when she prays. This moment 
of contact—conjuring the trope of touch mentioned above—comes as 
Zofi a confesses that she sent the child to almost certain death. Elżbieta’s 
mouth quivers as Zofi a states again the importance of the life of a child. 
She reaches up to touch Zofi a’s hand. A train or siren is heard in the back-
ground, an occurrence that will become signifi cant later.
In following scenes, in an uneasy composition where both actresses are 
shot within the same frame, Elżbieta questions Zofi a about her teaching, 
about her works, and about how to lead a life. What is strange in the whole 
exchange, indeed in the fi lm more broadly, is that Elżbieta’s emotions or 
thoughts are barely addressed. Her gesture, touching her, has brought 
comfort to Zofi a. Zofi a may have been conjured by Elżbieta as her accuser 
and confessor in the classroom, but in the privacy of the apartment, in this 
reparative fantasy of containment and tenderness, Elżbieta brings compo-
sure and absolution, facilitating the smooth continuation of Zofi a’s orderly 
life. Elżbieta offers no account of her own past, of the loss of her parents, or 
of the status of her present work. She begins to seem like a surviving adult 
whom Zofi a’s imagination has fostered forth for comfort.
Here, thinking about the primacy of touch in the fi lm, in the shots at 
the start and in the contact between Zofi a and Elżbieta, it may be useful to 
refer to Emmanuel Levinas on the caress. While Levinas apparently refers 
to the caress in an amorous context, he concedes: “The loving intention 
goes unto the Other, unto the friend, the child, the brother, the beloved, 
the parents.”8 One of his insights into love comes in the recognition: “To 
love is to fear for another, to come to the assistance of his frailty” (256). 
Extreme fragility and vulnerability are part of the tenderness of this en-
counter and part of its hesitance and diffi culty. For Levinas:
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The caress consists in seizing upon nothing, in soliciting what cease-
lessly escapes its form toward a future never future enough, in solicit-
ing what slips away as though it were not yet. It searches, it forages. It is 
not an intentionality of disclosure but of search: a movement unto the 
invisible. In a certain sense it expresses love, but suffers from an inability 
to tell it. (257–258)
The caress is not about capture, contact, or revelation. It is a feeling search 
in invisibility or darkness. In the touch between Zofi a and Elżbieta, atten-
dant doubts about Elżbieta’s presence or absence allow the fi lm to intimate 
something of the impossible encounter with the other.
Zofi a invites Elżbieta to stay in her apartment. Where the fi lm has been 
interrupted previously by acts of intrusion, here it is marked by her hos-
pitality. Elżbieta asks her if the room was her son’s, and Zofi a replies that 
her son did not want to stay with her. Through this synoptic account of 
her affective relations, the fi lm seems to hint at a possible failure in love, 
or failure in maternity, on Zofi a’s part. Her refusal to shelter the child, to 
play the role of her godparent, is aligned with a possible failure to act as 
actual parent.
Eight approaches questions about the Shoah through a narrative of a miss-
ing child. The opening shots—the child’s small hand, the glimpse of her 
spectral face—are the visual tokens the fi lm uses to signal threat and hor-
ror. That this sentient child should be endangered, and that an adult can, 
through error or lapse of judgment, fail to protect her from almost certain 
death, displays in magnifi ed form the senseless horror and ethical hell of 
the Shoah. This is its point of contact with the later work by Boltanski. 
The narrative of Zofi a and Elżbieta that Kieślowski develops in Eight is 
one that pertains to the specifi city of the Shoah and its atrocities (more 
so, I think, than he himself acknowledges in the lines quoted above). It 
is also aligned in his work with other narratives about the protection, or 
endangering, of children. As Insdorf notes: “The credit sequence of 8 . . . 
is continuous with 7: as they are walking, an adult takes a child’s hand in 
close-up” (107). Seven, a narrative about contested maternity, segues into 
Eight about a woman who fails to save a Jewish child. Meanings seep from 
sequence to sequence.
Boltanski likewise appears in his artistic practice, and in his statements 
about his art and himself, to endorse connections between regular life ex-
periences and losses, and those unnatural tragedies of genocide. His art 
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encompasses images of children who died in the Shoah, images of children 
in Dijon who “seem to have died from unnatural (if unspecifi able) causes” 
(Semin 99), and images of himself and other children. Marianne Hirsch, 
suggesting that images with no indexical relation to the Shoah may yet 
carry its meanings, says of The Children of Dijon:
Although the actual children depicted may well still be alive, their 
images form altarpieces, reminiscent of Byzantine icons, commemorat-
ing the dead. Through iconic and symbolic but not directly indexical 
implication, Boltanski connects these images of children to the mass 
murders of the Holocaust: the pictures themselves evoke and represent 
the actual victims, but neither we nor the artist has a way of knowing 
whether the individuals in the photos are Holocaust victims or enlarged 
faces of random schoolchildren.9
Boltanski also suggests no strict demarcation between images of the dead 
and images of now missing past selves; he has said, “I began to work as an 
artist when I began to be an adult, when I understood that my childhood 
was fi nished, and was dead. I think we all have somebody who is dead in-
side of us. A dead child. I remember the Little Christian that is dead inside 
me.”10 It seems disturbing to align past selves with literally dead others, 
children who have died before they have reached adulthood and indeed 
children who have died through genocide. Yet it is peculiarly the case that 
photographs— objects with which Boltanski works extensively in his in-
stallations—necessarily make no category distinction between a past self 
and missing others. As Jacek (Mirosław Baka), preoccupied by a photo-
graph of his dead sister, asks in Five: “Can you tell from a photograph 
whether a person’s dead or alive?” Retrospective knowledge that a child 
imaged has died in infancy, childhood, or adolescence invests any image 
of him or her with the emotions attached to the future anterior (in Roland 
Barthes’s terms), the horrifi ed knowledge that he or she is now dead, that 
the death was impending even as he or she was imaged alive. But this patina 
of emotion is laid over an image that might otherwise exist as any family 
relic. This lack of distinction raises questions of whether emotions that 
usually attach to family photography and to images of children have bear-
ing in the exorbitant context of the Shoah.
Hirsch argues that “the Holocaust photograph is uniquely able to bring 
out this particular capacity of photographs to hover between life and death, 
to capture only that which no longer exists, to suggest both the desire 
and the necessity and, at the same time, the diffi culty, the impossibility, of 
mourning” (20). She explains: “Holocaust photographs, as much as their 
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subjects, are themselves stubborn survivors of the intended destruction 
of an entire culture, its people as well as all their records, documents, and 
cultural artifacts” (23). She includes in her discussion “pictures which are 
connected for us to total death and to public mourning—pictures of hor-
ror and also ordinary snapshots and portraits, family pictures connected 
to the Holocaust by their context and not by their content” (20). Starting 
from a different place from Boltanski, and retaining an indexical link to the 
Shoah, she nevertheless correlates pictures of horror and family snapshots, 
implying contact between the affect of each. In writing about Boltanski, 
Hirsch refers in passing to “the transcendently painful fi gure of the dead 
child” (263), yet she does not otherwise separate images of children from 
other photographs.
In his memorial volume, French Children of the Holocaust, Serge Klarsfeld 
writes:
The eyes of 2,500 children gaze at us from across the years in these 
pages. They are among the more than 11,400 children whose lives are 
chronicled here[:] innocent children who were taken from their homes 
all over France to be deported and put to death in the Nazi camps. . . . 
More than 50 years have passed since the murders of these beautiful 
children . . . perhaps it is time to share this with others so they may 
know how these terrible events happened and come to know some of the 
young victims, arrested in the streets you will fi nd if you visit France.11
Klarsfeld states that the work was born out of his obsession that these chil-
dren should not be forgotten. He describes the book as their collective 
gravestone. The volume holds images that offer a sign, an index, of the an-
terior presence of these several thousand children. While their images—
family snapshots, studio portraits, occasional identifi cation photos and 
even images from gravestones—are not distorted visually, like Boltanski’s, 
they are likewise overlaid with knowledge that their subjects have been 
murdered. So many of the images are tender, intimate, and disarming. A 
bid to resurrect the past lives here—“to come to know some of the young 
victims,” in Klarsfeld’s words—requires some desperate attempt to link 
the domestic or studio setting to a future situation of genocide, to separa-
tions, to physical suffering, and to almost certain death. Emotion here is 
bound with knowledge, as memories of our own attachments and losses, 
infi nitely minor in this context, are hesitantly present in attempts to look 
at these children.
The images in Klarsfeld’s volume surely also resist such an appropriative 
gaze. Hesitation derives from the privacy of the images—these are images 
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for the family—yet also from the future vulnerability by which they are 
shadowed. We may long to protect these children, but they remain also 
untouchable, remote. With diffi culty, one may imagine the moment in 
the studio or in the drawing room when the picture was taken. I imagine 
a child taking up the pose that has been captured immemorially in the 
image. In such imagining, I attempt to fi nd animate and haptic images of 
the anterior presence of these missing children. But such virtual images, 
powered by the wish to see or know a child alive, are all too fl eeting. Such 
hesitant imagining is what I think Kieślowski tries to capture in the emo-
tive shots at the start of Eight. Emerging out of darkness are shots conjured 
by an imagination attempting to feel and trace a child’s emotion.
Examining the Klarsfeld images may afford a further insight into the 
reparative and imaginative acts of Eight. A fi lm such as Thomas Gilou’s Pa-
roles d’étoiles (2002) shows interviews with adults who survived the Shoah 
and who speak about their childhood. As each adult reveals his or her age 
in 1942, he or she seems strangely aligned with the photographs of chil-
dren murdered. The distance between the children in Klarsfeld’s volume 
and the present seems momentarily covered. We see and hear witnesses 
who conjure images of the adults the dead children might have become. 
Klarsfeld’s volume itself is seen at one point in Paroles d’étoiles, and its pages 
are turned as a woman speaks of her memories of children clinging to their 
mothers. The uncanny presence and youthfulness of the adults in the fi lm, 
found too in the faces of the witnesses who speak in a documentary such 
as Into the Arms of Strangers: Stories of the Kindertransport (2000), makes the 
images of the murdered children and the horror of their missing destinies 
more immediate, more the matter of living memory and revived emotion, 
yet also incommensurable.12
It is this possibility of viewing the adult the child might have become 
that is found in Eight. At stake in the emotions conjured is the wish to see 
the live adult avatar of the abandoned child. When the living adult seems to 
be found, or convincingly imagined, Zofi a will seek some means of assuag-
ing her guilt and grief through reparative acts of tenderness. Delicately 
evoked, the mother/child relation seems to be involved in the reparative 
moments, or fi ctions, of the fi lm. This is particularly apparent in later 
sequences.
We see Zofi a glimpse Elżbieta as she prays in the guest bedroom of the 
apartment and, like a parent checking on a child at night, she gently closes 
the door upon her. The room is closed in darkness, the tones and textures 
of the shot recalling the sequence of images at the start of the fi lm. The 
train or siren heard as the women touched earlier is heard again here. The 
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scene has taken on the shade of memory rather than actuality. As before, 
Kieślowski cuts to external shots of the morning woodland and of Zofi a 
running. Elżbieta is only found again when Zofi a is back in the apartment. 
The guest has made breakfast and brought white peonies. Zofi a holds the 
fl owers carefully, touched by Elżbieta’s gesture. Here, together, they at-
tend to each other. When Zofi a later takes Elżbieta to meet the tailor who 
was due to hide her, she waits outside. Where Elżbieta was missing before, 
Zofi a is now present. The two women talk in the street and their image 
is glimpsed from inside the building, and through a barred window. The 
fi lm ends with a distanced image, through glass, of the renewed tenderness 
between the two women, of Zofi a reaching again to touch, and protect 
Elżbieta.
Eight begins with shots that may be a memory, or an imagined image, of 
a child who may not have survived. While the surface narrative offers af-
fi rmation that this child has survived, there are moments where this seems 
less certain. This doubt, this returning uncertainty, plays a part in the 
meanings of the fi lm. If we remain uncertain of Elżbieta’s status—as sur-
vivor or as specter—we can never fully reach her or grasp her experience. 
She remains at once vulnerable and untouchable, as, in the Levinasian im-
age evoked above, touch itself is infested with failure. Where, in the fi lm’s 
tenderness, Elżbieta is never fi nally fi xed and held, also the fi lm’s survivor 
memories, or the memories of the dead, are left untouched. The fi lm ap-
proaches instead the pathos of another woman’s fascination with a specter 
from her past, a wish-fulfi lling fantasy of the apparition, in her classroom, 
of a grown child she would have wished once to save.
The fi lm offers insight into the emotions that insist in this relation to a 
child from the past, emotions that have their roots in past childhood expe-
riences of loss and separation, of helplessness and lack of control. Speak-
ing of child experience, Martha Nussbaum writes, “So the child is always 
inhabiting a world that is both safe and dangerous, aware of herself as both 
hard and terribly soft, both able and unable to rely on receiving nourish-
ment and security from her caretakers. This intermittence of care, and the 
intermittence of safety that results, is an essential part of becoming able to 
live” (209).
The context of the Shoah offers a horrifi cally magnifi ed vision of dan-
ger, insecurity, and the intermittence of care. In The Decalogue, Kieślowski 
explores connections between this exorbitant vision and other instances of 
love, abandonment, and grief between parents and children. The unspeak-
able emotions conjured have some relation, for protagonists and viewers 
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alike, to childhood attachments. As Nussbaum insists, intimacy, sensa-
tions of love and loss, are, and should be, bound into our ethical decisions. 
Emotions, summoned in Eight through a moving image of a missing child, 
summoned elsewhere in testimonies and visual culture through images of 
children who have died, here rarefy these memorial works.
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c h a p t e r  1 1
Divine Possession: Metaphysical 
Covetousness in Decalogue Nine
Philip Sicker
Recalling his underlying assumptions and method in the Decalogue fi lms, 
Krzysztof Kieślowski casts himself as a psychological and ethical detective: 
“I believe everybody’s life is worthy of scrutiny, has its secrets and dramas. 
People don’t talk about their lives because they’re embarrassed. They don’t 
want to open old wounds, or are afraid of appearing old- fashioned and 
sentimental. So we wanted to begin each fi lm in a way which suggested 
that the main character had been picked by the camera as if at random.”1 
In setting the primary action of all ten fi lms in and around an anonymous-
looking Warsaw housing estate, Kieślowski provides a locus for the hid-
den lives of various characters whose paths briefl y intersect, but whose 
“secrets” are known only to the fi lmmaker and his audience. Devoting 
himself to revealing “what’s going on inside” these characters’ lives, the 
director notes that he used the apartment complex’s “thousands of simi-
lar windows” as an establishing shot in each fi lm, sometimes letting the 
camera slowly pan across these indistinguishable glass barriers (as at the 
start of Seven) before moving into a particular interior and penetrating one 
or more private lives (KK, 146). In framing the Decalogue fi lms this way, 
Kieślowski draws intriguing connections between his cinematic enterprise, 
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which monitors individual lives “caught in a struggle” with circumstance, 
and various forms of surveillance.
Kieślowski’s underlying idea that “the camera should pick somebody 
out from a crowded street and then follow him or her throughout the rest 
of the fi lm” (KK, 146) recalls Edgar Allan Poe’s story of “The Man in the 
Crowd,” which held such fascination for Charles Baudelaire and Walter 
Benjamin. However, the fi lmmaker’s roving camera is not confi ned to scru-
tinizing the outward behavior of individuals in the passing parade, the per-
ceptual praxis of the fl âneur with his hermeneutic gaze from the pavement. 
Kieślowski regards such external urban spectatorship not as the province 
of a specialized observer but as a collective habit, a symptom of commu-
nist Poland’s spiritual malaise in the mid-1980s: “You’re always watched by 
others . . . neighbours, family, loved ones, friends, acquaintances or even by 
strangers in the street” (KK, 149). In an atomized culture where “people are 
terribly afraid of loneliness,” each individual is the object of manifold scru-
tiny, yet these gazes—refractory, furtive, superfi cial—do nothing to al-
leviate the prevailing sense of “egotistic” estrangement and “hopelessness” 
(160). Kieślowski describes a paradoxical epistemology in which those who 
desperately seek knowledge and connection through the gaze retreat from 
the eyes of others, fashioning an “outside” face “appropriate for strangers” 
and hurrying home to “lock the door on the inside and remain alone with 
themselves” (146, 160). In stressing both the omnipresence of observation 
and the oppressiveness of being observed, Kieślowski inevitably alludes 
to the censorious eye of the state, under which he labored in creating The 
Decalogue, and to a monitory agency it controlled: “the newspapers” (149). 
Given Kieślowski’s capacity for self-mockery and ironic self-awareness, 
one might be tempted to suppose that he regards his cinema camera as akin 
to the post-Enlightenment technologies of political surveillance and so-
cial control that Michel Foucault laments in Discipline and Punish. Indeed, 
Kieślowski’s description of his cinematic method—infi ltrating various 
lives sealed behind mortar and glass for presentation on Polish television 
screens—might suggest a more refi ned version of Bentham’s disciplinary 
panopticon, which brought the “captive shadows” of enclosed cells into “full 
lighting” and the “trap” of visibility.2 In his urgent observation of covert 
human conduct, Kieślowski’s confi ning lens seems to trap agonized pro-
tagonists in moments of ontological crisis, but it does so in the absence of 
any regulatory system of judgment or punishment. More important, in 
exploring the private experience of his characters, Kieślowski is ultimately 
less concerned with their traceable actions than with the psychological 
tensions that produce them. Throughout the Decalogue fi lms, he uses close-
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ups to suggest complex processes of thought, confl icted feelings, unful-
fi lled desires for which there is no adequate human register within the 
world of the fi lm. Ultimately, the comprehensive awareness behind these 
rich illuminations of interior life fi nds its appropriate analogue not in the 
gaze of the urban sociologist nor in the watchful perspective of the state, 
but, as Joseph G. Kickasola has suggested, in the omniscient eye of God.3
In his refl ections on the Decalogue project, Kieślowski specifi cally as-
sociates this divine optics with the God of Abraham and Moses, “the God 
of the Old Testament” who “leaves us a lot of freedom and responsibility, 
observes how we use it and then rewards or punishes” (KK, 149). While the 
director maintains that such a supernatural “authority does exist” and that 
His commandments provide an “absolute” ethical “point of reference,” 
the Decalogue fi lms themselves persistently question the harsh judgment 
(and, at times, the existence) of this all-seeing, unforgiving God and probe 
the ambiguity of His moral imperatives (KK, 149, 150). Nowhere is this 
critique more urgent than in Decalogue Nine, a fi lm that self-consciously 
utilizes cinema’s capacity for omniscient surveillance both to examine the 
immorality of the protagonist’s attempt to appropriate this invasive power 
and to question the justice of a God who monitors humankind’s inner life. 
Notwithstanding Kieślowski’s observation that the Decalogue fi lms bear 
no simple or sequential correspondence to specifi c commandments and 
that one could exchange the sixth and ninth commandments,4 the aims 
and methods of the penultimate fi lm in the series reveal a searching re-
sponse to the unique and ambiguous injunction presented in Exodus 20 
and repeated in Deuteronomy 5: “You shalt not covet your neighbor’s 
wife” (Exod. 20:17 RSV). Whereas the previous commandments all regu-
late forms of conduct or action, the ninth (as numbered in Catholic and 
Lutheran Poland) imposes an ethical restriction on thought and motive.5 
While the sixth commandment forbids the commission of adultery, the 
ninth identifi es the mere desire for unlawful possession as a transgression 
in the eyes of an all-perceiving deity who “ruthlessly demands obedience 
to his principles” (KK, 149). Far from constituting a redundancy or an 
admonitory afterthought, the ninth commandment is a stern, purposeful 
reminder that God’s inescapable vision detects even the briefest and most 
clandestine motions of the mind and heart.
If Kieślowski can aptly characterize the Old Testament Jehovah as 
“cruel” (KK, 149), the ninth commandment’s alignment of covetous desire 
with sin establishes the divine eye as an explicit instrument of investiga-
tive terror, punishment and control. At the same time, the commandment 
poses the kind of ambiguity that fascinates the fi lmmaker: Whereas the 
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tenth explicitly warns against coveting others’ material possessions (ox, 
donkey, “or any thing that is thy neighbor’s”), the ninth raises the question 
of what it means to covet another human being and fails to specify whether 
the unlawful desire for acquisition is sexual, legal or domestic. Jealous ava-
rice for another’s goods is sinful because it may logically lead to theft, a 
violation of the seventh commandment, but in the ninth commandment 
the relationship between coveting another’s wife and the sin of adultery 
(sexual intercourse in violation of marriage bonds) remains suffi ciently 
fl uid and uncertain that Kieślowski has Roman (Piotr Machalica) covet not 
his neighbor’s wife but his own. Thus, in exploring the commandment, 
the fi lm’s stress falls upon the psychology of covetous desire for another 
person and the immaterial forms that this urge to possession can take. In-
terrogating the unique demands and implications of this most troubling 
Mosaic injunction, Kieślowski offers in Nine a sustained meditation on the 
entwined concepts of divine omniscience and possessive desire that inhere 
in the ninth commandment. In an inspired act of cinematic compression, 
Kieślowski gives his male protagonist a double function within this ethical 
inquiry: Roman sins against the spirit of the commandment by coveting his 
wife Hanka (Ewa Błaszczyk), not as a sexual object but with a metaphysical 
longing to invade and possess her every thought and feeling, a drive for to-
talizing knowledge of her inner experience that mimics not only the fi lm-
maker’s exposure of secret lives but God’s relentless omniscience. Thus, in 
Kieślowski’s elegant formulation, Roman embodies, at once, man’s puta-
tive sin against God and God’s inquisitory cruelty toward man.
Kieślowski establishes the fi lm’s concern with the hidden details of his 
characters’ lives through an intercutting of intimate moments at the start. 
The opening shot is a brief close-up of Hanka as she sleeps and then sud-
denly wakes in a state of alarm. Already the camera has infi ltrated the bed-
room, the most private of domestic spaces, and it seems poised to enter the 
world of Hanka’s dreams. Cutting abruptly away, Kieślowski shifts from 
the Warsaw apartment to Cracow, where Roman is engaged in a pain-
fully confi dential conversation with his friend, a urologist who impassively 
informs him that he is permanently impotent. Unlike most of the Deca-
logue fi lms, which confi ne themselves to Warsaw and, in some cases, claus-
trophobically, to the area around the apartment complex, the ninth fi lm 
immediately demonstrates the cinema camera’s godlike capacity to move 
freely across space and time in pursuing its disclosures. In his fi rst words to 
his friend, Roman demands “the truth,” foreshadowing both his insistence 
that Hanka and he discuss their private lives “to the limit” and his desire to 
align his visual perspective with that of the penetrating camera. When he 
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returns home, the agonized Roman stands outside the apartment building 
exposing himself to the rain, as if to delay the humiliating disclosure to 
Hanka that truthfulness demands. In the intercutting of shots leading up to 
this conversation, Kieślowski and his cinematographer, Piotr Sobociński, 
repeatedly frame images of husband and wife and of their visual perspec-
tives through blurred, dirty or refractory glass: As Hanka, anxious for Ro-
man’s return, enters their apartment, we see her image distorted through 
a translucent vase, Roman appears through the car windshield as he drives 
back to Warsaw, and as he pulls into the dark parking lot we see the car 
from Hanka’s perspective through the rain-streaked kitchen windowpane. 
Upon arriving, Roman gazes at a lamp blurred by the wet car window and 
is himself glimpsed through the darkened glass entrance to the apartment 
building. A moment later, Hanka’s image appears in this angled door, con-
verting a medium of supposed transparency into one of self-refl ection and 
linking this homecoming to a host of other mirror shots of both characters 
that occur early in the fi lm.
Cumulatively, this trope of visual distortion and indirection suggests 
the emotional barriers and lies that have separated Roman and Hanka and 
that the couple must overcome through open and honest conversation. At 
the same time, however, Kieślowski’s early inscription of window-framed 
views introduces the central theme of surveillance and the epistemic meth-
ods that Roman will employ in his surreptitious pursuit of Hanka’s secrets. 
Knowledge of another, Kieślowski suggests, fi nds its proper ethical place 
somewhere between Hanka’s evasive claim that “some things shouldn’t be 
discussed to the limit” and Roman’s obsessive need to appropriate her inner 
life. As the couple take the elevator up to their apartment, the director sub-
tly reinforces the disturbing visual superintendence inherent in both divine 
omniscience and the fi lmic perspective: We catch intimate images of Hanka 
stroking Roman’s face and Roman touching her shoulder as the lift moves 
between fl oors, but the alternation of light and darkness has the disquieting 
effect of a zoetrope or of a fi lm projector moving so slowly that we see the 
interstices between the frames. In this cinematic self- reference, Kieślowski 
suggests what Laura Mulvey and Christian Metz have long maintained: The 
experience of sharing a fi lm’s revelatory perspective as we sit watchfully in 
the dark (as Roman later will) binds the viewer in complicit voyeurism.6 
However, by appearing to slow down the moving frames in the elevator 
ride, Kieślowski deliberately fragments the diegesis to produce an unplea-
surable visual sequence that forces the viewer to refl ect upon the inherent 
perversity of such detection. At the same time, the fi lmmaker refl ects upon 
the intrusive power of the cinema camera and invites his viewer to share in 
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this meditation. Kieślowski offers intimate and probing disclosures of mul-
tiple lives, rather than the fetishistic surveillance of a single individual, but 
by frequently aligning his camera angles with Roman’s voyeuristic detec-
tion, he acknowledges how easily this ethical distinction can be blurred.
Roman’s conversation with the urologist lays the groundwork for what 
becomes his compulsive drive to penetrate the secret domain of Hanka’s 
thought and feeling. The twin motors of this covetous obsession are his 
long-standing habit of desire and the added spur of jealousy. Asked how 
many women he has slept with, Roman replies “nine, ten . . . maybe fi fteen” 
and implies that some of these affairs have occurred during the ten years 
of his marriage. Very likely, he has been guilty of coveting the wives of 
other men. As a successful surgeon, invited to Zagreb to give lectures and 
assist at diffi cult operations, Roman commands power and prestige, and 
his history of sexual conquests seems to parallel his professional develop-
ment. Later, as he tells a beautiful young heart patient of his early desire to 
become a doctor, his lingering gaze of sexual interest and futility suggests 
that his subsequent life has been ruled by a succession of physical desires 
and fulfi llments. Sexual dysfunction renders the act of phallic possession 
impossible and, in curtailing the pattern of desire and gratifi cation that 
has shaped and sustained Roman’s life, it forces him to question whether 
life without sexual desire and possession is worth living. The urologist’s 
impertinent question, “Is your wife attractive?” crystallizes this existential 
dilemma, distilling Roman’s sense of powerlessness and loss, but providing 
a peculiar (and unintended) impetus to the renewal of desire. When Ro-
man answers, “Very,” his friend offers a word of cynical advice: “Divorce.” 
Convinced that other men will inevitably crave Hanka—and that she will 
naturally seek sexual satisfaction outside marriage—the urologist suggests 
a pragmatic alternative to the humiliation of cuckoldry. Ironically, in doing 
so he not only plants the seeds of jealousy by insinuating the presence of 
rivals, but also makes Hanka more desirable in Roman’s eyes by stressing 
her appeal to others. Roland Barthes, in A Lover’s Discourse, refers to this 
familiar fi gure in the representation of desire as “induction”: “The loved 
one is desired because another or others have shown the subject that such 
a being is desirable.”7 It is this state of longing, predicated upon his wife’s 
transfi gured desirability through the competitive interest of other men, 
that Roman needs to preserve even before he determines what new form 
his ardor will take. Thus, when he discloses his impotence to Hanka, he 
does not advise her to divorce him but urges her to take a lover, “if you 
haven’t taken one already.” What appears to be generous concern for his 
wife’s sexual needs is, in fact, a gesture intended, perhaps unconsciously, 
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to generate a rival (the more established the better) whose physical pos-
session— or threat of possession—can arouse in Roman the drive for a 
more totalizing metaphysical possession. This new species of desire that 
Roman seeks to call into being through jealousy has no prior existence in 
his marriage: It is an appropriative compulsion for an all-pervasive com-
mand of Hanka’s hidden life that will serve as substitute for the missing 
sexual possession.
For all of the cruelty, perversity and egotism inherent in Roman’s visual 
and auditory prying, Kieślowski makes it clear that these acts are driven 
not by the sadism that Mulvey fi nds underlying male voyeurism, but by 
ontological necessity. In this respect, Roman’s behavior throughout Nine 
irresistibly suggests Freud’s eros/thanatos paradigm: Throughout his life, 
he has been torn between the promised and remembered gratifi cations of 
sexual desire and the more powerful “urge inherent in organic life to re-
store an earlier state of things” through death.8 In the face of this elemental 
urge to nonbeing, Roman has sustained life primarily through projections 
of desire, identifying and fi lling specifi c sources of lack. When impotence 
threatens to deprive Roman of this mode of being, the impulse to sui-
cide becomes overwhelming. As he drives at high speed back to Warsaw 
from Cracow, he veers off the road and loses control of the spinning car. 
When the car stops, facing the wrong direction but still on the highway, 
he pounds the steering wheel in a gesture of rage and despair not simply 
at the loss of his manhood but at his failure to end his life. The glove 
compartment, which later plays a crucial part in his compulsive detection, 
uncannily opens at this moment, and Roman’s furious attempts to close it 
only underscore his feeling of helplessness. By the time he arrives home, 
he is so thoroughly unmanned and exhibits so little inclination to live that 
his wife coaxes him inside out of the rain, helps him unbutton his wet shirt, 
and begins to dry his hair as if he were a child.
Anticipating and fearing what Roman will tell her, Hanka asks him to 
delay the news until after dinner. She meets his disclosure fi rst with tacit 
disbelief and then with kind but facile reassurances, which, though meant 
to comfort, provide Roman with no new foundation for a life built on de-
sire. “The things we have are more important than the things we don’t 
have,” Hanka insists, but in view of their mutual infi delities, separate ca-
reers, and joint decision not to have children it is not readily apparent what 
they do share. Attempting to separate marital commitment from sex, she 
claims that “love is in one’s heart, not between one’s legs,” adding that it 
is not reducible to “biology” and involves much more than “panting in 
bed fi ve minutes a week.” As a basis for marriage, she proposes a recipro-
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cal, nonphysical devotion, but one that neither acknowledges the exigent 
pressures of physical desire, nor anticipates the rise of its metaphysical 
counterpart. Ironically, Hanka’s characterization of sex as a brief, physi-
ological release seems drawn from her ongoing but unacknowledged affair 
with the young physics student, Mariusz ( Jan Jankowski). Roman’s refusal 
to answer her repeated question, “Do you love me?” suggests that he re-
gards her affi rmation of love as friendship, affection, and spousal support 
as insuffi cient grounds for continuing to exist and that he dreads commit-
ting himself to such a life. Paradoxically, what begins to renew Roman’s 
tenuous interest in life is not Hanka’s solemn declaration of enduring love 
but rather her intriguing contradictions. A moment after quickly assuring 
Roman that she has not taken a lover, she adds that they should not look 
into such questions very closely. Then, as if to demonstrate the sustaining 
power of their sexless emotional bond, she asks Roman for “a cuddle.” The 
scene quickly becomes a moment of failed intimacy and frustrated longing 
that undermines Hanka’s dismissal of intercourse as a nonessential com-
ponent in their marriage: As Roman holds her, Hanka curls her leg around 
him more tightly and writhes against him with desperate sexual hunger. 
During this sequence, Roman’s face refl ects helpless desolation. Robbed of 
the capacity for phallic performance, he seems to hold himself back from 
the pain of unconsummated desire. However, his expression also suggests 
a strange surmise at his wife’s impassioned behavior, one that recalls the 
urologist’s lubricious innuendos about Hanka and that will lead Roman to 
initiate his detection the next morning.
During a sleepless night, Roman suggests that a child might make their 
life together “easier,” but the abrupt cut from the quiet, dimly lit bedroom 
to the harsh morning light and cacophony of traffi c indicates that he will 
reconfi gure his relationship with Hanka in a less conventional way. As a 
milky glass window opens, we share Hanka’s overhead view of Roman as 
she watches him prepare to drive to the hospital—and, we momentarily 
discover, as she scans the street for her lover’s imminent arrival. If this 
opening shot sequence establishes Hanka’s anxiety about her secret life, it 
also introduces the position of commanding surveillance that Roman will 
increasingly adopt in infi ltrating it. The shift from turbid glass to transpar-
ency anticipates the revelations that he comes to associate with this lofty 
perspective. Roman’s fi rst act of detection, however, is from below: He 
cranes his head at an awkward angle and looks up through the car’s passen-
ger side to see if Hanka is standing at the apartment window. Although she 
has retreated to the margin of its frame, he waves at her before she closes 
the pane. As the day begins, husband and wife observe one another with 
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mutual suspicion. Turning his head forward, Roman sees a blond young 
man (Mariusz) walking toward the apartment building and registers a look 
of acute suspicion even before the object of his gaze spots him, stops and 
moves clumsily in a different direction. By lowering the visor, the fi rst of 
several literal and fi gurative covers, Roman seeks the invisibility that char-
acterizes the visual perspectives of voyeurs, detectives, and divinities.
Roman is not only prepared for the appearance of his wife’s lover, but 
he also actually requires and welcomes this rival as the needed stimulus for 
the regeneration of his own desire to possess Hanka. Indeed, his behav-
ior conforms closely to René Girard’s classic formulation of “triangular 
desire” wherein the vaniteux (desiring male subject) exaggerates the glam-
our, potency, and emotional claims of a challenger in order to make the 
coveted object “more infi nitely desirable in his eyes.”9 Young, virile and 
sexually potent, Mariusz is the ideal “mediator” for Roman, “a veritable 
artifi cial sun [from whom] descends a mysterious ray which makes the ob-
ject shine with a false brilliance” (Girard 18). So necessary is this fi gure, 
Girard suggests, that a disillusioned subject who desires to desire will even 
bring a rival into existence in order to heighten his own longing by imitat-
ing another man’s. All such lovers, according to this paradigm, become 
further complicit in their fevered unhappiness by acting in ways that pre-
serve the mediator’s presence and the covetous jealousy that it generates. 
Roman’s behavior fi nds close corollaries in the self-tormented protagonists 
of Stendhal and Proust. After fi nding abundant evidence of Hanka’s poorly 
disguised affair, he violates his code of truth-telling by not directly con-
fronting her with this knowledge, for to do so would bring both the liaison 
and his surveillance to an immediate end. Instead, Kieślowski provides a 
symbolic illustration of the extent to which Roman will indirectly assist in 
Hanka’s infi delity when he offers to help a colleague fi ll his gas tank in the 
hospital parking lot. Annette Insdorf has noted that the “blatantly phallic” 
shape of the funnel that Roman holds seems a rather unsubtle reminder of 
his lost manhood (117), but this short, transitional scene is richer in im-
plication. Coming just after Roman’s fi rst sighting of Mariusz has aroused 
suspicions, his act of holding the funnel to assist another man prefi gures 
his facilitation of a sexually potent rival’s affair with Hanka.
Girard notes that the desiring subject unconsciously seeks interest and 
intensity in his life through a competitive relationship with an obstacle 
that is, at once, a source of fearful envy and intense hatred (7). In order for 
Mariusz to fulfi ll this doubly exalted mediatorial function, Roman must re-
gard him as more than a naïve university student who satisfi es Hanka’s bio-
logical needs. He needs to imagine (incorrectly) that his rival commands 
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Hanka’s love and thus has special access to aspects of her private life that 
she hides from Roman. Only such a Mariusz can pose a vivifying threat and 
stimulus to the emotional and psychological forms of possession to which 
Roman dedicates himself; and only through this artifi cial magnifi cation of 
Mariusz’s “prestige” (13) in Hanka’s life can Roman summon the requisite 
jealousy to eavesdrop on her phone conversations, sift the contents of her 
purse as she sleeps, search her mother’s apartment for clues to the affair, 
and watch the couple’s fi nal assignation from inside a closet. At the same 
time, however, Roman’s bitter hatred for his rival prompts him to deni-
grate the young man as his material antithesis, one whose leonine mane 
seems to mock his own receding hairline. Roman derisively refers to him 
as “that physicist,” as if to contradistinguish the young man’s study of me-
chanical laws from his own noncorporeal investigations. Finding Mariusz’s 
incriminating physics notebook in the glove compartment, Roman hurls 
it into a trash bin, where it is covered with decaying garbage. After a mo-
ment’s hesitation, he retrieves the soiled notebook, not as evidence with 
which to confront Hanka but as a fetish to spur and perpetuate his own 
anguished desiring. The gross materiality of this item refl ects the rival’s 
physical possession of his wife and feeds Roman’s contempt, but it also 
aids in sharpening his own desire for metaphysical possession, the only 
ground on which he can wage a struggle. Kieślowski’s camera frequently 
lingers on the golden plentitude of Hanka’s curly hair, but with the birth 
of metaphysical desire her erotic womanhood no longer conjures Roman’s 
fascination or longing. As Girard notes, a woman’s “physical qualities . . . 
can neither rouse metaphysical desire nor prolong it,” and her beauty “di-
minishes in importance” for the vaniteux as his drive for penetration and 
control of her inner being increases (88, 85). While a totalizing command 
of another’s thoughts and feelings is humanly impossible, this diffi culty not 
only sustains Roman’s enterprise but increases its urgency.
Even after his fi rst sighting of Mariusz, Roman’s suspicions might never 
have become a monstrous obsession were it not for an ill-timed phone call 
that he takes while his wife is out. Looming in the foreground, the magni-
fi ed image of the ringing telephone provokes Roman’s jealousy, while also 
inaugurating his preoccupation with the phone as an instrument of audi-
tory omniscience. At the same moment, Kieślowski establishes the aerial 
subject position that comes to characterize Roman’s visual surveillance: 
Looking down unseen through window blinds, he sees Hanka walking to-
ward the apartment building entrance. When she presents Roman with a 
new sports jacket, he models it awkwardly and self-consciously, seeming to 
view the garment as an absurd compensation for what she is giving to her 
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lover. As if to crown his humiliation, the foregrounded phone rings again, 
and, as Hanka hastily answers it and speaks to Mariusz, Roman strains to 
listen in the background. However, the next shot sequence reverses these 
relative positions and implies a correlative shift in the control of knowl-
edge within their relationship: We now see Roman, in medium close-up, 
using a soldering iron to install a listening device inside the living room 
phone and then eavesdropping as Hanka talks to her mother on another 
phone in the bedroom.
In this moment, Roman commits himself to invisibility and psychic in-
fi ltration as nothing less than an all-consuming way of life, and Kieślowski 
marks this existential turning point by framing the three telephone calls 
in the apartment between a pair of revealing conversations at the hospital. 
In both, Roman advises Ola ( Jolanta Piȩtek-Górecka), a talented young 
singer with a heart condition that threatens her professional career. She 
seeks Roman’s counsel on a risky operation that could repair the damage, 
allowing her to pursue the concert career for which she has long trained, 
but that could just as easily kill her. Her dilemma mirrors Roman’s own 
and raises the central questions of being that torment him: What does 
one need in order to live? Is a life without passionate desire and conquest 
worth living? Pressed by her mother to have the operation, Ola hesitates. 
Although she has embraced challenges in the past, including the music of 
Van Den Budenmayer (“He’s diffi cult but I sing him”), she tells Roman 
that she will settle for a life of contentment: “I want to live. That’s enough 
for me. I don’t have to sing.” Holding her fi ngers an inch apart, she mea-
sures the small quantity of experience that will suffi ce: “That much.” Far 
from contradicting her, Roman supports her reluctance, noting that the 
surgery in question is normally used only when there are “no other pos-
sibilities.” As the young woman retreats down the hospital corridor in a 
provocatively short gown, he gazes after her, as if measuring how much he 
needs to live in the absence of sexual pursuit and satisfaction. Roman con-
tinues this self-evaluation in relation to Ola as he sits at home listening to 
a recording of the haunting vocal music of Van Den Budenmayer (the fi c-
tional name of Kieślowski’s musical collaborator, Zbigniew Preisner). The 
ringing telephone and Hanka’s disquieting arrival interrupt this moment 
of meditation, as if demonstrating to Roman the impossibility of a life of 
domestic contentment and neutralized desire. In his next meeting with 
Ola, he listens to her rendition of the composer’s work and pronounces it 
“beautiful”—but now chides, “It’s a pity you don’t want to sing.” In im-
plicitly urging a dangerous operation, Roman tempts Ola to a choice that 
could intensify her life or cause her death (as it does in the screenplay), but 
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he also reveals his collateral commitment to a perilous course of action 
that is meant to prolong his life but that nearly destroys him. Both as a 
consulting surgeon and as investigating husband, Roman assumes a god-
like power over a woman’s life as a counterresponse to his powerful urge 
to extinction.10
Girard traces “the metaphysical roots of desire” to “a more or less con-
scious attempt at an apotheosis of the self,” which he regards as an underly-
ing psychological component in the structure of romantic love in Western 
narrative (63). Roman’s pursuit of omniscient possession is, by contrast, a 
compensatory response to impotence. Yet, even as a survival strategy, his 
desire partakes of the exalted egotism that Girard describes, for it seeks 
the complete mastery of Hanka’s mind and soul through the simulation 
of transhuman visual and auditory perspectives. In this respect, Roman’s 
ultimate mediator is not Mariusz but the God of the ninth commandment, 
whose disembodied comprehension is the true model that he strives, but 
fails, to emulate. Kieślowski offers a comic distillation of this point when 
Roman goes to his mother-in-law’s apartment on the pretext of retrieving 
her scarf and umbrella, but really to search the unmade bed, coffee table, 
and mail for evidence that Hanka is conducting her affair there. His inves-
tigation turns up a love note that Mariusz had recently mailed: a postcard 
showing God’s representative on earth, the Polish pope John Paul II, play-
fully curling his fi ngers around his eyes, as if spying through binoculars. 
This papal parody of divine detection reveals the absurdity of Roman’s 
crude snooping—calling a number he fi nds in his wife’s purse, secretly 
purchasing a duplicate key—and the hopeless metaphysical compulsion 
that underlies it. As Roman pursues increasingly elaborate methods of sur-
veillance, Kieślowski juxtaposes shots from his subject position with im-
ages of Hanka’s experience that he cannot see. When he follows her to an 
assignation at her mother’s apartment, for example, the camera cuts from 
a close-up of Hanka during sex, her face racked with anguish and guilt, 
to a shot of Roman sitting on a fl ight of stairs above the apartment door, 
hidden by shadows. We share his downward view as the buoyant Mariusz 
leaves, but we also recognize the insuffi ciency of his perspective: He does 
not know that his wife took no pleasure in the encounter inside. A moment 
later, Kieślowski reiterates Roman’s pursuit of an airborne perspective tra-
ditionally associated with a God’s-eye view. He watches from a balcony as 
Hanka walks to the parking lot, gets in the car, and slumps over the steering 
wheel as the vehicle’s alarm goes off. The headlights fl ashing in the dark-
ness recall the elevator ride, again reminding viewers of their inscription in 
the voyeuristic economy of both the protagonist and the fi lmmaker. How-
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ever, the shot selection here re-emphasizes the epistemic limits of Roman’s 
fi xed point of view: Kieślowski cuts from the protagonist’s balcony angle to 
a closer view of Hanka directly through the windshield. Her body posture 
and face reveal a state of paralyzing remorse that Roman, obstructed by the 
car’s frame, cannot fully comprehend.
Roman is not only increasingly aware of the doomed nature of his 
hermeneutic enterprise but consumed with unbearable shame and self-
disgust as he undertakes it. These feelings are so acute that the exercise of 
covetous desire meant to fend off the death wish sometimes increases its 
urgency. Shortly after beginning his surveillance, he rides his bicycle along 
an elevated highway that is still under construction in a rehearsal of the 
suicide he will later attempt. Stopping where the roadside slopes sharply 
down to a river, he seems to consider crashing into a concrete bridge pil-
lar before steering the bicycle into the water and wetting his face with his 
hands. If, as Freud suggests in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, “each organ-
ism wishes to die only in its own fashion” (39), Roman craves death as a 
passive surrender to gravity that will relieve him of the arduous labor of 
metaphysical desire, as a plunge from some height in which the quest for 
transcendental knowledge is replaced by the physical laws of mass and mo-
mentum that Mariusz studies. His self-generated longing for possession 
fails as a stay against suicide, in part because spying brings him none of the 
conventional satisfactions of male voyeurism, which, according to Laura 
Mulvey, include not only scopophilia but the viewer’s imagined control of 
a female object upon whom he can project personal fantasies. Inherent in 
this “determining” aspect of the male gaze is the sadistic pleasure of “forc-
ing a change in another person” (33, 35). Tomek’s voyeurism in the early 
stages of Six conforms to this erotic model: He views Magda as a source 
of masturbatory pleasure and enjoys controlling her movements with si-
lent phone calls. While Kickasola is right in noting that both Roman and 
Tomek seek “unlimited observational power” (234), they are moved by 
very different epistemic aims. Tomek seeks, initially, to objectify Magda as 
a purely physical spectacle in order to shape his fantasies freely around her, 
but for Roman such objectifi cation is antithetical to his craving to possess 
those immaterial qualities in Hanka that are most intimately and uniquely 
human. His sin is not, as Slavoj Ž iž ek ingeniously proposes in his theory 
of Kieślowski’s “displaced” commandments, a covetous conversion of his 
wife into mere “goods,” but rather a desire for abstract appropriation be-
yond man’s ethical scope and cognitive powers.11 Roman seeks a nonsexual, 
immaterial mode of possession that eschews visual pleasure and control-
ling fantasy in the pursuit of psychological and moral penetration. Just as 
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his espionage brings him no sadistic satisfaction, so too Roman fi nds no 
masochistic enjoyment in the degradation of half-obstructed peeping on 
Hanka and her lover from a closet, and he suffers only unbearable shame 
when she uncovers him after breaking off her affair with Mariusz. Speak-
ing gently at fi rst and then forcefully, Hanka summons her husband out of 
the darkness as she had earlier drawn him in from the rain; but when the 
rejected Mariusz briefl y returns, Roman retreats into the bathroom, over-
come with weakness and nausea. Nor does this ordeal conform to Freud’s 
moral masochism: Despite Roman’s philandering, his suffering brings him 
no self-punishing relief for past sexual betrayals of his wife. Instead, spying 
becomes an intolerable addiction that yields no satisfactions, and the self-
generated jealousy that drives it becomes a psychopathology from which 
he cannot free himself. Like several other characters in the Decalogue fi lms, 
he is “imprisoned by [his] passions and feelings” (KK, 150).
The agonizing mutual exposure outside the closet marks a decisive turn-
ing point in Nine because Roman and Hanka, rather than casting blame, 
recognize the pain that their lies have infl icted on one another. Roman’s 
admission, “I’ve no right to be jealous,” fi nds its complement in Hanka’s 
compassionate apology, “I didn’t think you’d be so hurt.” This scene of 
shared suffering and forgiveness produces a reconciliation in which the 
couple commit themselves to a future of complete transparency and, after a 
short period of separation, plan to adopt a child. Yet Kieślowski reveals the 
fragile and tentative nature of this accord through several details. Roman’s 
insistence that Hanka be the one to go away suggests that he can overcome 
the compulsion to jealous spying only by removing the desired object from 
his sight. There is also a hint of anxious control in his purchase of skis for 
her weekend trip to Zakopane, as if he wishes to insure that she act out her 
plans for an innocent vacation. More notably, as he stands by the window 
of the departing train, Roman pointedly does not answer Hanka’s fervent 
appeal, “Do you trust me?” While fear had kept him from responding to 
Hanka’s earlier request that he acknowledge his love for her, honesty now 
accounts for Roman’s silence. During Hanka’s absence, we see Roman 
looking down from the apartment window at a little girl (Ania from Seven) 
playing with her doll. While the context of this image is the couple’s plan 
for a family, the familiar elevated perspective dramatizes Roman’s desta-
bilizing struggle with the habit of surveillance. Ironically, it is not careful 
detection but a chance spotting of Mariusz loading skis onto his car that 
plunges Roman into suicidal despair. When the young man’s mother con-
fi rms that he has gone to Zakopane, Roman is consumed by  uncontrollable 
jealousy and a sense that he can neither trust Hanka nor ever know her 
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Figure 11–1. Hanka tries to telephone Roman from 
Zakopane in Decalogue Nine.
mind. Leaving a suicide note by the telephone, he sets off to die while it is 
still ringing. His refusal to answer this frantic call from Hanka is, at once, 
a denial of their future together, a renunciation of spousal trust, and a 
fi nal rejection of metaphysical desire as a mode of life-sustaining interest 
(Figure 11–1).
The Hitchcockian intercutting of Roman, pedaling toward suicide, and 
Hanka desperately riding the bus back to Warsaw to reassure him, visu-
ally stresses the fracturing of their relationship, as do several images: the 
broken white lines, the abrupt end of the unfi nished highway, and a bicycle 
wheel turning randomly after the fall (Figure 11–2). Kieślowski presents 
Roman’s collision with the earth from below and in slow motion, but then, 
in an extraordinary gesture, he moves to a long, hovering overhead shot 
of the twitching body and battered bicycle, as if viewed from the divine 
perspective that Roman had sought. In rising upward from this shattered 
scene, the camera also initiates an unexpected movement toward visual 
and emotional integration that crowns the fi lm: From the highway’s edge 
the camera accelerates backward along the road Roman has traveled until 
it blends seamlessly with one where Hanka’s bus is moving, linking the 
couple’s lives and destinies in a moment of acute crisis. Given the fi lm’s 
previous association of aerial perspectives with the invasiveness of hu-
man egotism and divine cruelty, this introduction to Roman’s nearly mi-
raculous survival and fi nal words of reconciliation with Hanka may seem 
mystifying.
The key to Kieślowski’s intentions at the end of Nine may lie in a dis-
tinction he draws between “a God of the Old Testament and a God of the 
New” (KK, 150). While the fi lmmaker frames Roman’s hypervigilance as 
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Figure 11–2. Roman’s suicide attempt in Decalogue 
Nine.
a version (or perversion) of the demanding, unforgiving vigilance of the 
God of the ninth commandment, he displaces this deity in the fi lm’s fi nal 
moments and tentatively suggests as an alternative a God who oversees hu-
man conduct not to judge and punish but to save and forgive. While this 
New Testament divinity has full access to individual consciousness, His 
true dwelling place is not above man but within him, for He is manifest in 
all forms of human love. We glimpse the potential presence of this God 
only fl eetingly and ambiguously throughout the ten fi lms, rather than in 
clear or consistent dialectical opposition to the God of Abraham and Mo-
ses. In One, Paweł’s Aunt Irena tells the boy that God resides in their love 
for one another, and in Eight, Zofi a speaks of a God who dwells inside us. 
Such a deity, working through human feeling and action, may be manifest 
in Dorota’s painful devotion to her dying husband in Two, an unarticulated 
but saving love that only a compassionate God could knowingly reward.
Prior to Roman’s equally miraculous survival at the conclusion of Nine, 
Kieślowski insinuates the possibility of such a merciful God by encrypt-
ing two alternative forms of subliminal knowledge within the fi lm’s visual 
texture. The fi rst is suggested by the gaze of Kieślowski’s perpetual witness, 
the nameless young man (Artur Barciś) “who comes and watches” charac-
ters in crisis throughout The Decalogue (KK, 159), but whose appearances 
in the ninth fi lm seem suffi ciently rich in spiritual implication to justify 
Insdorf ’s characterization of him as protective “angel” (74), an emissary or 
extension of a generous God, and to support Kickasola’s suggestion that in 
“his secret knowledge” he “bears the traits of God” (165). We fi rst glimpse 
him passing on a bicycle when Roman drives off the road after learning his 
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impotence is incurable; later he appears in a long tracking shot as he rides 
parallel to Roman and watches with grave, prescient concern as he nears 
the edge of the road. Finding the fallen Roman beneath the overpass, the 
young man, shot through the foregrounded bicycle spokes, surveys the 
situation before riding off—quite possibly to call the ambulance that saves 
Roman’s life.
Kieślowski offers a still more intriguing and vital form of “secret knowl-
edge” in Hanka’s seemingly telepathic comprehension of Roman in his 
moments of most acute pain. She wakes in sudden fear at the start of the 
fi lm as he receives his medical diagnosis, wakes again in alarm at the instant 
when Roman rides his bicycle into the river, and reacts with panic on the 
slopes at Zakopane when Mariusz arrives, as if sensing that her husband 
must somehow know of his presence. These divinations, for all of their nu-
minous implications, appear to be rooted in the loving concern that Hanka 
earlier told Roman is in her “heart”—a love in which the New Testament 
God makes His home and through which He bestows His grace.
Curiously, the couple’s most complete moment of unity comes through 
the more mundane circuitry of Roman’s telephone call from the emergency 
room. In the fi lm’s fi nal shot sequence, we see Hanka, having read Roman’s 
suicide note, reclining with her head near the phone as her blond hair fi lls 
the foreground like an aureole. A moment later, she answers the call from 
the bandaged Roman who has learned that she had tried to tell him of her 
immediate return. Their brief exchange converts a device heretofore used 
for adulterous appointments and eavesdropping into a cord of healing con-
nection, and it also provides a kind of benediction: “You’re there, God, 
you’re there,” Hanka says, and Roman answers, “I am.” In this curious 
moment of inadvertent identifi cation, Roman resembles something quite 
different from the punitive God of Mosaic Law whose investigatory cruel-
ties he had tried to practice. Although Kieślowski may think most often of 
a God who offers “no appeal or forgiveness” (KK, 149), his cinematic gaze 
is suffi ciently ambivalent and far-reaching to register, if only briefl y, the 
immanence of a different deity in the secret lives of men and women. Such 
a God, if He is truly present within the Decalogue fi lms, dwells in innuendo, 
ambiguity, and contradiction. Thus, despite the pagan associations of his 
name, Roman incongruously wears a cross around his neck throughout the 
fi lm; and if the name recalls the power and privilege that the fallen man 
once enjoyed, it may also allude to the fi rst of Paul’s epistles in which he 
urges his Roman readers to emulate God’s forgiveness and to “Let love be 
without dissimulation” (12:9).12 If Kieślowski is identifying his protagonist 
with divinity in the fi lm’s fi nal frames, it is not with the harsh monitor of 
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the ninth commandment but, poignantly and improbably, with the broken 
yet regenerate Christ.
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the life of his patient, he willingly embraces the role that the consulting doc-
tor in Two initially refuses to enact for Dorota and accepts only to save the 
life of her unborn child. Kieślowski illuminates Roman’s egocentric response 
to Ola when he notes that this “fi ne,” intriguing singer appears only briefl y in 
the fi lm because she functions as “a sort of window, as a contingency for the 
main character” (KK, 177).
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c h a p t e r  1 2
Laughter Makes Good Neighbors: 
Sociability and the Comic in Decalogue Ten
Regina Small
In Krzysztof Kieślowski’s Decalogue series, a cloistered apartment building 
in an alienated and shattered communist-ruled Poland serves as the back-
drop for a sober examination of the signifi cance of each of the command-
ments. The actions and attitudes of the characters (all tenants within these 
isolated, lonely quarters) drive each installment, as Kieślowski examines 
the weighty moral and ethical decisions each faces. The series is charac-
terized by a grave treatment of the subject matter with precious few mo-
ments of levity, impressing upon the viewer the critical nature of choice. 
Although in the tenth and fi nal fi lm of The Decalogue the exploration of 
these everyday choices is no less earnest, Kieślowski treats the material in a 
distinctively different manner. Unlike the fi lms that have preceded it, Ten 
contains several darkly comic elements.1
This departure from the characteristically somber tone of The Decalogue 
for the fi nal fi lm suggests that there is something essential about comic 
perspective. In spite of Kieślowski’s claim that The Decalogue is a collection 
of ten individual fi lms and not a series, that the fi nal fi lm revolves around 
the completion of a series seems undeniably self-referential and can be 
regarded as a refl ection on The Decalogue as a whole.2 In fact, the laughter 
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shared by the fi lm’s protagonists, brothers Artur (Zbigniew Zamachowski) 
and Jerzy ( Jerzy Stuhr), in the fi nal scene is the key to not only the fi lm it-
self but also the entire Decalogue series. It is the moment when they realize 
the absurdity of their fanatical and selfi sh obsession and laugh, along with 
the viewer, at their foolishness. In this way, laughter comes to aid individu-
als in moving beyond their private consciousness; the viewer, by laughing 
together with the characters, realizes her signifi cance to the larger social 
context of which she is a part, an important motif that underlies The Deca-
logue. By examining the operation of comedy in Ten, the audience gains 
greater clarity about the issue of individual responsibility within a social 
context, which is at the center of the entire Decalogue series.
The series begins in One by introducing us to the apartment complex 
through a low-angle establishing shot that tilts up the side of the building. 
As we follow a pigeon’s fl ight to a nearby windowsill, we are left with the 
peculiar sense that it is by pure chance that we stumble upon Krzysztof and 
Paweł’s story. Indeed, Kieślowski affi rmed that he wanted to “begin each 
fi lm in a way that suggested that the main character had been chosen by the 
camera as if at random,” emphasizing that “everybody’s life is worthy of 
scrutiny” (KK, 146). In this manner, Kieślowski expresses the importance 
of each life, not only individually but also as a part of a social context. Us-
ing the apartment building with its connected yet isolated cells as a meta-
phor for the hermetic, self-focused, and often obsessive existence led by 
each of his characters, Kieślowski constructs The Decalogue as a series of 
fi lms that examines the interconnectedness of human life and the necessity 
of recognizing the world beyond our own private consciousness.
In Ten, Kieślowski examines the nature of covetousness (the central in-
junction of the tenth commandment in the Roman Catholic and Lutheran 
traditions) by tracing specifi cally the effects wrought by the persistent and 
avaricious desire for acquisition. The central characters are consumed by 
the need to possess and to safeguard that which they have obtained. Inter-
estingly, while such a theme could easily lend itself to the severe approach 
and grave tone that has characterized The Decalogue thus far, it is precisely 
this single-mindedness that makes the content and characters comedic 
fare. As Artur and Jerzy learn more about the value of their deceased fa-
ther’s stamp collection and become increasingly single-minded, the world 
of their responsibilities and obligations recedes, giving rise to humorous 
situations (Figure 12–1).
This humorous single-mindedness takes the form of a fi xation, a central 
element of  Henri Bergson’s model of comedy, outlined in “Laughter” (1901). 
In Ten, we see what Bergson would term a “mechanical  arrangement,” in 
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Figure 12–1. Jerzy and Artur after their father’s death 
in Decalogue Ten.
the way in which events unfold and characters behave.3 This mechanical 
arrangement in comedy takes the form of absent-mindedness on the part 
of the characters that results from their obsession with a fi xed idea and 
distracts them from their obligations and responsibilities as social beings. 
Consequently, the normal progress of life is impeded. As Bergson points 
out, “life presents itself to us as evolution in time and complexity in space. 
Regarded in time, it is the continuous evolution of a being ever growing 
older; it never goes backwards and it never repeats itself” (118). At the 
level of individual consciousness, life is a continuous fl ux in perception, 
thoughts, and responses. But the introduction of an overwhelming and 
fi xed idea—in the case of Artur and Jerzy, the incipient desire for the ac-
quisition of something of material value—makes events and the characters 
involved less “mindful of their own course,” thus leading life, as portrayed 
in comedy, to be fi lled with situations that repeat themselves (118). Life, in 
this fi ctive and comedic formulation, does not progress but instead fi nds 
itself subject to an almost mechanistic repetition of events.
Though theorists of the comedic mode frequently cite the Bergsonian 
model, it has had its share of detractors as well. In The Idea of Comedy, Jan 
Hokenson claims that “critics and theorists tend to dismiss ‘Laughter’ as a 
rather Victorian document,” one that “suffers in critical esteem primarily 
because it is read as moralistic, subordinating the comic to ‘social moral-
ity.’ ”4 Hokenson insists that this is a misinterpretation of “Laughter,” and 
she asserts that we “tend to view such dicta as ‘the purpose of laughter is 
to correct,’ through our own post-Auschwitz, post-1960s lenses, reading 
Bergson as a stern moralist although he says little about morality, and de-
tecting didacticism and political conservatism where there is nothing of 
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the sort” (57). Clarifying Bergson’s thesis, Hokenson writes that “it does 
not incorporate the mean or norm of social behavior as a yardstick of value. 
There is no norm. There is only sociability and its temporary defi ciency” 
(57). If one applies Hokenson’s reading of Bergson to the end of Ten, when 
Artur and Jerzy laugh at the absurdity of their behavior, it becomes clear 
that they are not, to use Hokenson’s words, “laughed back to a norm of 
conventional behavior” but are “laughed back to self-consciousness as . . . 
social being[s]” (57). Viewers can conclude that Artur and Jerzy’s reac-
tion is not motivated by the imposition of a strict set of moral values but 
instead powered by the recognition of their vain, self-focused foolishness 
and a developing self-awareness. It is this self-consciousness that leads to 
a better understanding not only of one’s own nature but also of one’s place 
in relation to others and to one’s obligations.
Viewing Ten from this perspective, we can see that Kieślowski uses Ar-
tur and Jerzy’s absurd behavior to illustrate how laughter allows the indi-
vidual to step outside of self-obsession, recognizing the harm his single-
mindedness has caused. In allowing themselves to become consumed by the 
value of their father’s stamp collection, both Artur and Jerzy forget their 
duties as part of a larger society. Artur essentially abandons his bandmates 
while Jerzy ignores his family, and both fail to recognize their duty to each 
other as brothers. Bergson’s model seems particularly applicable in light 
of Kieślowski’s admission that The Decalogue is about people who “sud-
denly realize that they’re going round and round in circles, that they’re not 
achieving what they want.” He presses this point further: “We’ve become 
too egoistic, too much in love with ourselves and our needs, and it’s as if 
everybody else has disappeared into the background” (KK, 145). Familial 
and social duties are pushed aside in favor of egocentric, antisocial and 
ultimately meaningless conquest and possession.
The applicability of Bergson’s model to Ten becomes more readily ap-
parent when Bergson distinguishes between the mechanistic process in 
comedy and life. He believes that “each living being is a closed system 
of phenomena” and further explains that “a continual change of aspect, 
the irreversibility of the order of phenomena, the perfect individuality of 
a perfectly self-contained series: such then are the outward characteris-
tics—whether real or apparent is of little moment—which distinguish 
the living from the merely mechanical” (118). The mechanical counter-
parts and hence the “methods of light comedy” are defi ned by Bergson 
as “repetition, inversion, and reciprocal interference of series” (118). The 
absent-mindedness that results from the characters’ single-minded obses-
sion not only stimulates this mechanization of life but also “expresses an 
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individual or collective imperfection which calls for an immediate correc-
tive. This corrective is laughter” (117). For Bergson, this corrective has an 
essentially social character: The laughter occasioned by witnessing absent-
mindedness functions as a corrective insofar as the viewer, through her 
laughter, implicitly renders a negative judgment of the character’s foolish 
behavior, disassociating herself from the character’s actions. This disas-
sociation is a fundamentally social response for it keeps the viewer from 
engaging in similar behavior or, at the very least, produces an awareness of 
the need to resist such conduct, recognizing that the character’s behavior 
is fueled by a self-involved obsession.
The mechanization arising from this absent-minded conduct and its 
subsequent corrective of laughter are particularly evident in Ten. In the af-
termath of their father’s death, Artur and Jerzy initially mock the old man’s 
paranoid need to protect his impressive stamp collection. Neither brother 
can understand the mad lengths to which their father has gone, from in-
stalling countless locks on his front door to nailing his windows shut, all for 
the sake of preserving a simple collection of stamps. However, only days 
later, they realize the monetary value of the stamps, and they repeat their 
father’s covetous actions. As soon as a local expert reveals that their father’s 
collection is worth tens of millions of zlotys, they no longer roll their eyes 
at their father’s eccentric behavior. Instead, Jerzy suggests placing bars on 
the window as a more effective way of guarding against intruders, without 
any sense of the Bergsonian irony that he is repeating his father’s obsessive 
and paranoid behavior.
This desire to protect the collection and the drive for new acquisition 
becomes so powerful that the exact object of their pursuit becomes un-
clear. While they are awed when the veteran stamp collector translates the 
stamp collection’s worth in terms of what can be bought if the stamps were 
sold, the brothers seem struck, not by the specifi c possessions they can 
acquire, but rather, perhaps even more perversely, by the abstract worth of 
the collection. At one point, Artur is asked very pointedly, “Do you want 
the stamps or the money?” to which he responds, “the stamps.” Although 
Artur ostensibly means that he wishes to acquire the stamps for their mon-
etary value, both the question and his answer are very telling. They refl ect 
the extent to which the desire to possess has taken root, indicating that 
the object itself (whether it is money or the stamp itself ) is essentially ir-
relevant; its relevance lies partly in how much others desire it and, conse-
quently, the extent to which it represents the abstract notion of fabulous 
wealth. This drive toward ownership becomes the sole aim of their quest. 
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Whether they decide to maintain their father’s collection or complete it 
only to sell it becomes a moot point; as they both agree that it is a “com-
fort” to possess things and that “if you don’t want [something], it ceases 
to exist,” the viewer learns that it is always covetousness that informs the 
brothers’ actions and insinuates itself into their lives. It also seems to imply 
that they have an understanding that value is a function of desire, and is 
also suggestive of a belief system that posits there is no objective value; it is 
only desire that is able to confer value, and this desire drives their avarice.
Thus, this single-minded obsession distracts both Artur and Jerzy from 
life. Jerzy neglects his family, forgetting about his son’s dentist appoint-
ment and spending a great deal of time away from both his wife and son. 
They are pushed to the margins of his life and, consequently, to the margins 
of the fi lm. This is particularly evident when Jerzy admits that he “quite 
forgot” about his problems and is happy for this escape from his commit-
ments. Much like Jerzy’s prior suggestion that they bar the windows to 
their father’s apartment, Jerzy’s neglect perfectly exemplifi es Bergsonian 
repetition. Jerzy, in his drive to obtain something of material value, per-
haps even in a misguided attempt to prevent his son from living the impov-
erished life he was forced to live as a result of his father’s obsession, ends 
up re-enacting the very negligence that was visited upon him. As Joseph G. 
Kickasola notes, Jerzy’s father “supplanted his own children as a material 
surrogate” with his stamp collection.5 The same can now be said of Jerzy, 
who, like his father, has begun to privilege something with greater material 
value over the value of family. While the situation, when laid out so plainly, 
may not strike one as humorous, it becomes comedic insofar as the viewer 
observes not only the repetition itself, but also the dark irony of Jerzy’s 
failure to recognize how he is becoming his father.
Similarly, Artur, also consumed by this foolish desire to possess some-
thing of worth, trades something that previously held some value for him 
(namely, his career) for the abstract idea of extravagant wealth. This sac-
rifi ce becomes even more poignant when a fellow band member asks if 
he is dropping out of the band’s tour schedule for “a bit of skirt,” since a 
romantic interest would at least lend some deeper meaning to his aban-
donment of music. There is an almost pathetic sadness to his assent to this 
question, since both he and the audience know that his sacrifi ce does not 
even possess that level of emotional or social signifi cance, but is instead a 
crass, pecuniary trade-off for something that is only valuable to him in its 
abstractness. Much like Jerzy, Artur fails to realize how he is reinscribing 
the emotional deprivation experienced and enacted by his father in for-
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feiting something that can possess profound personal meaning and social 
value (that is, his music) for merely the idea of tremendous value embodied 
in the stamp collection and in the acquisition of the Rose Mercury stamp.
Kieślowski emphasizes this notion of repetition in the trope of stamp 
collecting itself. Each series of stamps involves a repetition of images in 
order for the series to be complete. It is thus beautifully and poetically 
appropriate that the drive to collect stamps in order to complete a series is 
simultaneously a drive for and of repetition. Jerzy and Artur narrowly seek 
the repetition of images (stamps) that will complete their collection and 
in so doing, practice a kind of absent-minded, mechanical behavior that is 
almost fanatical in its narrowness; they are completely distracted by their 
obsession with the collection’s value.
We again fi nd the repetition essential to Bergson’s notion of comedy, 
to a lesser extent, in Jerzy’s and Artur’s separate interactions with the po-
lice investigator. Here, Kieślowski mirrors the repetitive behavior of the 
characters in the plotting of the fi lm. Both Jerzy and Artur are, in the 
wake of the robbery, suspicious of the other and proceed to set up a meet-
ing with the investigator, engaging him in identical conversations, wherein 
each suggests that the other might have planned the robbery. This instance 
also illustrates the way Artur and Jerzy’s single-mindedness has led them to 
transgress against the familial bond that they share as brothers.
On a greater scale, the climactic robbery of the stamp collection is actu-
ally a repetition of the earlier swindling of Jerzy’s son. Further, the princi-
pal repetition is essentially all about different characters ( Jerzy, Artur, the 
suspicious stamp trader, the teenage hooligan) put in the same situation: 
They are all, at different times, being deceived or swindled in some man-
ner. We sense that, perhaps because Jerzy and Artur’s father owed the fi rst 
villain a large amount of money, their father has swindled the man. But the 
man seems suspicious and crafty, and viewers are left with the impression 
that he is attempting to dupe Artur and Jerzy. This is repeated throughout 
the fi lm as the teenage hoodlum cheats Jerzy’s son out of the prized Zep-
pelin stamp; the stamp trader nearly swindles Jerzy; and Artur blackmails 
the stamp trader into returning the stamp. Of course, the pivotal deception 
centers around the trickery involved in getting both Artur and Jerzy out 
of their father’s apartment under the guise of a necessary operation so that 
another necessary operation, that of breaking into the apartment, can oc-
cur. It is necessary in an ironic sense, since Jerzy does not need to give up 
his kidney for the Rose Mercury stamp—he does so only out of avarice—
and necessary in a nonironic way, insofar as the operation will allegedly 
save a life. There is perhaps a more profound irony that the ostensibly 
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selfl ess act of giving a kidney to a stranger is motivated only by selfi shness 
and greed, not by a sense of social duty or obligation. In this juxtaposition, 
Kieślowski also plays with the notion of cutting, as he intersperses the sur-
gical incisions into Jerzy with the cutting of the bars on the window, thus 
drawing a crucial ironic association between that which is truly, physically 
vital ( Jerzy’s kidney) and that which only seems vital (the stamp collection 
and its abstract worth), in a cinematic conceit that Annette Insdorf has 
termed “visual rhyming.”6 The same situation, of contrivance built upon 
contrivance and lie built upon lie, is repeated throughout the fi lm.
Bergson describes this repetition as “a series of imaginary events which 
affords a tolerably fair illusion of life, and within this ever-moving se-
ries . . . one and the same scene [is] reproduced either by the same char-
acters or by different ones.” This repetition “contrasts with the changing 
stream of life,” illustrating how the fi xation with one idea (in this instance, 
covetousness) causes a repetition of the same incident (that is, someone 
being tricked and defrauded), bringing the normal progression and evolu-
tion of life to a standstill (119). This is the central device of the fi lm, where 
the humor arises from watching the characters trapped in this repetitive 
cycle. According to Bergson, the circumstances of the repetition “become 
more laughable in proportion as the scene repeated is more complex and 
more naturally introduced” (119). Similarly, in Ten, as the accumulation 
of recurrent deception and defrauding culminates in the juxtaposition of 
Jerzy’s operation (his sacrifi ce) with the robbery (the destruction of that 
for which he is making the sacrifi ce), the situation becomes more and more 
humorous, albeit in a darkly comic manner.
But it is not entirely this repetition of trickery that renders the situation 
laughable. In many of the repetitions of deception, the roles are constantly 
reversed, or as Bergson would term it, “inverted.” Inversion, the second 
method of mechanization in comedy, emerges when “you reverse the situ-
ation and invert the roles” in a kind of perfect symmetry (Bergson 121). 
Often in this fi lm, the roles are reversed; the person who thought he was 
deceiving someone or getting the better end of a certain agreement ends 
up realizing that he was the one who was deceived. As Bergson notes, “not 
infrequently comedy sets before us a character who lays a trap in which 
he is the fi rst to be caught. The plot of the villain who is the victim of his 
own villainy, or the cheat cheated, forms the stock-trade of a good many 
plays” (122). In this fi lm, the relative strength of the characters’ positions 
in relation to others is consistently inverted or reversed. For example, the 
teenager cons Jerzy’s son out of the valuable Zeppelin stamp, leaving both 
Jerzy and Artur in a less powerful and more desperately avaricious position. 
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There is a brief reversal and darkly comical element when Jerzy confronts 
the teenage hoodlum who has deceived his son, twisting the hoodlum’s 
nose until it bleeds. However, both Jerzy and Artur ultimately remain in a 
vulnerable spot when Jerzy meets with the balding stamp trader. It is only 
when Artur returns to the scene, armed with a tape recorder, that he places 
himself in the position of power, once again inverting the roles by black-
mailing the trader, who believes that he has the upper hand. The humor 
arises from the unexpectedness of the inversion that pleases and amuses 
the viewer. Interestingly, the tape recorder itself functions as a symbol of 
Bergsonian repetition, in its capacity to move backward and forward with 
mechanical exactitude.
It is also interesting to note that, in another instance of inversion, the 
only thing of signifi cant monetary value that is not subject to commodifi -
cation is the signed City Death album that Artur gives to Jerzy as a gift for 
Jerzy’s son. Obviously, since City Death appears to be a fairly popular, if 
subpar, band (at least popular enough for Artur to be recognized and to re-
ceive sexual favors because of it), such a possession would have a certain, no 
doubt signifi cant, amount of economic worth. However, it is given freely, 
as a gift, and none of the characters (neither Artur, nor Jerzy, nor Jerzy’s 
son) ever think of selling the album for fi nancial gain. Rather, for Jerzy’s 
son, this object holds signifi cance most likely beyond monetary value as 
well as forms an emotional connection with an uncle he has not seen in 
years. Not only is this a subtle inversion of the avariciousness that per-
meates the fi lm, but also, from an optimistic perspective, it can function 
as a foreshadowing of the eventual realization that both Jerzy and Artur 
experience—namely that worth is relative and that the abstract concept of 
wealth is perhaps less important than human interconnection.
Finally, after the shock of robbery has abated and both Jerzy and Artur 
witness a meeting between the three suspicious fi gures (the man to whom 
their father owned money, the teenage hoodlum, and the stamp trader) 
on the street, accompanied by two large dogs that greatly resemble the 
ultimately ineffectual guard dog Artur bought, the viewer realizes that this 
scene is the greatest inversion of all. Jerzy and Artur began the fi lm in 
possession of a tremendously valuable collection of stamps without any 
interest or knowledge of its worth, resentful of the impact that it had on 
their childhood. Now, they possess more than a fair amount of knowledge 
about stamp collecting and a signifi cant interest in their father’s stamp col-
lection, but the collection has been stolen, having wreaked havoc on their 
lives just as much in its absence as in its presence. All of the inversions and 
reversals of power that have occurred thus far are possibly part of a greater 
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stratagem, one that leads up to an inversion ending with the three villains 
benefi ting.
It is this twist to the narrative, the notion that these three characters 
are not only acquainted, but also that they may have planned this scheme 
from the moment they heard of the old man’s death, that conforms to the 
third method of comic effect, which Bergson defi nes as the “reciprocal 
interference of series” (123). As Bergson states of this method, “a situa-
tion is invariably comic when it belongs simultaneously to two altogether 
independent series of events and is capable of being interpreted in two 
entirely different meanings at the same time” (123). The meeting of the 
three fi gures is inescapably comic because, as Bergson states, “we waver 
between the possible meaning and the real” (123). When the viewer sees 
these three fi gures meet with a friendly greeting, she is left to wonder: Is 
it possible that these three have planned this from the beginning? Could 
they have really anticipated how both Artur and Jerzy would behave in this 
situation? It is certainly possible since both Artur and Jerzy have a look 
of wonder on their faces that suggests that this is their conclusion—an 
interesting deduction since we have never seen Artur and the teenager 
on screen together. Did they have some off-screen acquaintance? It is not 
hard to imagine the teenager as a fan of City Death or as some sycophantic 
hanger-on. Could he have possibly been the friend who helpfully advised 
Artur to buy the exact same type of dog owned by the other two villains, 
thus allowing the robbery to run smoothly? This is speculative, but not 
without basis, since he is the only character with whom Artur is not (os-
tensibly) acquainted and yet Artur is still dumbstruck by the presence of all 
three characters. The possible meaning is that this has been an elaborate 
scheme, while the real meaning is ambiguous. We are tempted to believe 
that this has been planned, but we are only left to conjecture, since neither 
Jerzy nor Artur—nor Kieślowski himself—resolves the ambiguity of this 
scene. It is this coincidence (if it is indeed a coincidence) of the two inde-
pendent series that produces the comic effect.
After all of the repetition, inversion, and fi nally this last interference of 
independent series, the viewer might wonder: Toward what is this comedic 
mode directed? What is the point? For both Bergson and Kieślowski, these 
situations produce laughter, not merely for its own sake, but to function 
as a necessary corrective of human behavior. As Jerzy and Artur’s absent-
mindedness stimulates the mechanization so often involved in comedy, 
they grow less mindful of life. Consumed by the thought of owning (exem-
plifi ed by the City Death lyric at the beginning of the fi lm, “everything is 
yours,” which Artur himself enacts in his abandonment of his music for the 
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possibility of coarse, material gain) Artur and Jerzy invest all of their energy 
in this single pursuit. Life, in turn, stops its linear progress, and merely 
begins to unfold in repetitive ways. Inversion is simply a variation on this 
theme; the situation is the same, only the relative positions of the charac-
ters change. The interference of two independent series contains a sense 
of mechanism, almost as if certain events, like this possibly coincidental 
meeting of the three villains, are “due to the working of strings or springs” 
(Bergson 117). In this case, it is Kieślowski who purposely arranges this 
coincidence to produce the comic effect—the consequence of the mecha-
nistic repetition occasioned by Jerzy and Artur’s absent-mindedness.
Comedy, by pointing out how life’s progress toward change and fl ux is 
hindered by such absent-mindedness, plays out what the viewer thinks of as 
absurd situations, but, in doing so, essentially provides its own corrective. 
Bergson believes that “actual life is comedy just so far as it produces, in a 
natural fashion, actions of the same kind,” and “the ludicrous in an indi-
vidual character always results from some fundamental absent-mindedness 
in the person” (126–127). So the type of absent-mindedness that occurs 
in comedy could occur in life and could lead to the type of monomaniacal 
behavior that both Jerzy and Artur exhibit in this fi lm. The viewer’s ability 
to laugh at their folly, their absent-mindedness and its effects, functions as 
a preemptive corrective to such behavior for the viewer in question. She is 
forced into a state of self-refl ection, recognizing the imprudence and inhu-
man, mechanical nature of Artur and Jerzy’s behavior, implicitly agreeing 
that she would never engage in such behavior. This laughter is distinctly 
different from the laughter Artur and Jerzy enjoy at the beginning of the 
fi lm, as they mock their father’s obsession. According to Hokenson, since 
“comedy mocks the unthinking and the unbecoming,” it is “intelligent, 
refl ective laughter” that Bergson envisions as the optimal response to com-
edy. She then explains that, in Bergson’s view, “[laughter’s] bringing to 
consciousness is the only way comedy corrects manners” (57).
Kieślowski takes this Bergsonian corrective a step further, by actually 
allowing his characters to laugh at their own folly in a gesture of self-
 correction. They, along with the audience, benefi t from this corrective and 
now, as they gaze over their identical randomly assembled series of stamps 
(random in that neither Jerzy nor Artur realized that the other bought 
the same stamps, though hardly random for Kieślowski), they realize how 
foolish they have been for prizing material worth over the greater social 
values of family and connection. As they laugh, their joined foreheads sig-
nify a new sense of emotional and psychic connection, which they perhaps 
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Figure 12–2. Jerzy and Artur fi nally connect in Deca-
logue Ten.
have never had. Their laughter brings them back into self-consciousness 
as  social beings, and they grasp that they have a duty greater than the 
pursuit of their own obsessions. They have not just literally completed a 
series by serendipitously buying the same stamps but also they themselves, 
as brothers, joined now by this touching and comic revelation, complete 
a series, having reversed their father’s perverse legacy of covetousness 
( Figure 12–2).
As the City Death song closes the fi lm with “you are the only hope, the 
only light in your tunnel. Because all around you is in you. Everything is in 
you,” we discover that the corrective has worked—the song might remain 
the same, but the perspective of the characters has altered. A lyric such as 
“all around you is in you” suggests a deeper connection to the larger world, 
as we are not only a part of the world but the world is part of us. The song 
is no longer prescribing avaricious seizure of all desirable things or unapol-
ogetic hedonism; rather, it tells the viewer and the characters that a phrase 
such as “everything is yours” may be less about possession and more about 
connectedness between individuals. Artur and Jerzy laugh themselves back 
into self-consciousness, forging a new connection between them as they 
relinquish their foolish quest, clearing the path for each of them to connect 
more deeply with others.
It is this conclusion, the priority of human interconnectedness, pres-
ent in Ten, which makes it a fi tting end to The Decalogue, which is, like the 
stamps in the fi lm and Jerzy and Artur themselves, a series. Accordingly, it 
is only fair to Kieślowski to attempt to understand his implementation of 
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the Bergsonian corrective of laughter as a corrective not only for the char-
acters in Ten (as well as the audience) but also for the characters featured 
in the entire Decalogue.
The characters in the entire Decalogue are, as a whole, isolated from 
one another, closed off in their cell-like apartments, unaware of each 
other’s private dramas (the only possible exception being Zofi a’s apparent 
knowledge, in Eight, of Dorota’s situation in Two). They are all ultimately 
distracted by a particular, fi xed idea that prevents them from recognizing 
their roles in a larger context; for Krzysztof in One and Dorota in Two, it is 
the need for certainty that can only be provided by certain authorities (ei-
ther empirical reasoning or a godlike fi gure); for Janusz in Three and Anka 
in Four, it is the weight of familial responsibility counterbalanced by the 
ambiguities of their own desires; for Jacek in Five, it is the chaotic violence 
of a cruel and random universe; for Tomek and Magda in Six, it is the voy-
euristic and exhibitionistic avoidance of a real relationship; for Zofi a and 
Elżbieta in Eight, it is the specter of a past that neither can continue to ig-
nore; for Majka and Ewa in Seven, as well as Roman in Nine and both Jerzy 
and Artur in Ten, it is the possession of what is or what they feel should be 
theirs. All become so fi xated on this one particular idea that, while only 
Ten explicitly enacts the theme of repetition, the entire Decalogue itself is 
an act of repetition as these narrow attitudes, these self-obsessions persist 
in each fi lm, leaving the problem unresolved. It is only when Ten directly 
and self-referentially tackles the question of absent-minded behaviors that 
there can be a conclusion, an end to the series.
Ten, with its implicit critique of the negative (albeit humorous) effects 
of absent-minded behavior of its characters, thus also critiques the absent-
minded (or single-minded) behavior of all of characters in The Decalogue. 
Just as Jerzy and Artur fi nd themselves repeatedly experiencing the same 
situation, so too does the audience fi nd that each fi lm brings the same 
underlying confl ict: An individual (or group of individuals) is sealed in 
his or her own subjectivity, isolated from others (illustrated beautifully by 
the sequestered nature of each individual apartment) and focused on one, 
single idea that drives their actions. Ten addresses this issue and offers a 
corrective—that of laughing at the folly of one’s behavior and the subse-
quent recognition of one’s foolishness. But in this metacommentary, not 
only are the characters ( Jerzy and Artur) able to attain a level of connec-
tion and intersubjectivity, but additionally the audience, in laughing with 
Jerzy and Artur, also establishes a vital connection with them. The message 
of human connectedness transcends the text of The Decalogue, as the viewer 
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laughs herself into self-consciousness, and, one can hope, builds a richer 
and more expansive engagement with those around her.
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Barciś, Artur 77, 81, 89, 135, 147, 171, 
185, 212
Bardini, Aleksander 27, 81
Barełkowska, Maja 166
barrier 119, 150, 152–153, 155–156, 168, 
178, 197, 201 




Bergson, Henri 11, 34, 217–226, 228, 
229
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